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Abstract
The work in this dissertation investigates selected topics concerning sensor networks
which focus on solving signal detection and estimation problems. In the interest of com-
plexity reduction or to facilitate efficient distributed computation using consensus, modified
versions of the optimal hypothesis test are considered for a canonical multivariate Gaussian
problem in the first part. As the optimal test involves all possible products of observations
taken at L different times or from L different sensors, the investigations consider truncated
tests which maintain only those products involving sensors or times with indices that differ by
k or less. Such tests can provide significant complexity and storage reduction and facilitate
efficient distributed computation using a consensus algorithm provided k is much smaller
than L. The focus is on cases with a large number L of observations or sensors such that
significant efficiency results with a truncation rule, k as a function of L, which increases very
slowly with L. A key result provides sufficient conditions on truncation rules and sequences
of hypothesis testing problems which provide no loss in deflection performance, an accepted
performance measure, as L approaches infinity when compared to the optimal detector. Sev-
eral popular classes of system and process models, including observations from wide-sense
stationary limiting processes as L→ ∞ after the mean is subtracted, are employed as illus-
trative classes of examples to demonstrate the sufficient conditions are not overly restrictive.
In these examples, we find significant truncation can be employed even when we assume the
difficulty of the hypothesis testing problem scales in the least favorable manner, putting the
most stringent conditions on the truncation rule. In all the cases considered, numerical results
imply the fixed-false-alarm-rate detection probability of the truncated detector converges to
the detection probability of the optimal detector for our asymptotically optimal truncation
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in terms of deflection.
In the second part, distributed estimation of a deterministic mean-shift parameter in
additive zero-mean noise is studied when using binary quantized data in the presence of
man-in-the-middle attacks which falsify the data transmitted from sensors to the fusion cen-
ter. Several subsets of sensors are assumed to be tampered with by adversaries using different
attacks such that the compromised sensors transmit fictitious data. First, we consider the
task of identifying and categorizing the attacked sensors into different groups according to
distinct types of attacks. It is shown that increasing the number K of time samples at each
sensor and enlarging the size N of the sensor network can both ameliorate the identifica-
tion and categorization, but to different extents. As K → ∞, the attacked sensors can be
perfectly identified and categorized, while with finite but sufficiently large K, as N → ∞,
it can be shown that the fusion center can also ascertain the number of attacks and obtain
an approximate categorization with a sufficiently small percentage of sensors that are mis-
classified. Next, in order to improve the estimation performance by utilizing the attacked
observations, we consider joint estimation of the statistical description of the attacks and
the parameter to be estimated after the sensors have been well categorized. When using
the same quantization approach successfully employed without attacks, it can be shown that
the corresponding Fisher Information Matrix (FIM) is singular. To overcome this, a time-
variant quantization approach is proposed, which will provide a nonsingular FIM, provided
that K ≥ 2. Furthermore, the FIM is employed to provide necessary and sufficient conditions
under which utilizing the compromised sensors in the proposed fashion will lead to better
estimation performance when compared to approaches where the compromised sensors are
ignored.
In the last part, estimation of an unknown deterministic vector from possible nonbina-
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ry quantized sensor data is considered in the presence of spoofing attacks which alter the
data presented to several sensors. Contrary to previous work, a generalized attack model is
employed which manipulates the data using transformations with arbitrary functional forms
determined by some attack parameters whose values are unknown to the attacked system.
For the first time, necessary and sufficient conditions are provided under which the trans-
formations provide a guaranteed attack performance in terms of Cramer-Rao Bound (CRB)
regardless of the processing the estimation system employs, thus defining a highly desirable
attack. Interestingly, these conditions imply that, for any such highly desirable attack when
the attacked sensors can be perfectly identified by the estimation system, either the Fisher
Information Matrix (FIM) for jointly estimating the desired and attack parameters is singu-
lar or the attacked system is unable to improve the CRB for the desired vector parameter
through this joint estimation even though the joint FIM is nonsingular. It is shown that it
is always possible to construct such a highly desirable attack by properly employing a suffi-
ciently large dimension attack vector parameter relative to the number of quantization levels
employed, which was not observed previously. For a class of spoofing attacks, a computation-
ally efficient heuristic for the joint identification of the attacked sensors and estimation of the
desired vector parameter achieves the CRB when the sensor system can perfectly identify the
attacked sensors (a genie bound) for a sufficient number of observations in numerical tests.
3
Chapter 1
Introduction
Encouraged by the great success in applications ranging from inexpensive commercial
systems to complex military and homeland defense surveillance systems, sensor systems em-
ployed for hypothesis testing and parameter estimation have seen growing interest in recent
years. Sensor systems usually consist of a large number of dispersed sensors which execute
multiple functions such as sensing, data processing, and communication. Several fundamental
issues remain open on the topic of sensor networks focusing on signal detection and estimation
problems, especially for the cases where practical concerns are taken into account.
In practical sensor systems, the communication power of each senor is limited. Hence,
every sensor can only communicate with its neighbor sensors which are sufficiently close to it.
For widely distributed sensor systems without a fusion center, two sensors can not directly
communicate with each other when they are very far apart, and hence it is impossible to
compute the optimum test statistic if single hop communications are employed. Motivated
by this fact and recent advancement in consensus algorithms, we investigate the truncated
multivariate Gaussian hypothesis testing problem, and show that under certain conditions,
4
the truncated detector can asymptotically achieve the optimum performance. It is worth
mentioning that there are numerous applications of the truncated detector beyond sensor
systems.
Recent technological advances in coding, digital wireless communications technology and
digital electronics have lead to the dominance of digital communications using quantized data
in sensor networks. Hence, a great deal of attention has focused on parameter estimation
using quantized data. For this kind of system, the time samples are converted to quantized
data and then transmitted to the fusion center (FC) due to the communications employed at
each sensor. After collecting the quantized data from all sensors, the FC makes an estimate
of the desired parameter. However, this kind of sensor system is vulnerable to malicious
attackers. The last work in this dissertation focuses on attacked sensor systems attempting to
perform parameter estimation by using quantized data. Two classes of malicious attacks are
considered. One class of attacks are called man-in-the-middle attacks, which capture several
subsets of sensors and falsify the quantized data transmitted from the attacked sensors to
the FC. The other class of attacks are referred to as spoofing attacks, which modify the
unquantized observations of the phenomenon presented to the attacked sensors.
In the presence of malicious attacks in sensor networks, two important issues involved in
the parameter estimation are of considerable interest. One is how to identify and categorize
the attacked sensors into different groups according to distinct types of attacks. The other
one is how much gain we can obtain by making using of the data from the attacked sensor.
For the man-in-the-middle attacks, we first study the ability of the FC to identify the attacked
sensors and categorize them into different groups corresponding to distinctly different types of
attacks. We only assume that the set of unattacked sensors is a larger percentage of all sensors
than any set of identically attacked sensors to avoid ambiguity between a set of attacked and
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a set of unattacked sensors. It can be shown that increasing the number K of time samples at
each sensor and enlarging the size N of the sensor network can both improve the performance
of the identification and categorization approach, but to different extents. To be specific, the
FC is able to determine the number P of attacks in the sensor network and achieve the correct
categorization as K → ∞, while as N → ∞ with finite but sufficiently large K, it can be
shown that the FC can also ascertain P and obtain an approximate categorization with a very
small percentage of sensors that are misclassified, so small that this misclassification impacts
performance in a manner which can be tolerated. In this sense, with sufficiently many time
samples at each sensor or a sufficiently large size sensor network, the FC is able to determine
the number of attacks in the sensor network and categorize the sensors into different groups
according to distinct types of attacks perfectly or with negligibly small misclassification.
Next, we consider estimation of the desired parameter. There are two approaches: (1) ignore
the data at the attacked sensors. (2) Use the data at the attacked sensors. We can easily
take approach (1) without estimating any parameters describing the attacks. However, to
attempt to take approach (2), and potentially do better than approach (1), we will investigate
the performance of the joint estimation of the desired parameter and the unknown attack
parameters. It is shown that the Fisher Information Matrix (FIM) for jointly estimating these
parameters is singular when we apply exactly the same quantization approach typically used
for the unattacked system. Thus, it is not possible to jointly estimate the desired and attack
parameters efficiently with an estimation error that decreases with KN by employing the
same quantization approach typically used for the unattacked system. In order to overcome
the FIM singularity, a time-variant quantization approach has been proposed. The basic
idea is that each sensor divides its observation time interval into several time slots, and in
each time slot, all sensors use an identical threshold to quantize the time samples. However,
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the thresholds utilized in different time slots are distinct. We can show that as long as at
least two different thresholds have been employed, the FIM of the time-variant quantization
approach is nonsingular. Further, this FIM has been used to provide necessary and sufficient
conditions under which taking advantage of the attacked sensors in the proposed fashion will
provide better estimation performance when compared to approaches where the attacked
sensors are ignored. These results are obtained by also employing the FIM for the case where
the attacked sensors are ignored and the comparisons were made assuming both approaches
use the same set of distinct thresholds over the same different time slots to provide a fair
comparison. In the numerical results, we show that for some cases, significant improvement
in the estimation performance can be obtained by employing the proposed approach. The
focus is on binary quantization in this chapter.
Spoofing attacks on sensor networks can occur in various engineering applications. For
instance, spoofing attacks have been described for the localization problem in wireless sensor
networks. Radar and sonar systems also suffer from spoofing attack threats in practice. As
one example of a spoofing attack technique, the application of an electronic countermea-
sure (ECM), which is designed to jam or deceive the radar or sonar system, can critically
degrade the detection and estimation performance of the system. One popular technique
for the implementation of ECM employs digital radio frequency memory (DRFM) in radar
systems to manipulate the received signal and retransmit it back to confuse the victim radar
system. DRFM can mislead the estimation of the range of the target by altering the delay
in transmission of pulses, and fool the system into incorrectly estimating the velocity of the
target by introducing a Doppler shift in the retransmitted signal. Unlike previous work, a
generalized attack model is employed which manipulates the data using transformations with
arbitrary functional forms determined by some attack parameters whose values are unknown
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to the attacked system. For the first time, necessary and sufficient conditions are provid-
ed under which these transformations provide a guaranteed attack performance in terms of
Cramer-Rao bound (CRB) no matter what processing the estimation system employs, thus
defining a highly desirable attack. These conditions imply that for any such attack when
the attacked sensors can be perfectly identified by the estimation system, either the FIM for
jointly estimating the desired and attack parameters is singular or that the attacked system
is unable to improve the CRB for the desired vector parameter through this joint estimation
even though the joint FIM is nonsingular. It is shown that it is always possible to construct
such a desirable attack by properly employing a sufficiently large dimension attack vector
parameter relative to the number of quantization levels employed, which was not observed
previously. It is shown that when the attacked sensors can be perfectly identified, a spoof-
ing attack can render the attacked measurements useless in terms of reducing the CRB for
estimating the desired vector parameter if and only if it is such a desirable attack. For a
class of such desirable attacks, a computationally efficient heuristic is developed for the joint
identification of the attacked sensors and estimation of the desired vector parameter which,
in numerical tests for a sufficiently large number of observations, achieves a genie bound that
knows all the groups of identically attacked sensors. Possibly nonbinary quantizations are
considered in this chapter.
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Chapter 2
Asymptotically Optimal Truncated
Multivariate Gaussian Hypothesis
Testing with Application to
Consensus Algorithms
2.1 Introduction
Hypothesis testing for sensor networks with observations described by a multivariate
Gaussian distribution has attracted considerable attention, with applications ranging across
various engineering disciplines such as spectrum sensing in cognitive radio networks [1, 2],
multiple-input multiple-output radar detection [3–5], and more recently, fault and attack de-
tection in smart grids [6–9]. Here we consider the most general formulation of the simple
versus simple hypothesis test [10] for multivariate Gaussian observations which has numerous
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applications beyond sensor networking. Particular example application areas include quanti-
tative analysis of the economy [11], stochastic finite element analysis in civil and mechanical
engineering [12], and medical imaging [13]. Further applications are detailed in [14–16]. Let
xL = [x1, x2, ..., xL]
T represent an observed Gaussian random vector with real entries. Then
the general hypothesis testing problem can be stated as
H0 :xL ∼ N (0, I) (2.1)
H1 :xL ∼ N (µL,ΣL)
where N (v,C) denotes a multivariate Gaussian distribution with mean vector v and covari-
ance matrix C. A mild assumption is made throughout this chapter.
Assumption 1 µL and ΣL are known, and either µL 6= 0 or ΣL 6= I. The elements of
µL are finite, and the eigenvalues of ΣL are bounded by
[
ε0, ε
−1
0
]
for some positive number
ε0 < 1.
Note that, any test of H0 : xL ∼ N (µL,0,ΣL,0) versus H1 : xL ∼ N (µL,1,ΣL,1) can be
reduced to the canonical test (2.1), by subtraction and whitening to define µL = µL,1−µL,0
and ΣL = Σ
− 1
2
L,0ΣL,1Σ
− 1
2
L,0.
The optimal test statistic to minimize error probability, risk, or one of several other
criteria for the problem in (2.1) compares the log-likelihood ratio
T optL = x
T
LRLxL + 2µ
T
LΣ
−1
L xL =
L∑
i=1
L∑
j=1
xi(RL)i,jxj + 2
L∑
i=1
ζixi (2.2)
to a threshold [10], where RL
∆
=
(
I−Σ−1L
)
and µTLΣ
−1
L
∆
= [ζ1, ζ2, ..., ζL]. If L is large, the
statistic in (2.2) is difficult to compute. Even if the components of the vector xL are time
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samples available at a single location [17,18], then (2.2) requires storing the entire vector xL
which results in unreasonable storage requirements if L is large. Further the computation of
(2.2) generally requires O(L2) multiplications. On the other hand, if we were able to ignore
those terms in (2.2) which involve time samples xi and xj that are sufficiently far apart from
one another in the time sequence, thus |i − j| > k, then we compute (2.2) with a truncated
approximation as
T trL = x
T
LB
(k)
L xL + 2µ
T
LΣ
−1
L xL =
L∑
i=1
L∑
j=1
xi
(
B
(k)
L
)
i,j
xj + 2
L∑
i=1
ζixi (2.3)
where
(
B
(k)
L
)
i,j
∆
=


(RL)i,j , if |i− j| ≤ k
0, otherwise
is the truncated matrix of RL, and k is the
truncation length. We refer to the detector based on the test statistic shown in (2.3) as the
truncated detector. To compute (2.3), we need only store a very small running window of
about 2k + 1 time samples around each incoming time sample which results in considerably
lower storage requirements. The number of multiplications is also reduced to grow linearly
with L.
Analogous benefits can be gained in distributed sensor networking applications where the
entries of xL come from remotely positioned sensors and a consensus algorithm is employed.
Motivated by early ground breaking work [19, 20], deterministic [21, 22] or randomized con-
sensus algorithms [23,24], are known to be very efficient methods to compute a test statistic
while simultaneously communicating the result to every node in the network when the num-
ber of nodes is very large, even for imperfect communication channels [25–28]. For simplicity,
consider the case where the sensors are placed along a line in what is often called a linear
array. Then to compute (2.2) exactly requires collecting, at a single location, observations
11
xi and xj that may be produced at sensors which are very far apart. Collecting this infor-
mation implies large energy communications if single hop communications and centralized
processing are employed. If multiple hop communications are employed, very large delays
result and complex control is required. On the other hand, the truncated test statistic in
(2.3) can be calculated in an efficient two step procedure. In the first step, each node collects
the data from its k neighbors on each side so the i-th node can compute the inner sum of
L∑
i=1
L∑
j=1
xi
(
B
(k)
L
)
i,j
xj from (2.3). In the second step, a single consensus algorithm [21–34] is
used to simultaneously compute the outer sum along with the other added term in (2.3) as
L∑
i=1
(
xi
L∑
j=1
(
B
(k)
L
)
i,j
xj + 2ζixi
)
. The ideas extend to cases where the sensors are not located
in an array, in that we would still like to have each sensor only collect observations from its
closest neighbors in the first step and then run consensus in the second step. The recent
flurry of activity focusing on developing the theory of consensus algorithms has produced an
extremely efficient method of distributed computation of a test statistic provided the test
statistic can be expressed as a linear function of local statistics which can each be computed
using only local observations at each sensor. Test statistics which are quadratic forms like
(2.2), which appear in some of the most basic and important signal detection problems, do
not satisfy this requirement and we have not seen previous work on using consensus algo-
rithms to compute such statistics. Our truncated test provides a method for computing the
test statistic in (2.2) using consensus, motivating our study of the impact of the truncation
on detection performance.
To alleviate the multiplication and storage unit requirements without consideration of
consensus algorithm implementation, [17] and [18] have considered a special class of (2.1)
involving signal-plus-noise hypothesis testing problems in which µL = 0 and ΣL is a Toeplitz
matrix. Given these assumptions, [17] and [18] investigated using a truncated test somewhat
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similar to (2.3). However, they have shown that when the power of the signal is bounded, their
detectors have performance loss, as measured by deflection or asymptotic relative efficiency,
even as the size of the observation vector goes to infinity. In their analysis they assume the
k in (2.3) is constant with L. Here we consider employing truncation in the more general
hypothesis testing problem in (2.1), but unlike [17] and [18] we do not consider using a fixed
truncation length k as the size of the observation vector L grows. Instead, we consider a
slowly increasing function of the size of the observation vector L, denoted by k = ϕ(L). We
call the function ϕ(L), the truncation rule of the truncated detector. Since it is infeasible to
obtain a closed-form expression of the error probability of our test statistic, similar to [17]
we make use of the deflection or generalized SNR [35] [36], one of most useful performance
measures for quadratic detectors, to evaluate the detection performance of the truncated
detector (2.3). Deflection has been extensively studied and justified for problems of the
type we consider [35] [36]. In particular, in many problems of practical importance, the
test statistic which optimizes the deflection criterion is exactly the celebrated likelihood
ratio detector [36]. Please see [36] for a complete discussion of the properties of Deflection.
Here, we are primarily interested in the asymptotic (L → ∞) detection performance of the
truncated detector so we focus on the asymptotic deflection ratio (ADR) of the truncated
detector relative to the optimal detector (2.2). Sufficient conditions are given in this chapter
for a truncation rule ϕ(L) and a sequence of hypotheses tests from (2.1) which lead to no
loss in asymptotic deflection ratio of the truncated detector relative to the optimal detector.
Moreover, in contrast to the negative results in [17] and [18], we show that the sufficient
conditions are satisfied by several important classes of system and process models [37–39].
Further, our sufficient conditions shed light on how changes in the difficulty of the hypothesis
test with L will directly impact the effects of truncation. For example, if the difference
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between the parameters (0, I) and (µL,ΣL) becomes more considerable (in a way we define)
as L → ∞, generally a more severe truncation can be employed without sacrificing unity
ADR when we compare to a case where the difference between the parameters (0, I) and
(µL,ΣL) is fixed with L. Finally, the ϕ(L) satisfying our sufficient conditions are very useful
for obtaining a rough idea of how the required truncation length k must increase with L in
order to judge the required complexity.
Since the truncated test statistic in (2.3) eliminates some terms from the optimal statis-
tic which may be necessary for good detection performance, its performance can seriously
degrade for some scenarios in which the truncation is too severe. Extremely severe truncation
can even make the detection problem singular. To avoid this, the following assumption is
made throughout the chapter.
Assumption 2 As it would not make sense to consider truncated detectors, whose truncation
makes the two hypotheses indistinguishable, the truncation length k is large enough to ensure
that if µL = 0 and RL 6= 0, then the matrix B
(k)
L 6= 0.
Some comment on the use of deflection as opposed to error probability is in order here.
First, analysis using error probability would be intractable. More importantly, we employ
deflection in a very constrained manner which we believe will mask any limitations of de-
flection. Thus we attempt to find truncation rules which render the asymptotic (L → ∞)
deflection of the truncated detector and the optimal detector to be equivalent. Thus in terms
of deflection, the dropped terms are not important as L →∞. Employing deflection in this
way is intuitively appealing, moreover in all numerical examples we tried, the sufficient con-
ditions for the equivalence in terms of asymptotic deflection also ensure the equivalence in
terms of limiting error probability.
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Throughout this chapter, bold upper case letters and bold lower case letters are used to
denote matrices and column vectors respectively. The symbol I signifies the identity matrix,
while 0 and 1 stand for the all-zero and all-one column vectors respectively. The subscript of
a matrix or a column vector indicates its dimension, for example ΣL is an L-by-L matrix. The
dimensions of I, 0, and 1 are typically deducible from the context, hence are not explicitly
specified. We use ‖·‖ for the ℓ2 norm of a vector and (A)i,j for the element in the i-th row and
j-th column of the matrix A. The notation {AL} denotes the sequence {AL}
∞
L=1. Finally,
the expectation operator is denoted as E (·) and tr (A) is the trace of A.
The reminder of the chapter is organized as follows. The ADR of the truncated detector
relative to the optimal detector is investigated in Section 2.2. Sufficient conditions for unity
ADR are developed in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 discusses some illustrative hypothesis testing
problems using important classes of system and process models and provides slowly increasing
truncation rules which satisfy the sufficient conditions. Section 2.5 demonstrates how to apply
a two-step consensus algorithm to compute the truncated test statistic in (2.3) at each sensor.
In Section 2.6, several numerical results are provided to illustrate our theoretical analysis. In
Section 2.7, we extend our results to spatially and temporally correlated Gaussian hypothesis
testing problems and present the corresponding sufficient conditions. Finally, Section 2.8
provides our conclusions.
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2.2 Asymptotic Deflection Ratio of the Truncated Detector
relative to the Optimal Detector
For a binary hypothesis testing problem like (2.1), the deflection or generalized SNR
[35], [36] of a quadratic test statistic T is defined by
D(T ) =
[E (T |H1)− E (T |H0)]
2
E (T 2| H0)− [E (T |H0)]
2 . (2.4)
For the optimal test statistic T optL in (2.2) for the problem in (2.1), we can obtain
E
(
T optL
∣∣∣H1) = L∑
i,j=1
(RL)i,jE (xjxi|H1) + 2µ
T
LΣ
−1
L E (xL|H1) = tr (RLΣL) + 2µ
T
LΣ
−1
L µL
(2.5)
and since H0 is H1 with µL = 0 and ΣL = I, we have
E
(
T optL
∣∣∣H0) = tr (RL) . (2.6)
Since
(
T optL
)2
=
(
xTLRLxL + 2µ
T
LΣ
−1
L xL
)2
(2.7)
=
L∑
i,j,l,m=1
(RL)i,j(RL)l,mxixjxlxm + 4
L∑
i,j,l=1
ζl(RL)i,jxixjxl + 4µ
T
LΣ
−1
L xLx
T
LΣ
−1
L µL
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we have
E
((
T optL
)2∣∣∣∣H0
)
= E
(
L∑
i,j,l,m=1
(RL)i,j(RL)l,mxixjxlxm + 4
L∑
i,j,l=1
ζl(RL)i,jxixjxl
+ 4µTLΣ
−1
L xLx
T
LΣ
−1
L µL
∣∣∣∣H0
)
=
L∑
i,j,l,m=1
(RL)i,j(RL)l,m (Ii,jIl,m + Ii,lIj,m + Ii,mIj,l) + 4µ
T
LΣ
−1
L IΣ
−1
L µL
(2.8)
= [tr (RL)]
2 + 2tr
(
R2L
)
+ 4µTLΣ
−2
L µL (2.9)
where (2.8) is a consequence of Isserlis’ theorem [40], and (2.9) is based on the result that
tr(AB) =
∑
i
∑
j
Ai,jBj,i.
As a result, the deflection of T optL can now be given by
D(T optL ) =
[
E
(
T optL
∣∣∣H1)− E(T optL ∣∣∣H0)]2
E
((
T optL
)2∣∣∣∣H0
)
−
[
E
(
T optL
∣∣∣H0)]2 (2.10)
=
[
tr (RLΣL −RL) + 2µ
T
LΣ
−1
L µL
]2
2tr
(
R2L
)
+ 4µTLΣ
−2
L µL
.
Similarly, for the truncated test statistic T trL with truncation matrix B
(ϕ(L))
L , we can
obtain
D(T trL ) =
[
E
(
T trL
∣∣H1)− E (T trL ∣∣H0)]2
E
((
T trL
)2∣∣∣H0)− [E (T trL ∣∣H0)]2 (2.11)
=
[
tr
(
B
(ϕ(L))
L ΣL −B
(ϕ(L))
L
)
+ 2µTLΣ
−1
L µL
]2
2tr
[(
B
(ϕ(L))
L
)2]
+ 4µTLΣ
−2
L µL
.
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Now, consider the sequence of optimal test statistics
{
T optL
}
in (2.2) for the sequence of
tests in (2.1) with {ΣL}, and the sequence of truncated test statistics
{
T trL
}
in (2.3) for the
same problem using
{
B
(ϕ(L))
L
}
. By (2.10) and (2.11), the asymptotic deflection ratio of the
truncated detector relative to the optimal detector is therefore
Λ(T tr∞, T
opt
∞ )
∆
= lim
L→∞
tr
(
R2L
)
+ 2µTLΣ
−2
L µL
tr
[(
B
(ϕ(L))
L
)2]
+ 2µTLΣ
−2
L µL

tr
(
B
(ϕ(L))
L ΣL −B
(ϕ(L))
L
)
+ 2µTLΣ
−1
L µL
tr (RLΣL −RL) + 2µTLΣ
−1
L µL


2
(2.12)
= lim
L→∞
(
1 +
δ
(ϕ(L))
1 (L)
ψ
(ϕ(L))
1 (L)
)(
1−
δ
(ϕ(L))
2 (L)
ψ2 (L)
)2
where
δ
(ϕ(L))
1 (L)
∆
= tr
(
R2L
)
− tr
[(
B
(ϕ(L))
L
)2]
(2.13)
δ
(ϕ(L))
2 (L)
∆
= tr
[(
RL −B
(ϕ(L))
L
)
(ΣL − I)
]
(2.14)
ψ
(ϕ(L))
1 (L)
∆
= tr
[(
B
(ϕ(L))
L
)2]
+ 2µTLΣ
−2
L µL (2.15)
and
ψ2 (L)
∆
= tr (RLΣL −RL) + 2µ
T
LΣ
−1
L µL. (2.16)
2.2.1 Upper Bounds and Lower Bounds on (2.13)-(2.16)
In order to describe sufficient conditions for Λ(T tr∞, T
opt∞ ) → 1, some upper and lower
bounds on the quantities in (2.13)-(2.16) are useful. First consider lower bounds on ψ
(ϕ(L))
1 (L)
and ψ2 (L).
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Lemma 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2,
ψ
(ϕ(L))
1 (L) ≥ C1 (2.17)
and
ψ2 (L) ≥ C2 (2.18)
where C1 > 0 and C2 > 0 are constants.
Proof: [Proof of Lemma 1] Even without Assumption 2, we have tr
[(
B
(ϕ(L))
L
)2]
≥ 0
and µTLΣ
−2
L µL ≥ 0. If µL 6= 0, then for any non-zero element of the µL, say µL,j which is
assumed to be the j-th element of µL, we have
ψ
(ϕ(L))
1 (L) = tr
[(
B
(ϕ(L))
L
)2]
+ 2µTΣ−2L µ ≥ 2
(
Σ−2L
)
j,j
µ2L,j > 0 (2.19)
therefore we can choose C1 = 2
(
Σ−2L
)
i,i
µ2L,j.
Otherwise, we must have B
(ϕ(L))
L 6= 0 according to Assumption 2. Then for any non-zero
entry of B
(ϕ(L))
L , say
(
B
(ϕ(L))
L
)
i,j
, we can obtain
ψ
(ϕ(L))
1 (L)
∆
= tr
[(
B
(ϕ(L))
L
)2]
+ 2µTLΣ
−2
L µL ≥
[(
B
(ϕ(L))
L
)
i,j
]2
> 0 (2.20)
thus, C1 =
[(
B
(ϕ(L))
L
)
i,j
]2
.
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On the other hand since RL = I−Σ
−1
L , we note that
ψ2 (L) = tr (RLΣL −RL) + 2µ
T
LΣ
−1
L µL = tr
[
ΣL +Σ
−1
L − 2I
]
+ 2µTLΣ
−1
L µL (2.21)
=
L∑
i=1
(
λi +
1
λi
− 2
)
+ 2µTLΣ
−1
L µL
where λi is the i-th eigenvalue of ΣL.
Since the minimum of
(
λi +
1
λi
− 2
)
occurs at λi = 1,
(
λi +
1
λi
− 2
)
must be non-
negative. If µL 6= 0, then by the same argument for ψ
(ϕ(L))
1 (L), we know ψ2 (L) ≥ C2 for
some positive constant C2. Otherwise, according to Assumption 1, we have ΣL 6= I. Thus,
there exists at least one eigenvalue of ΣL which is not equal to 1, say λj. Then we can obtain
ψ2 (L) =
L∑
i=1
(
λi +
1
λi
− 2
)
+ 2µTLΣ
−1
L µL ≥
(
λj +
1
λj
− 2
)
> 0 (2.22)
hence C2 =
(
λj +
1
λj
− 2
)
.
Using (2.13) and (2.14), we next describe upper bounds on the absolute values of
δ
(ϕ(L))
1 (L) and δ
(ϕ(L))
2 (L). The upper bounds are determined by both the size of the ob-
servation vector and the truncation length.
Lemma 2 Under Assumption 1, consider a truncated detector with truncation rule ϕ(L) for
the hypothesis testing problem (2.1) where L denotes the size of the observation vector. Upper
bounds on the absolute values of δ
(ϕ(L))
1 (L) and δ
(ϕ(L))
2 (L) are given by
∣∣∣δ(ϕ(L))1 (L)∣∣∣ ≤ LΩ(ϕ(L))ΣL (2.23)
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and ∣∣∣δ(ϕ(L))2 (L)∣∣∣ ≤ 1ε0L
[
Ω
(ϕ(L))
ΣL
] 1
2
(2.24)
where Ω
(ϕ(L))
ΣL
is defined by
Ω
(ϕ(L))
ΣL
∆
= max
i
∑
j:|j−i|≥ϕ(L)+1
[(
Σ−1L
)
i,j
]2
, (2.25)
which is related to the part of the inverse covariance matrix that is not accounted for in the
truncation rule ϕ(L).
Proof: [Proof of Lemma 2] Inserting tr
(
RLB
(ϕ(L))
L
)
= tr
[(
B
(ϕ(L))
L
)2]
into (2.13), we
can obtain
δ
(ϕ(L))
1 (L) = tr
[
R2L −
(
B
(ϕ(L))
L
)2]
= tr
(
RL −B
(ϕ(L))
L
)2
=
L∑
i=1
∑
j:|j−i|≥ϕ(L)+1
[(
Σ−1L
)
i,j
]2
(2.26)
which implies
∣∣∣δ(ϕ(L))1 (L)∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
L∑
i=1
∑
j:|j−i|≥ϕ(L)+1
[(
Σ−1L
)
i,j
]2∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ LΩ(ϕ(L))ΣL . (2.27)
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Further, noting that tr
(
RL −B
(ϕ(L))
L
)
= 0 and applying the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality
[41] to (2.14), yields
[
δ
(ϕ(L))
2 (L)
]2
=
{
tr
[(
RL −B
(ϕ(L))
L
)
(ΣL − I)
]}2
=
{
tr
[(
RL −B
(ϕ(L))
L
)
ΣL
]}2
(2.28)
≤ tr
[(
RL −B
(ϕ(L))
L
)2]
tr
(
Σ2L
)
≤
1
ε20
L2

max
i
∑
j:|j−i|≥ϕ(L)+1
[(
Σ−1L
)
i,j
]2
=
1
ε20
L2Ω
(ϕ(L))
ΣL
by employing (2.25) and Assumption 1.
Hence, the upper bound on
∣∣∣δ(ϕ(L))2 (L)∣∣∣ can be expressed as
∣∣∣δ(ϕ(L))2 (L)∣∣∣ ≤ 1ε0L
[
Ω
(ϕ(L))
ΣL
] 1
2
. (2.29)
2.3 Sufficient Conditions for Unity ADR
Let ν denote a positive small constant, such that 0 < ν ≪ 1. Define ξ (L)
∆
=
L∑
i=1
1 (|µL,i| ≥ ν)
and η (L)
∆
=
L∑
i=1
1 (|λi − 1| ≥ ν), where 1 (·) is the indicator function and µL,i is the i-th ele-
ment of µL. As a result, ξ (L) describes the number of elements in µL which are sufficiently
different from zero, and η (L) represents the number of eigenvalues ofΣL which are sufficiently
different from unity.
Lemma 3 Considering the hypothesis testing problem (2.1), we can always choose a constant
ν such that
ξ (L) > 0, or η (L) > 0. (2.30)
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Proof: Suppose there is no number ν which can render ξ (L) or η (L) non-zero for some
L. Then we have 

µL,i = 0
λi = 1
for i = 1, 2, ..., L (2.31)
Since ΣL is a symmetric matrix, it can be diagonalized by the eigendecomposition
ΣL = QTQ
T (2.32)
where Q is an orthogonal matrix, and T is a diagonal matrix with λi on the diagonal.
Hence, we get the contradiction that µL = 0 and ΣL = QTQ
T = I, which implies the
two hypotheses in (2.1) are indistinguishable. This completes the proof.
Next, we develop sufficient conditions for unity ADR.
Lemma 4 The ADR of the truncated detector with truncation rule ϕ(L) relative to the op-
timal detector converges to unity if and only if


lim
L→∞
δ
(ϕ(L))
1 (L)
ψ
(ϕ(L))
1 (L)
= 0
lim
L→∞
δ
(ϕ(L))
2 (L)
ψ2(L)
= 0
. (2.33)
Hence, a sufficient condition for (2.33) is that upper bounds on
∣∣∣∣ δ(ϕ(L))1 (L)ψ(ϕ(L))1 (L)
∣∣∣∣ and
∣∣∣∣ δ(ϕ(L))2 (L)ψ2(L)
∣∣∣∣
decrease to 0, as the size of the observation vector L increases to infinity.
Since Lemma 4 is straightforward from (2.12), the proof is omitted.
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Before proceeding, it is important to define a family of sequences, as it will play a
significant role in our analysis. Using (2.25), let
U (ϕ)
∆
=
{
{ΣL}
∣∣∣∣ limL→∞ω (L)Ω(ϕ(L))ΣL = 0
}
(2.34)
describe the family of all sequences of {ΣL} with the stated limit, where
ω (L)
∆
=


ω1 (L) = max
{
L, L
2
η2(L)
}
,
if ξ (L) = 0 and η (L) > 0
ω2 (L) = max
{
L
ξ(L) , L
2[2ε0 (1 + ν) ξ (L) + η (L)]
−2
}
,
if ξ (L) > 0 and η (L) ≥ 0
(2.35)
and ε0 was defined in Assumption 1.
We now give a Theorem providing sufficient conditions, under which the ADR converges
to unity.
Theorem 1 Given a sequence of covariance matrices {ΣL} in (2.1) which satisfy Assump-
tions 1 and 2 and a sequence of truncated test statistics
{
T trL
}
in (2.3) with truncation rule
ϕ0(L), sufficient conditions for Λ(T
tr∞, T
opt∞ ) = 1 are
{ΣL} ∈ U(ϕ0). (2.36)
If a given ϕ0(L) satisfies (2.36), then it follows that any truncation rule ϕ(L), which satisfies
lim
L→∞
ϕ(L)
ϕ0(L)
≥ 1, will also provide Λ(T tr∞, T
opt∞ ) = 1.
Proof: [Proof of Theorem 1] Let’s first deduce upper bounds on
∣∣∣∣ δ(ϕ(L))1 (L)ψ(ϕ(L))1 (L)
∣∣∣∣ and
∣∣∣∣ δ(ϕ(L))2 (L)ψ2(L)
∣∣∣∣
respectively for the two situations enumerated in (2.35).
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For the situation that ξ (L) = 0 and η (L) > 0, by (2.21), we can obtain
ψ2 (L) =
L∑
i=1
(
λi +
1
λi
− 2
)
+ 2µTLΣ
−1
L µL
≥
L∑
i=1
(
λi +
1
λi
− 2
)
≥
(
1 + ν +
1
1 + ν
− 2
)
η (L) =
ν2
1 + ν
η (L) . (2.37)
Consequently, (2.23), (2.24), (2.37) and Lemma 1 yield the upper bounds on
∣∣∣∣ δ(ϕ(L))1 (L)ψ(ϕ(L))1 (L)
∣∣∣∣
and
∣∣∣∣ δ(ϕ(L))2 (L)ψ2(L)
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ δ
(ϕ(L))
1 (L)
ψ
(ϕ(L))
1 (L)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1C1LΩ(ϕ(L))ΣL (2.38)∣∣∣∣∣δ
(ϕ(L))
2 (L)
ψ2 (L)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
1
ε0
L
[
Ω
(ϕ(L))
ΣL
] 1
2
ν2
1+ν η (L)
=
1 + ν
ε0ν
2
[
L2
η2 (L)
Ω
(ϕ(L))
ΣL
] 1
2
(2.39)
where C1 was defined in Lemma 1.
For the situation that ξ (L) > 0 and η (L) ≥ 0, the corresponding lower bound on
ψ
(ϕ(L))
1 (L) is obtained from (2.15) as
ψ
(ϕ(L))
1 (L) = tr
[(
B
(ϕ(L))
L
)2]
+ 2µTLΣ
−2
L µL ≥ 2µ
T
LΣ
−2
L µL ≥ 2ε
2
0µ
T
LµL ≥ 2ε
2
0ν
2ξ (L) . (2.40)
Similarly, we have
ψ2 (L) =
L∑
i=1
(
λi +
1
λi
− 2
)
+ 2µTLΣ
−1
L µL ≥
ν2
1 + ν
η (L) + 2ε0ν
2ξ (L) . (2.41)
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Hence, the corresponding upper bounds on
∣∣∣∣ δ(ϕ(L))1 (L)ψ(ϕ(L))1 (L)
∣∣∣∣ and
∣∣∣∣ δ(ϕ(L))2 (L)ψ2(L)
∣∣∣∣ for this situation
can be expressed as
∣∣∣∣∣ δ
(ϕ(L))
1 (L)
ψ
(ϕ(L))
1 (L)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 12ε20ν2
LΩ
(ϕ(L))
ΣL
ξ (L)
(2.42)
∣∣∣∣∣δ
(ϕ(L))
2 (L)
ψ2 (L)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
1
ε0
L
[
Ω
(ϕ(L))
ΣL
] 1
2
ν2
1+ν η (L) + 2ε0ν
2ξ (L)
=
1 + ν
ε0ν
2
{
L2
[2ε0 (1 + ν) ξ (L) + η (L)]
2Ω
(ϕ(L))
ΣL
} 1
2
.
(2.43)
Taking into account the upper bounds on
∣∣∣∣ δ(ϕ(L))1 (L)ψ(ϕ(L))1 (L)
∣∣∣∣ and
∣∣∣∣ δ(ϕ(L))2 (L)ψ2(L)
∣∣∣∣ for the different
situations, the conclusion that the ADR converges to unity follows from (2.36) and Lemma
4.
From (2.25), we can see that Ω
(ϕ(L))
ΣL
is a nonnegative decreasing function of truncation
length. Thus, if {ΣL} ∈ U (ϕ0) and lim
L→∞
ϕ(L)
ϕ0(L)
≥ 1, then
0 ≤ lim
L→∞
ω (L)Ω
(ϕ(L))
ΣL
≤ lim
L→∞
ω (L)Ω
(ϕ0(L))
ΣL
= 0 (2.44)
and hence, {ΣL} ∈ U (ϕ). This completes the proof.
Since 0 ≤ ξ (L) , η (L) ≤ L, then (2.35) implies that ω (L) is a non-decreasing function of
L. Therefore, in order to satisfy the limit in (2.34), Ω
(ϕ(L))
ΣL
should be a decreasing function
of L with a decay rate larger than the rate of increase of ω (L). Furthermore, we can see that
the growth rates of ω1 (L) and ω2 (L) with L are smaller or equal to L
2, with equality if and
only if ξ (L) and η (L) do not grow with L which describes the least favorable situation that
the difficulty of the hypothesis testing problem does not reduce as L increases. Hence, the
sufficient conditions in (2.36) involve the smallest set of solutions when ω (L) = L2 and we
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call them the strongest sufficient conditions. In other words, if {ΣL} satisfies the sufficient
conditions in (2.36) with ω (L) = L2, then {ΣL} satisfies the sufficient conditions for the
other cases as well. Moreover, as (2.35) shows, ξ (L) and η (L) impact the rate of increase of
ω (L) differently. For instance, if ξ (L) = L and η (L) = 0, then the rate of increase of ω (L) is
0, while ω (L) is proportional to L when ξ (L) = 0 and η (L) = L. This seems consistent with
our intuition that the shift in mean testing problems considered in (2.35) are often easier
when compared to the change in covariance matrix testing problems (2.35) considers. The
next section provides analysis for some specific well-accepted classes of models.
2.4 Illustrative Classes of Problems
The previous section reveals that if the sequence of covariance matrices {ΣL} under
hypothesis H1 is contained in U(ϕ) for some ϕ, we can employ a truncated detector instead
of the optimal detector without performance loss when the size of the observation vector L
increases to infinity. We notice that the sufficient conditions described by U(ϕ) in (2.34)
are not expressed directly in terms of {ΣL}, but on
{
Σ−1L
}
. Thus, the structure of the
required {ΣL} is not apparent. Nevertheless, we have found that the sufficient conditions
are satisfied by several important classes of system and process models [17, 18, 37–39] with
reasonable regularity conditions, provided an adequate truncation rule ϕ(L) is chosen. We
consider two well-accepted classes of models, which have been studied extensively in previous
research projects, and elucidate that for these models, the performance of the truncated
detector is asymptotically equivalent to that of the optimal untruncated detector for specific
ϕ(L) which increase slowly compared to L. In this section, we will just consider the strongest
sufficient conditions, i.e. U (ϕ) with ω (L) = L2, and provide a ϕ(L) which renders the
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strongest sufficient conditions satisfied for the models. Following the same procedure, the
corresponding results for the weaker sufficient conditions can be similarly obtained.
2.4.1 ΣL with Banded Structure
One general class of practical models is based on the following assumption.
Assumption 3 For a sequence of observations under hypothesis H1, each observation is only
correlated to its neighbors with sufficiently close indices. For these sort of practical models,
the covariance matrix ΣL is a banded matrix with fixed bandwidth m. That is to say, for
some m < L, (ΣL)i,j = 0, ∀ |i− j| >
m
2 .
For spatial signals, Assumption 3 models the situation that an observation taken at a
given sensor is only correlated with observations from the sensors which are sufficiently close
to it. A similar signal model has been employed for temporal signals, which deems that two
observations are correlated only if the time interval between these two observations is not too
long.
Generally, the inverse of a banded matrix is not banded. However the following well-
known inequality for the inverse of a positive definite banded matrix from [42] will be useful
in our analysis.
Lemma 5 Let A be a positive definite banded matrix with band-width m, i.e. Ai,j = 0 if
|i− j| > m2 . Let [a, b] be the smallest interval containing the spectrum of A. Set r =
b
a ,
q =
√
r−1√
r+1
, D0 =
(1+
√
r)
2
2ar , and γ = q
2
m . Then we have
∣∣∣(A−1)i,j∣∣∣ ≤ Dγ|i−j| (2.45)
where D = max{a−1,D0}.
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Using Assumption 3 and Lemma 5, we give the following theorem.
Theorem 2 As per (2.1), let ΣL denote the covariance matrix of the observations under
hypothesis H1 for a given L and consider the strongest sufficient conditions in (2.34) (ω (L) =
L2 in (2.35)). Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, {ΣL} ∈ U(ϕ0) for ϕ0(L) =
⌈
1+κ
lnγ−1 lnL
⌉
, where
κ is an arbitrary small positive constant and γ =
(
1−ε0
1+ε0
) 2
m
. Thus, the ADR of the truncated
detector relative to the optimal detector converges to 1. Note that any other truncation rule
ϕ(L) such that lim
L→∞
ϕ(L)
ϕ0(L)
≥ 1, will also provide unity ADR.
Proof: [Proof of Theorem 2] By Lemma 5, we have
∣∣∣(Σ−1L )i,j∣∣∣ ≤ Dγ|i−j| (2.46)
where γ =
(
1−ε0
1+ε0
) 2
m
< 1 and D = max
{
ε−10 ,
(1+ε0)
2
2ε0
}
are constants.
Employing ω (L) = L2 and ϕ0(L) =
⌈
1+κ
ln γ−1 lnL
⌉
, the condition in (2.36) becomes
L2Ω
(ϕ0(L))
ΣL
= L2max
i
∑
j:|j−i|≥ϕ0(L)+1
∣∣∣(Σ−1L )i,j∣∣∣2 ≤ L2maxi ∑
j:|j−i|≥ϕ0(L)+1
D2γ2|i−j| (2.47)
≤ 2L2
L−1∑
l=ϕ0(L)+1
D2γ2l = 2L2D2
[
1− γ2(L−ϕ0(L)−1)
]
1− γ2
γ2(ϕ0(L)+1)
≤
2D2
1− γ2
L2γ2ϕ0(L) ≤
2D2
1− γ2
1
L2κ
.
Since 2D
2
1−γ2 and κ are positive constants, and Ω
(ϕ(L))
Σ
is a nonnegative function, as L
increases to infinity, we have
0 ≤ lim
L→∞
L2Ω
(ϕ(L))
Σ
≤ lim
L→∞
2D2
1− γ2
1
L2κ
= 0. (2.48)
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We therefore have proved that {ΣL} ∈ U (ϕ0) for ϕ0(L) =
⌈
1+κ
lnγ−1
lnL
⌉
, and hence the
proof of the theorem is complete by applying Theorem 1.
Note that ϕ0(L) =
⌈
1+κ
lnγ−1
lnL
⌉
increases much slower than L, but Theorem 2 demon-
strates that its deflection performance is asymptotically equivalent to that of the optimal de-
tector. This significant advantage of the truncated detector can provide underlying benefits
in implementation in realistic problems. Furthermore, since we take the strongest sufficient
conditions into account here, we can expect that the truncated detector with some truncation
rule ϕ(L), whose rate of increase is even slower than ϕ0(L), can also achieve unity ADR if
ξ (L) or η (L) grow with L.
2.4.2 Wide-Sense Stationary Limiting Models after the Mean is Subtract-
ed
The other general class of practical models under consideration is based on the assump-
tion below.
Assumption 4 Assume that as L→∞, xL−µL approaches a wide-sense stationary random
process with power spectral density S (f) under hypothesis H1. Let S
(m) (f) denote the m-
th derivative of S (f). We assume that S(f) is bounded away from 0 and ∞, that is to
say, 0 < ε ≤ S(f) ≤ ε−1 for some ε, and
∥∥S(m)(f)∥∥∞ ≤ C for some m > 1, where
‖S (f)‖∞
∆
= sup
f∈(− 12 , 12)
|S (f)|.
Note that Assumption 4 does not impose any restriction on µL. Due to this, the class of
limiting processes defined by Assumption 4 includes some that are not wide-sense stationary.
The part of Assumption 4 requiring 0 < ε ≤ S(f) ≤ ε−1 for some ε is similar to our previous
Assumption 1 that the eigenvalues of ΣL are bounded by
[
ε0, ε
−1
0
]
, since it is known from [43]
30
that the largest and smallest eigenvalues of ΣL in the limit follow lim
L→∞
λmax = sup
f
S(f) and
lim
L→∞
λmin = inf
f
S(f), where λmax and λmin denote the largest and smallest eigenvalues of ΣL
respectively.
Before investigating the performance of the truncated detector applied to this class of
problems, we first introduce a lemma on the asymptotic behavior of the inverses of covariance
matrices of wide-sense stationary processes described above. Some similar results can also
be found in [44].
Lemma 6 Define r˜(i−j) =
(
Σ−1L
)
i,j
. Under Assumption 4, S˜ (f) =
∞∑
t=−∞
r˜(t)e−i2pift = 1S(f)
and Σ−1L is asymptotically a symmetric Toeplitz matrix.
Proof: Suppose Σ−1L is a symmetric Toeplitz matrix when L → ∞. Let r (i− j)
and r˜ (i− j) denote (ΣL)i,j and
(
Σ−1L
)
i,j
respectively, and let S (f) =
∞∑
t=−∞
r(t)e−i2pift and
S˜ (f) =
∞∑
t=−∞
r˜(t)e−i2pift as L→∞.
Using the expression ΣLΣ
−1
L = I, we obtain the following equations
Ik,l =
∞∑
i=−∞
r(k − i)r˜(i− l) (2.49)
=
∞∑
i=−∞
r(k − l − i)r˜(i).
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Hence, we have
S(f)S˜(f) =
∞∑
t=−∞
r(t)e−i2pift
∞∑
k=−∞
r˜(k)e−i2pifk (2.50)
=
∞∑
t=−∞
∞∑
k=−∞
r(t)r˜(k)e−i2pif(k+t)
=
∞∑
l=−∞
[ ∞∑
k=−∞
r(l − k)r˜(k)
]
e−i2pifl
= 1
Since S(f) is bounded by
[
ε, ε−1
]
, we immediately have S˜(f) = 1S(f) , and we can calcu-
late r˜(t) =
1/2∫
−1/2
S˜(f)ei2piftdf which implies Σ−1L is a symmetric Toeplitz matrix when L→∞
as assumed. By the uniqueness of the inverse of ΣL, Σ
−1
L is a symmetric Toeplitz matrix.
The following theorem addresses the asymptotic equivalence of the truncated detector
to the optimal detector in terms of deflection.
Theorem 3 Consider the strongest sufficient conditions in (2.34) (ω (L) = L2 in (2.35)).
Given a sequence of covariance matrices {ΣL} in (2.1) satisfying Assumptions 1, 2 and
4, {ΣL} ∈ U(ϕ0) for ϕ0(L) =
⌈
L
2+α
2m−1
⌉
, where α is an arbitrary small positive constant.
Consequently, the ADR of the truncated detector with ϕ0(L) relative to the optimal detector
converges to unity. Note that any other ϕ(L) such that lim
L→∞
ϕ(L)
ϕ0(L)
≥ 1, will also provide unity
ADR.
Proof: [Proof of Theorem 3] Under Assumption 4, S(f) is bounded by
[
ε, ε−1
]
for some
ε > 0 and
∥∥S(m)(f)∥∥∞ ≤ C for some m > 1. Therefore by Lemma 6, S˜(f) is also bounded
by
[
ε, ε−1
]
and
∥∥∥S˜(m)(f)∥∥∥
∞
≤ C˜, where C˜ is a constant.
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Let r˜(i− j) =
(
Σ−1L
)
i,j
. Since r˜(t) = r˜(−t) with r˜(t) and S˜(f) a Fourier transform pair,
we can obtain
S˜(2l)(f) = S˜(2l)(−f) (2.51)
S˜(2l+1)
(
1
2
)
= S˜(2l+1)
(
−
1
2
)
= 0. (2.52)
Thus, utilizing integration by parts, we can obtain the following upper bound on |r˜(t)|
|r˜(t)| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1/2∫
−1/2
S˜(f)ei2piftdf
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1/2∫
−1/2
S˜(m)(f)
(i2πt)m
ei2piftdf
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ (2.53)
≤
∥∥∥S˜(m)(f)∥∥∥
∞
1
(2πt)m
1/2∫
−1/2
∣∣∣∣ei2piftim
∣∣∣∣ df ≤ C˜(2πt)m .
As a result, for ω (L) = L2 and ϕ0(L) =
⌈
L
2+α
2m−1
⌉
, the condition in (2.36) becomes
0 ≤ lim
L→∞
L2Ω
(ϕ0(L))
ΣL
= lim
L→∞
L2max
i
∑
j:|j−i|≥ϕ0(L)+1
|r˜(i− j)|2 (2.54)
≤ lim
L→∞
2L2
L−1∑
t≥ϕ0(L)+1
|r˜(t)|2 ≤ lim
L→∞
2L2
L−1∑
t≥ϕ0(L)+1
C˜2
(2πt)2m
≤ lim
L→∞
2C˜2L2
(2m− 1)(2π)2m
{
1
[ϕ0(L)]
2m−1 −
1
(L− 2)2m−1
}
(2.55)
≤ lim
L→∞
2C˜2L2
(2m− 1)(2π)2m
1
[ϕ0(L)]
2m−1
≤ lim
L→∞
2C˜2
(2m− 1)(2π)2m
1
Lα
= 0
where (2.55) is obtained by using an integral to bound the sum.
Consequently, it is clear that {ΣL} ∈ U(ϕ0) for ϕ0(L) =
⌈
L
2+α
2m−1
⌉
.
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Invoking Theorem 1 again, we conclude the proof. Thus when we employ the truncated
detector with ϕ(L) ≥ ϕ0(L) =
⌈
L
2+α
2m−1
⌉
for the class of problems which satisfy Assumptions
1, 2 and 4, the ADR of the truncated detector relative to the optimal detector converges to
unity.
We also can see that the truncation length of the truncated detector, described by
ϕ0(L) =
⌈
L
2+α
2m−1
⌉
, increases slower than the growth of L. In addition, since the strongest
sufficient conditions are considered here, the minimum requirement for the truncation rule
can be further reduced for the problems where ξ (L) or η (L) are increasing functions of L.
Assumption 4 is satisfied by a very large class of well-studied and well-accepted wide-
sense stationary limiting models. As a particular example, we consider xL generated with
autoregressive moving average (ARMA) models.
Let {ei} denote a real sequence of independent random variables with zero mean and
variance σ2S . An ARMA(p,q) process {xi} can be defined by
xi =
p∑
l=1
φlxi−l +
q∑
t=1
θtei−t + ei. (2.56)
Accordingly, the power spectral density of the ARMA(p,q) process can be expressed as
S(f) =
σ2S
∣∣∣∣1 + q∑
t=1
θt exp (−i2πft)
∣∣∣∣2∣∣∣∣1− p∑
l=1
φl exp (−i2πfl)
∣∣∣∣2
for |f | <
1
2
. (2.57)
Thus, with appropriate {θt} and {φl}, S(f) can easily satisfy Assumption 4.
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2.5 Implementation of Consensus based Truncated Detector
In this section, we will briefly discuss how to apply a two-step consensus algorithm to
compute the truncated test statistic (2.3) with truncation rule ϕ(L) at each sensor. For
simplicity, we assume ideal communication channels.
2.5.1 Initialization of Local Statistics
Let y (t) = [y1 (t) , y2 (t) , ..., yL (t)]
T denote a vector of local statistics at time t. In this
step, each sensor collects the observations from 2ϕ(L) neighbors, and then computes the
inner sum of
L∑
i=1
L∑
j=1
xi
(
B
(ϕ(L))
L
)
i,j
xj from (2.3) as its initial local statistic. To be specific, for
the i-th sensor, its initial local statistic can be written as
yi (0) =
L∑
j=1
xi
(
B
(ϕ(L))
L
)
i,j
xj + ζixi =
∑
j:|i−j|≤ϕ(L)
xi(RL)i,jxj + ζixi (2.58)
with ζi a constant from (2.2).
2.5.2 Consensus Procedure
After initialization, a standard consensus algorithm can be applied to compute the trun-
cated test statistic (2.3). Here, we assume a synchronous time model [23], in which time
is assumed to be slotted commonly across sensors. In each slot, each sensor received its
neighbors’ local statistics and updates its own local statistic. The updating rule for the local
statistics can be expressed as
yi (t+ 1) =Wi,iyi (t) +
∑
j:|i−j|≤ϕ(L)
Wi,jyj (t) (2.59)
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where t = 1, 2, ... and Wi,j is the weight on the local statistic of the j-th sensor. Thus, the
corresponding compact vector form is
y (t+ 1) =Wy (t) =Wty (0) . (2.60)
Theorem 4 For any doubly stochastic matrix W ∈ W such that ρ
(
W − 1L11
T
)
< 1, then
we have
lim
t→∞y (t) =
1
L
T trL · 1 (2.61)
where ρ (·) denotes the spectral radius of a matrix.
The proof is provided in [21,22].
Theorem 4 demonstrates that every sensor’s local statistic converges to a scaled version
of the truncated test statistic in (2.3), and hence each sensor can make its own decision based
on its own local statistic while achieving the same performance as the truncated detector
implemented in centralized manner. Furthermore, as [21] indicates, if we just consider sym-
metric W, we can easily find the best choice of W making the consensus procedure have the
fastest speed of convergence by solving a convex problem.
It is worth mentioning that though we assumed ideal communication channels and a
deterministic weight matrix W as an example here, other consensus algorithms and their
corresponding performance analysis for non-ideal channels [25,26] or random weight matrices
[23] can be directly adopted in our two-step consensus algorithms to compute our truncated
test statistic.
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2.6 Numerical Results
To illustrate our theoretical results, here we present a few numerical examples involving
the cases studied in the previous theorems.
2.6.1 Signals with Banded Covariance Matrices
We first consider a case where ΣL is banded and the bandwidth is fixed for all L.
Our particular example assumes a stationary signal with triangular correlation. For any L,
µL = 0, and ΣL=0.025ΣL,s + I, where
(ΣL,s)i,j =


1− |i−j|20 , |i− j| < 20
0, otherwise
. (2.62)
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Figure 2.1: Deflection ratio of the truncated detector relative to the optimal detector for a
triangularly correlated signal.
Figure 2.1 shows the deflection ratios (DR) of some truncated detectors with different
ϕ(L) which all satisfy our sufficient conditions for unity ADR. The deflection ratios of the
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truncated detectors with truncation rules ϕ(L) =
⌈
L
5
⌉
− 5, ϕ(L) =
⌈
L0.6
⌉
− 7, and ϕ(L) =
⌈6 lnL⌉ − 20 are plotted in dash, solid and dot-dash curves respectively. It is seen that the
numerical results agree with our analytical prediction that ADR equals to 1. As expected,
Figure 2.1 depicts that the larger the value of ϕ(L) for a given L, the better deflection ratio
performance that the corresponding truncated detector enjoys.
Figure 2.2 shows the relationship between the deflection ratio and the ROC curve1 for
various truncated detectors when L = 1000. It is seen that larger deflection ratio implies
better performance in terms of the ROC curve in this example. Furthermore, we investigate
the detection probability of some truncated detectors with different ϕ(L) which all satisfy our
sufficient conditions for unity ADR. Figure 2.3 illustrates that as L increases, the detection
probability performance of each truncated detector converges to that of the optimal detector.
Moreover, the larger the value of ϕ(L) for large L, the faster the rate of convergence to the
optimal detector. On the other hand, Figure 2.3 also shows that as L increases, the detection
probability performance of the truncated detector with constant truncation length diverges
from that of the optimal detector.
2.6.2 Autoregressive Moving Average Models
To illustrate Theorem 3, we use an ARMA(1,1) model. In our numerical results, µL = 0
and ΣL = 0.01Σ
ARMA
L + I, where Σ
ARMA
L is the covariance matrix of the ARMA(1,1) model
with dimension L. The parameters in (2.56) are taken as φ1 = 0.8, θ1 = 0.4 and σ
2
S = 1.
Figure 2.4 shows the deflection ratios of two truncated detectors with different ϕ(L)
which both satisfy our sufficient conditions for unity ADR. We can see that the numerical
1In the ROC curve, the false alarm probability Pfa
∆
= Pr (Declare H1 |H0 is true ) and the detection proba-
bility is defined as Pd
∆
= Pr (Declare H1 |H1 is true).
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Figure 2.2: Relationship between the deflection ratio and the ROC (L=1000).
results agree with our analytical prediction that ADR equals to 1. As expected, Figure 2.4 also
depicts that the truncated detector with larger ϕ(L) has better deflection ratio performance
for that L.
Figure 2.5 shows the relationship between the deflection ratio and the ROC curve for
various truncated detectors when L = 1000. We can see from the figure that larger deflection
ratio implies better performance in terms of the ROC curve in this example also. Figure 2.6
illustrates the detection probability performance of each truncated detector. It is seen that
as L increases, the detection probability performance of the truncated detectors converges
to that of the optimal detector. Moreover, the truncated detector with larger ϕ(L) achieves
better detection probability performance. However, the difference between the the detection
probability performance of the optimal detector and that of the truncated detector with
constant truncation length becomes larger and larger as L increases.
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Figure 2.3: Detection probabilities of several truncated detectors (Pfa = 0.1).
2.7 Extension to Spatially and Temporally Correlated Gaus-
sian Observations
Then the general hypothesis testing problem for spatially and temporally correlated
Gaussian observations can be expressed as
H0 : z(K,L) ∼ N (0, I) (2.63)
H1 : z(K,L) ∼ N (µ(K,L),Σ(K,L)).
The following assumption is made in this section.
Assumption 5 µ(K,L), and Σ(K,L) are known, and either µ(K,L) 6= 0 or Σ(K,L) 6= I. The
elements of µ(K,L) are finite, and the eigenvalues of Σ(K,L) are bounded by
[
ε0, ε
−1
0
]
for some
positive number ε0 < 1.
Similar to (2.2), the optimal test statistic to minimize error probability, risk, or one of
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Figure 2.4: Deflection ratio of the truncated detector relative to the optimal detector for an
ARMA(1,1) model with φ1 = 0.8, θ1 = 0.4 and σ
2
S = 1.
several other criteria for the problem in (2.63) compares the log-likelihood ratio
T opt
(K,L)
= zT(K,L)R(K,L)z(K,L) + 2µ
T
(K,L)Σ
−1
(K,L)
z(K,L) =
K∑
i=1
K∑
j=1
uTi Dijui + 2µ
T
(K,L)Σ
−1
(K,L)
z(K,L)
(2.64)
to a threshold, where
R(K,L) = I−Σ
−1
(K,L) =


D11 D12 · · · D1K
D21 D22 · · · D2K
...
...
. . .
...
DK1 DK2 · · · DKK


(2.65)
and Dij is the (i, j)-th block of R(K,L). Since Σ(K,L) is assumed known in Assumption 5,
every Dij can be calculated beforehand. As in (2.3), our truncation rule will ignore those
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Figure 2.5: Relationship between the deflection ratio and the ROC (L=1000).
terms in (2.64) which involve ui,l and uj,m with |l−m| > ϕ(L), and hence the truncated test
statistic is
T tr(K,L) = z
T
(K,L)B
(ϕ(L))
(K,L) z(K,L)+2µ
T
(K,L)Σ
−1
(K,L)z(K,L) =
K∑
i,j=1
uTi E
(ϕ(L))
ij uj+2µ
T
(K,L)Σ
−1
(K,L)z(K,L)
(2.66)
whereB
(ϕ(L))
(K,L) is the truncated matrix of R(K,L), and the elements of the (i, j)-th block E
(ϕ(L))
ij
of B
(ϕ(L))
(K,L) can be expressed as
(
E
(ϕ(L))
ij
)
p,q
∆
=


(Dij)p,q, if |p− q| ≤ ϕ(L)
0, otherwise
.
Consider the following generalization of Assumption 2.
Assumption 6 As it would not make sense to consider truncated detectors whose truncation
makes the two hypotheses indistinguishable, the truncation rule ϕ(L) is required to ensure that
if µ(K,L) = 0 and R(K,L) 6= 0, then the matrix B
(ϕ(L))
(K,L) 6= 0.
By (2.64) and (2.66), as the number of sensors increases to infinity, the asymptotic
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Figure 2.6: Detection probability performance of the truncated detectors (Pfa = 0.1).
deflection ratio of the truncated detector relative to the optimal detector is
Λ(T tr(K,∞), T
opt
(K,∞)) = limL→∞
tr
(
R2(K,L)
)
+ 2µT(K,L)Σ
−2
(K,L)µ(K,L)
tr
[(
B
(ϕ(L))
(K,L)
)2]
+ 2µT(K,L)Σ
−2
(K,L)µ(K,L)
(2.67)

tr
(
B
(ϕ(L))
(K,L) Σ(K,L) −B
(ϕ(L))
(K,L)
)
+ 2µT(K,L)Σ
−1
(K,L)µ(K,L)
tr
(
R(K,L)Σ(K,L) −R(K,L)
)
+ 2µT(K,L)Σ
−1
(K,L)µ(K,L)


2
= lim
L→∞
(
1 +
δ˜
(ϕ(L))
1 (L)
ψ˜
(ϕ(L))
1 (L)
)(
1−
δ˜
(ϕ(L))
2 (L)
ψ˜2 (L)
)2
where
δ˜
(ϕ(L))
1 (L)
∆
= tr
(
R2(K,L)
)
− tr
[(
B
(ϕ(L))
(K,L)
)2]
, (2.68)
ψ˜
(ϕ(L))
1 (L)
∆
= tr
[(
B
(ϕ(L))
(K,L)
)2]
+ 2µT(K,L)Σ
−2
(K,L)µ(K,L), (2.69)
δ˜
(ϕ(L))
2 (L)
∆
= tr
[(
R(K,L) −B
(ϕ(L))
(K,L)
)(
Σ(K,L) − I
)]
, (2.70)
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and
ψ˜2 (L)
∆
= tr
(
R(K,L)Σ(K,L) −R(K,L)
)
+ 2µT(K,L)Σ
−1
(K,L)µ(K,L). (2.71)
Lemma 7 Under Assumption 5, consider a truncated detector with truncation rule ϕ(L) for
the hypothesis testing problem (2.63). Upper bounds on the absolute values of δ˜
(ϕ(L))
1 (L) and
˜
δ
(ϕ(L))
2 (L) are given by ∣∣∣δ˜(ϕ(L))1 (L)∣∣∣ ≤ K2LΩ˜(ϕ(L))Σ(K,L) (2.72)
and ∣∣∣δ˜(ϕ(L))2 (L)∣∣∣ ≤ KLε0
[
Ω˜
(ϕ(L))
Σ(K,L)
]1
2
(2.73)
where Ω˜
(ϕ(L))
Σ(K,L)
is defined by
Ω˜
(ϕ(L))
Σ(K,L)
∆
= max
i,j,p
∑
q:|p−q|≥ϕ(L)+1
(
Dij
)2
p,q
. (2.74)
Proof: [Proof of Lemma 7] Noting that tr
(
R2(K,L)
)
=
K∑
i,j=1
tr
(
D2ij
)
and tr
[(
B
(ϕ(L))
(K,L)
)2]
=
K∑
i,j=1
tr
[(
E
(ϕ(L))
ij
)2]
, we can obtain
δ˜
(ϕ(L))
1 (L) = tr
(
R2(K,L)
)
− tr
[(
B
(ϕ(L))
(K,L)
)2]
=
K∑
i,j=1
tr
[
D2ij −
(
E
(ϕ(L))
ij
)2]
=
K∑
i,j=1
tr
[(
Dij −E
(ϕ(L))
ij
)2]
=
K∑
i,j=1
L∑
p=1
∑
q:|p−q|≥ϕ(L)+1
(
Dij
)2
p,q
. (2.75)
Hence, it is easy to see that
∣∣∣δ˜(ϕ(L))1 (L)∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
K∑
i,j=1
L∑
p=1
∑
q:|p−q|≥ϕ(L)+1
(
Dij
)2
p,q
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ K2LΩ˜(ϕ(L))Σ(K,L) (2.76)
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Using Assumption 5, (2.74) and the same bounding approach used in (2.28) yields
[
δ˜
(ϕ(L))
2 (L)
]2
=
{
tr
[(
R(K,L) −B
(ϕ(L))
(K,L)
)
Σ(K,L)
]}2
≤ tr
[(
R(K,L) −B
(ϕ(L))
(K,L)
)2]
tr
(
Σ2(K,L)
)
≤
L
ε20
K∑
i,j=1
tr
[(
Dij −E
(ϕ(L))
ij
)2]
≤
K2L2
ε20
Ω˜
(ϕ(L))
Σ(K,L)
, (2.77)
which implies ∣∣∣δ˜(ϕ(L))2 (L)∣∣∣ ≤ KLε0
[
Ω˜
(ϕ(L))
Σ(K,L)
] 1
2
. (2.78)
Let ν denote a positive small constant, such that 0 < ν ≪ 1. Define
ξ˜ (L)
∆
=
L∑
i=1
1
(∣∣µ(K,L),i∣∣ ≥ ν) and η˜ (L) ∆= L∑
i=1
1
(∣∣λ(K,L),i − 1∣∣ ≥ ν), (2.79)
where µ(K,L),i and λ(K,L),i are the i-th element of µ(K,L) and the i-th largest eigenvalue of
Σ(K,L) respectively. Before proceeding, define
ω˜ (L)
∆
=


max
{
L, L
2
η˜2(L)
}
, if ξ˜ (L) = 0 and η˜ (L) > 0
max
{
L
ξ˜(L)
, L2
[
2ε0 (1 + ν) ξ˜ (L) + η˜ (L)
]−2}
, if ξ˜ (L) > 0 and η˜ (L) ≥ 0
.
(2.80)
We now give a Theorem providing sufficient conditions for the general hypothesis testing
problem (2.63) with spatially and temporally correlated Gaussian observations, under which
the ADR converges to unity.
Theorem 5 Given a sequence of covariance matrices
{
Σ(K,L)
}
in (2.63) which satisfy As-
sumptions 5 and 6 and a sequence of truncated test statistics T tr(K,∞) in (2.66) with truncation
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rule ϕ0(L), sufficient conditions for Λ
(
T tr(K,∞), T
opt
(K,∞)
)
= 1 are
{
Σ(K,L)
}
∈ U˜(ϕ0), (2.81)
where U˜(ϕ0)
∆
=
{{
Σ(K,L)
} ∣∣∣∣ limL→∞ ω˜ (L) Ω˜(ϕ0(L))Σ(K,L) = 0
}
. If a given ϕ0(L) satisfies (2.81), then
it follows that any truncation rule ϕ(L), which satisfies lim
L→∞
ϕ(L)
ϕ0(L)
≥ 1, will also provide
Λ
(
T tr(K,∞), T
opt
(K,∞)
)
= 1.
Noting that K is a finite constant, the proof of Theorem 5 is very similar to that of Theorem
1. Hence, the proof is omitted here.
2.7.1 Separable Space-Time Covariance Model
The separable covariance model has been widely used in statistical modeling of space-
time observations, which assumes that the space-time covariance can be factored into the
product of a purely spatial covariance and a purely temporal covariance. Since the separable
covariance model is nicely interpretable in practical problems and can facilitate computational
procedures for large space-time observations set [45–48], we will investigate the performance
of the truncated detector based on this model in the following part.
Assumption 7 The covariance between two observations ui,l and uj,m can be expressed as
cov
(
ui,l, uj,m
)
= (ΣK)i,j(ΣL)l,m, (2.82)
where ΣK and ΣL are the purely temporal covariance matrix for a given sensor and the purely
spatial covariance matrix for a given time epoch respectively. In addition, we assume that
the eigenvalues of positive definite matrices ΣK , ΣL and Σ(K,L) are bounded by
[
ε0, ε
−1
0
]
for
46
some positive number ε0 < 1. Hence, the covariance matrix of z(K,L) can be obtained as
1
Σ(K,L) = ΣK ⊗ΣL. (2.83)
According to Assumption 7, the optimal test statistic in (2.64) can be rewritten as
T opt(K,L) = z
T
(K,L)R(K,L)z(K,L) + 2µ
T
(K,L)Σ
−1
(K,L)z(K,L) (2.84)
=
K∑
i=1
uTi
(
I− ρiiΣ
−1
L
)
ui −
K∑
i,j=1,i 6=j
ρiju
T
i Σ
−1
L uj + 2µ
T
(K,L)Σ
−1
(K,L)z(K,L),
where R(K,L)
∆
= I−Σ−1(K,L) = I−Σ
−1
K ⊗Σ
−1
L and ρij
∆
=
(
Σ−1K
)
i,j
. Furthermore, the elements
of the matrix E
(ϕ(L))
ij in (2.66) can be expressed as
(
E
(ϕ(L))
ij
)
p,q
=


ρij
(
Σ−1L
)
p,q
, if i 6= j, |p− q| ≤ ϕ(L)(
I− ρiiΣ
−1
L
)
p,q
, if i = j, |p− q| ≤ ϕ(L)
0, otherwise
. (2.85)
Lemma 8 Under Assumption 5, 6 and 7, consider a truncated detector with truncation
rule ϕ(L) for the hypothesis testing problem (2.63). Upper bounds on the absolute values of
δ˜
(ϕ(L))
1 (L) and
˜
δ
(ϕ(L))
2 (L) are given by
∣∣∣δ˜(ϕ(L))1 (L)∣∣∣ ≤ ρ2maxK2LΩ(ϕ(L))ΣL (2.86)
and ∣∣∣δ˜(ϕ(L))2 (L)∣∣∣ ≤ ρmaxKLε0
[
Ω
(ϕ(L))
ΣL
] 1
2
, (2.87)
1⊗ denotes kronecker product.
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where ρmax
∆
= max
i,j
∣∣∣ρij∣∣∣ and Ω(ϕ(L))ΣL is defined in (2.25). Thus, the sufficient conditions
described by U˜(ϕ0) in Theorem 5 can be simplified to
{
Σ(K,L)
}
∈ U∗(ϕ0)
∆
=
{{
Σ(K,L)
} ∣∣∣∣ limL→∞ ω˜ (L)Ω(ϕ0(L))ΣL = 0
}
. (2.88)
Proof: [Proof of Lemma 7] Noting that
tr
(
R2(K,L)
)
= tr
[(
I−Σ−1K ⊗Σ
−1
L
)2]
=
K∑
i=1
tr
[(
I− ρiiΣ
−1
L
)2]
+
K∑
i,j=1,i 6=j
ρ2ijtr
[(
Σ−1L
)2]
(2.89)
and
tr
[(
B
(ϕ(L))
(K,L)
)2]
=
K∑
i,j=1
tr
[(
E
(ϕ(L))
ij
)2]
, (2.90)
we can obtain
δ˜
(ϕ(L))
1 (L) = tr
(
R2(K,L)
)
− tr
[(
B
(ϕ(L))
(K,L)
)2]
=
K∑
i=1
tr
[(
I− ρiiΣ
−1
L
)2]
+
K∑
i,j=1,i 6=j
tr
[(
ρijΣ
−1
L
)2]
−
K∑
i,j=1
tr
[(
E
(ϕ(L))
ij
)2]
=
K∑
i=1
tr
[(
I− ρiiΣ
−1
L −E
(ϕ(L))
ii
)2]
+
K∑
i,j=1,i 6=j
tr
[(
ρijΣ
−1
L −E
(ϕ(L))
ij
)2]
=
K∑
i,j=1
ρ2ij
L∑
p=1
∑
q:|p−q|≥ϕ(L)+1
[(
Σ−1L
)
p,q
]2
. (2.91)
Hence, it is easy to see that
∣∣∣δ˜(ϕ(L))1 (L)∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
K∑
i,j=1
ρ2ij
L∑
p=1
∑
q:|p−q|≥ϕ(L)+1
[(
Σ−1L
)
p,q
]2∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ρ2maxK2LΩ(ϕ(L))ΣL , (2.92)
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where Ω
(ϕ(L))
ΣL
is defined in (2.25).
Using Assumption 5, 7 and the same bounding approach used in (2.28) yields
[
δ˜
(ϕ(L))
2 (L)
]2
=
{
tr
[(
R(K,L) −B
(ϕ(L))
(K,L)
)
Σ(K,L)
]}2
≤ tr
[(
R(K,L) −B
(ϕ(L))
(K,L)
)2]
tr
(
Σ2(K,L)
)
≤
L
ε20


K∑
i=1
tr
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I− ρiiΣ
−1
L −E
(ϕ(L))
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)2]
+
K∑
i,j=1,i 6=j
tr
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ρijΣ
−1
L −E
(ϕ(L))
ij
)2]
≤
ρ2maxK
2L2
ε20
Ω
(ϕ(L))
ΣL
, (2.93)
which implies ∣∣∣δ˜(ϕ(L))2 (L)∣∣∣ ≤ ρmaxKLε0
[
Ω
(ϕ(L))
ΣL
] 1
2
. (2.94)
Using Assumption 6, (2.92), (2.94) and the same approach used in the proof of Theorem
1, we can conclude the proof.
Theorem 6 Given a sequence of covariance matrices
{
Σ(K,L)
}
in (2.63) which satisfy As-
sumption 5, 6 and 7, if {ΣL} satisfy Assumption 3, then {ΣL} ∈ U
∗(ϕ0) for ϕ0(L) =⌈
1+κ
ln γ−1 lnL
⌉
, where κ is an arbitrary small positive constant and γ =
(
1−ε0
1+ε0
) 2
m
. Similarly, if
{ΣL} satisfy Assumption 4, {ΣL} ∈ U
∗(ϕ0) for ϕ0(L) =
⌈
L
2+α
2m−1
⌉
, where α is an arbitrary
small positive constant. As a result, for both cases, the ADR of the truncated detector with
ϕ0(L) relative to the optimal detector converges to unity. Furthermore, any other ϕ(L) such
that lim
L→∞
ϕ(L)
ϕ0(L)
≥ 1, will also provide unity ADR.
It is seen that the limit stated by U∗(ϕ0) in (2.88) is the same as that described by U(ϕ0) in
(2.34). Thus, the proof of Theorem 6 is very similar to Theorem 2 and 3 and hence is omitted
here.
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It is worth mentioning that we adopt the separable covariance model and we let the
size of the sensor network L increase to infinity while the size of temporal observations at
each sensor K is fixed and finite. Hence, intuitively, the covariance matrix of total set of
observations Σ(K,L) should be dominated by the purely spatial covariance matrix ΣL. Thus,
as the size of the sensor network L increases to infinity, it is seen that the limit in U∗(ϕ0)
only describes the requirement of the purely spatial covariance, which is the same as that
described by U(ϕ0) in (2.34). As a result, if the purely spatial covariance matrix ΣL is
contained in the two general classes of system and process models discussed in Section IV,
the sufficient conditions described in Theorem 5 can be easily satisfied, provided an adequate
truncation rule ϕ(L) is chosen. We can show that large classes of nonseparable covariance
models also satisfy the conditions of Theorem 5, for example the class of all models where the
covariance on the left-hand side of (2.82) can be expressed as a weighted sum of separable
terms like those on the right-hand side of (2.82) provided the other assumptions in Theorem
6 hold. However, the largest class of nonseperable covariance models satisfying the conditions
of Theorem 5 is still an open problem.
2.8 Summary
In this chapter, we study the large observation size performance of a truncated detector
for a canonical multivariate Gaussian hypothesis testing problem. The benefits gained by
utilizing the truncated detector instead of the optimal detector can be summarized from two
viewpoints. If the components of xL are time sampled observations, the truncated detector
can reduce the storage and multiplications needed when compared to the optimal detector. If
the components of xL are obtained from distributed sensors, the truncated detector not only
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reduces the communication energy requirement, it allows efficient implementation by adopting
a consensus algorithm. Motivated by these benefits, we have investigated the performance of
the truncated detector in terms of deflection, and derived sufficient conditions for a truncation
rule and a sequence of tests which lead to no loss in ADR of the truncated detector relative to
the optimal detector. The sufficient conditions provided depend on how the hypothesis testing
problem scales with L. When either ξ (L) or η (L) grow with L, indicating the difficulty
of the hypothesis testing problem decreases when L increases, we find a more aggressive
truncation rule can be tolerated. Further, the amount of truncation which can be tolerated
is different depending on which function, ξ (L) or η (L), grows with L. Moreover, we employ
several well-accepted and popular classes of system and process models as examples to show
that the sufficient conditions are not overly restrictive. For all the examples considered,
we find truncation rules which increase slowly with L, implying significant savings, even
for the least favorable case where the difficulty of the hypothesis testing problem doesn’t
decrease as L increases. In all the cases considered, numerical results imply that not only
do the deflections of the truncated and the optimal detectors converge for large L for our
asymptotically optimal truncation rules, but the probability of detections also converge for
fixed false alarm probabilities.
While we have focused on asymptotic analysis in this chapter, some comments on finite
L cases are in order for completeness. Finite L analysis employing (2.10) and (2.11) can be
useful to evaluate deflection loss. Simplifications like
∣∣∣∣ δ(k)2 (L)ψ2(L)
∣∣∣∣ ≪ 1 can be employed when
justified. Even for finite L, unity deflection can be obtained in some extreme cases. The
following result provides one example.
Theorem 7 Assume the elements of ΣL are bounded and L is finite. As ‖µL‖ increases
without bound, the deflection ratio Λ(T trL , T
opt
L ) of a truncated detector relative to the optimal
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detector converges to unity regardless of the truncation length k.
The proof is obvious. Even with bounded ‖µL‖, we have found models satisfying Assumption
1 that achieve unity deflection for finite k and L. However, the full class of models of this
type seems to be one of a number of open problems in this area.
There are some other important problems still open. Necessary conditions for asymptotic
optimality are still unknown. In this chapter, we have derived sufficient conditions which
lead no loss in ADR of the truncated detector relative to the optimal detector. However, the
deflection is a sub-optimal metric and the error probability is a better measure of detection
performance. Our numerical results imply that the sufficient conditions for the equivalence
in terms of deflection lead to an equivalence in terms of the limiting error probability in the
cases we studied. A theoretic proof will be pursued in future work for the largest possible
class of truncation rules and detection problems. It would be of great interest to consider tests
employing constrained communications with neighbors for other hypothesis testing problems
with dependent observations.
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Chapter 3
Asymptotically Optimum
Distributed Estimation in the
Presence of Attacks
3.1 Introduction
Sensor networks employed for parameter estimation have been extremely successful in
applications ranging from inexpensive commercial systems to complex military and homeland
defense surveillance systems and have seen even greater interest in recent years [49]. Recen-
t technological advances in coding, digital wireless communications technology and digital
electronics have lead to the dominance of digital communications using quantized data in
such systems. Hence, a great deal of attention has focused on parameter estimation using
quantized data [50–56].
Under the assumption that several subsets of sensors are forced to send data corrupted
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by a set of adversaries, we consider the problem of estimating a deterministic mean-shift
parameter in the presence of zero-mean noise by using quantized data for a large number of
observations in this chapter. Under the control of adversaries, the malicious sensors, which
are called Byzantine sensors in recent literature [57–62], attempt to confuse the fusion center
(FC) by sending modified quantized observations. The FC attempts to identify the different
sets of malicious sensors and mitigate the impact on the estimation performance caused by the
adversaries. This kind of distributed estimation problem under attacks is well motivated by
the vulnerability of sensor networks in practice. For example, large scale sensor networks are
typically comprised of inexpensive nodes with low computing capacity and limited battery
power. Hence, highly complicated encryption algorithms cannot be implemented at each
sensor which provides the adversaries an opportunity to modify the data to undermine the
estimation performance of the sensor network. On the other hand, adversaries can also
capture some limited set of sensors and force them to send altered data.
We assume that, without attack, all sensors make independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) observations of the unknown deterministic parameter corrupted by zero-mean noise
with known distribution. At each sensor, the time samples are converted to one-bit data and
then transmitted to the FC due to the stringent energy and bandwidth limitations. However,
the quantized outputs of some vulnerable subsets of sensors are hijacked by adversaries. We
grant the adversaries, assumed to employ a finite number of different attacks in total at any
given time, the largest power to manipulate their compromised sensors under some constraints
concerning the information they have about the estimation system and the environment
as well as to their access to the attacked sensors. In particular, the adversaries can only
get physical access to the quantized data but they do not have access to the input of the
quantizer (so called man-in-the-middle attacks) and they do not have information about what
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computations the fusion system is using. Among other things they do not have information
about the parameter to be estimated and the quantization thresholds. Thus, the adversaries
do not really understand what the bits at each sensor actually mean since the fusion center and
the sensors can agree on any interpretation they like. Thus, we assume that each adversary
can modify the quantized data to bring about an arbitrary probability mass function (pmf)
at the output of each sensor the adversary controls. Further, during the time window over
which the estimation is performed, the statistical descriptions of the modification strategies
of the adversaries are described by probability transition matrices unknown to the FC.
The communication channel between the FC and each sensor is assumed ideal, and
hence the FC is able to accurately receive what was transmitted from both the unattacked
and Byzantine sensors. The FC is assumed unaware of which subsets of sensors have been
tampered with by adversaries. In order to avoid ambiguity between a set of attacked and
a set of unattacked sensors, the set of unattacked sensors is assumed to occupy a larger
percentage of the total number of sensors than any set of identically attacked sensors. The
FC will attempt to identify not only the set of unattacked sensors but also each set of malicious
sensors employing a distinct attack. After the identification and categorization of the sensors,
an asymptotically optimum1 estimate that involves all unknown parameters, including the
parameter to be estimated and all the attack parameters, will be considered at the FC. The
appropriate performance metric for the framework is the Cramer-Rao Bound (CRB) which
provides a lower but asymptotically achievable bound on mean squared error (MSE). We will
make use of CRB analysis to benchmark the estimation performance of unbiased estimators
of these parameters.
In some parts of this chapter, we are primarily interested in the distributed estimation
1Maximum likelihood is one such estimate that achieves the asymptotically optimum performance.
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problem for sufficiently large scale sensor networks so we pursue analytical characterization of
the asymptotic estimation performance as the number of sensors grows to infinity. Attention
is restricted to cases where each distinct attack occupies a nonzero percentage of all sensors
in the limit to avoid consideration of attacks on sets of sensors with zero measure in the limit.
Such would be the case if, for example, only a single sensor was attacked in the limit.
3.1.1 Summary of Results and Main Contributions
For the distributed estimation problem in the presence of attacks, we first study the
ability of the FC to identify the attacked sensors and categorize them into different groups
corresponding to distinctly different types of attacks. We only assume that the set of u-
nattacked sensors is a larger percentage of all sensors than any set of identically attacked
sensors to avoid ambiguity between a set of attacked and a set of unattacked sensors. It
can be shown that increasing the number K of time samples at each sensor and enlarging
the size N of the sensor network can both improve the performance of the identification and
categorization approach, but to different extents. To be specific, the FC is able to determine
the number P of attacks in the sensor network and achieve the correct categorization as
K → ∞, while as N → ∞ with finite but sufficiently large K, it can be shown that the FC
can also ascertain P and obtain an approximate categorization with a very small percentage
of sensors that are misclassified, so small that this misclassification impacts performance in
a manner which can be tolerated. In this sense, with sufficiently many time samples at each
sensor or a sufficiently large size sensor network, the FC is able to determine the number of
attacks in the sensor network and categorize the sensors into different groups according to
distinct types of attacks perfectly or with negligibly small misclassification. Based on this
fact, we can assume that the sensors have been well identified in the next part of the chapter.
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Next, we consider estimation of the desired parameter. There are two approaches: (1)
ignore the data at the attacked sensors. (2) Use the data at the attacked sensors. We can
easily take approach (1) without estimating any parameters describing the attacks. However,
to attempt to take approach (2), and potentially do better than approach (1), we will in-
vestigate the performance of the joint estimation of the desired parameter and the unknown
attack parameters. It is shown that the Fisher Information Matrix (FIM) for jointly esti-
mating these parameters is singular when we apply exactly the same quantization approach
used for the unattacked system. Thus, it is not possible to jointly estimate the desired and
attack parameters efficiently with an estimation error that decreases with KN by employing
the same quantization approach used for the unattacked system.
In order to overcome the FIM singularity, a time-variant quantization approach has
been proposed. The basic idea is that each sensor divides its observation time interval into
several time slots, and in each time slot, all sensors use an identical threshold to quantize
the time samples. However, the thresholds utilized in different time slots are distinct. We
can show that as long as at least two different thresholds have been employed, the FIM of
the time-variant quantization approach is nonsingular. Further, this FIM has been used to
provide necessary and sufficient conditions under which taking advantage of the attacked
sensors in the proposed fashion will provide better estimation performance when compared
to approaches where the attacked sensors are ignored. These results are obtained by also
employing the FIM for the case where the attacked sensors are ignored and the comparisons
were made assuming both approaches use the same set of distinct thresholds over the same
different time slots to provide a fair comparison. In the numerical results, we show that
for some cases, significant improvement in the estimation performance can be obtained by
employing the proposed approach.
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3.1.2 Related Work
The distributed detection and estimation problem in the presence of Byzantine attacks
has seen great interest in recent years, see [57–62] and references therein. The closest work we
have seen to that proposed in this chapter appears in [62]. Still, there are major differences.
First and foremost, the model in [62] is very different from that in our work. The model in [62]
assumes that each sensor is attacked with a certain probability, which is known to the FC,
and the probability that any given sensor is attacked is the same. We consider an observation
time interval and assume that only some subsets of sensors can be attacked over that time due
to the limited resources available. Further, the statistical description of the attack strategy
in [62] is also assumed known to the FC, while we do not make this assumption and consider
the joint estimation of the parameter to be estimated and the attack parameters.
An encrypted sensor network scheme is investigated in [63,64], where the stochastic enci-
pher flips the binary sensor outputs with a certain probability to disguise the sensor outputs
with the goal of confusing an enemy fusion center (EFC) while preserving the detection or
estimation performance at the authorized fusion center (AFC). From the EFC perspective,
the encryption process can be treated as a malicious attack, since the EFC does not know
the probability a sensor output is flipped in the encryption process while the AFC knows this
probability. The EFC in [63], which is the counterpart of the FC in our scheme, implements
what we call the naive MLE. Hence, our proposed work is quite different. Moreover, since
the focus is on a different problem, encryption, the overlap with our investigations is not
significant.
The effect of attacks can also be considered as coming from sensors which transmit their
original data through a bit-flipping channel to the FC [65]. Some research has investigated
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distributed detection and estimation performance when the sensor network suffers from this
kind of non-ideal channel, see [55, 66] and the references therein. This work assumes that
the FC is aware of the set of sensors which are subject to the non-ideal channels and that
the error probability of each of these binary channels is known to the FC (channel-aware).
Together, these two assumptions are equivalent to assuming that the sets of attacked sensors
and the attack strategies are known to the FC in our scheme. We do not make this assump-
tion (we are channel-unaware). Instead, we investigate the identification and categorization
of the attacked sensors. Further, in the previous literature on channel-aware distributed es-
timation, only the standard fixed-quantizer approach (fixed threshold for all time samples)
is considered. However, we show that if the standard fixed-quantizer approach is used at
each sensor, without information on the flipping probabilities of the binary channels, then
the corresponding FIM is singular which implies that one cannot jointly estimate the de-
sired parameter and the attack parameters with an accuracy that grows with the number of
observations.
3.1.3 Notation and Organization
Throughout this chapter, bold upper case letters and bold lower case letters are used to
denote matrices and column vectors respectively. The symbol I signifies the identity matrix,
while 1(·) stands for the indicator function. Let [A]i,j denote the element in the i-th row and
j-th column of the matrix A. A ≻ 0 and A  0 imply that the matrix is positive definite and
positive semidefinite respectively. For any set S of sensors, |S| denotes the number of sensors
in the set S, and PS represents the percentage of all sensors occupied by S. Let AC denote the
complement of the set A. To avoid cumbersome sub-matrix and sub-vector expressions in this
chapter, we introduce the following notation. Let A ({i1, i2, ..., iL} , {j1, j2, ..., jM}) denote
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the sub-matrix which consists of the elements located in the {il}
L
l=1-th rows and {jm}
M
m=1-th
columns of matrix A, and A ({i1, i2, ..., iL} , {:}) represents the sub-matrix which consists of
the elements located in the {il}
L
l=1-th rows of matrix A. The notation v (i1, i2, ..., iL) stands
for the sub-vector which only contains the {il}
L
l=1-th elements of v, and the i-th element of
the vector v is denoted by vi. Finally, the expectation, determinant and rank operators are
denoted E (·), det (·) and rank (·) respectively.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The signal and adversary model is
introduced in Section 3.2. The ability of the FC to identify and categorize attacked sensors
is studied in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 analyzes the corresponding FIM. In Section 3.5, a time-
variant quantization approach is proposed. Necessary and sufficient conditions are developed
under which using the attacked sensors with this time-variant quantization approach will lead
to better estimation performance. In Section 3.6, several numerical results are provided to
illustrate our theoretical analysis. Finally, Section 3.7 provides our conclusions.
3.2 Signal and Adversary Models
3.2.1 Signal Model and Naive Maximum Likelihood Estimator
We consider a set of N distributed sensors, each makingK observations of a deterministic
scalar parameter θ corrupted by additive noise. At the j-th sensor, the observation at the
k-th time instant is described by
xjk = θ + njk, ∀j = 1, 2, ..., N, ∀k = 1, 2, ...,K, (3.1)
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where njk denotes the additive noise sample with common zero-mean probability density
function (pdf) f(njk) and {njk} is an independent and identically distributed sequence.
Due to the stringent energy and bandwidth limitations in realistic sensor networks, each
sensor is restricted to transmit a single bit per observation xjk to the fusion center (FC). In
this chapter, to simplify the problem in terms of both implementation and analysis, all xjk
are quantized to ujk by using threshold quantizers of the same design
ujk = 1 {xjk ∈ (τ,∞)} . (3.2)
We assume that the quantizer design and the threshold τ is known to the FC. The common
probability mass function (pmf) at the output of the quantizer under no attack is


Pr (ujk = 0 |θ ) = F (τ − θ)
Pr (ujk = 1 |θ ) = 1− F (τ − θ)
, (3.3)
where F (x)
∆
=
∫ x
−∞ f (t) dt denotes the cumulative distribution function (cdf) corresponding
to the pdf f(x). We assume that F−1 (x) is differentiable on the open interval (0, 1). After
collecting the binary observations {ujk} from all sensors, by employing the invariance of an
ML estimate, the naive Maximum Likelihood Estimate (NMLE), the MLE formulated under
the assumption of no attack, of the parameter θ can be expressed as [50,51]
θˆNML = τ − F
−1

1− 1
KN
N∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
ujk

 , (3.4)
which, without the presence of an adversary, can be expected to provide asymptotically
unbiased and efficient estimation of θ.
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3.2.2 Adversary Model
The adversaries aim at tampering with the quantized observations {ujk}, hoping to cause
the FC to reach an inaccurate estimate in terms of large bias and variance. Consider a set of
P distinct types of malicious attacks, where each attack will sometimes modify some sensors’
observations. Let Ap denote the set of sensors subjected to the p-th attack. Let u˜jk represent
the after-attack quantized observation which is a modified version of ujk. The statistical
description of the p-th attack can be described by a probability transition matrix Ψp,
Ψp
∆
=

 ψp,0 1− ψp,1
1− ψp,0 ψp,1

 , (3.5)
where ψp,0
∆
= Pr (u˜jk = 0 |ujk = 0) and ψp,1
∆
= Pr (u˜jk = 1 |ujk = 1) are the modification
probabilities. Due to the p-th attack, the after-attack pmf of the observations can be related
to the before-attack pmf using

 1− p˜ (Ψp, θ)
p˜ (Ψp, θ)

 ∆=

 Pr (u˜jk = 0 |θ )
Pr (u˜jk = 1 |θ )

 = Ψp

 Pr (ujk = 0 |θ )
Pr (ujk = 1 |θ )

 (3.6)
Substituting (3.3) into (3.6), we can obtain
p˜ (Ψp, θ) = (1− ψp,0) Pr (ujk = 0 |θ ) + ψp,1 Pr (ujk = 1 |θ )
= (1− ψp,0 − ψp,1)F (τ − θ) + ψp,1. (3.7)
For the sake of expressing the after-attack pmfs of observations in a uniform form for
both attacked and unattacked sensors, the set A0 of unattacked sensors are considered “under
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attack” with probability transition matrix Ψ0 = I, where Ψ0 is known to the FC.
From a practical point of view, the following assumption is made through this chapter.
Assumption 8
1. Over the estimation time interval and for all p, the p-th attack is statistically described
as in (3.6) for all the sensors in the set Ap. The set Ap and Ψp are both unknown to
the FC (except Ψ0), and for sufficiently large N the number of sensors in Ap, |Ap|,
is a fixed percentage Pp of the total number N of sensors in the sensor network. Such
an assumption is required so that as N → ∞ the effect of an attack will not shrink
to zero (Ap becoming a set of measure zero). Moreover, we assume that the group of
unattacked sensors is the largest group and P0 > Pp +∆0 for all p ≥ 1 where ∆0 is a
positive constant. Further the sets A0,A1, . . . ,AP are disjoint so that
Ap ∩ Ap′ = ∅ if p 6= p
′. (3.8)
2. Significant Attacks. In order to give rise to sufficient impact on the statistical charac-
terization of the outputs from attacked sensors, every attacker is required to guarantee
a minimum distortion dimpact on p˜ (Ψ0, θ) and tamper with at least ∆ percent of sensors
so that the following relations should be satisfied
|p˜ (Ψp, θ)− p˜ (Ψ0, θ)| ≥ dimpact, ∀p = 1, 2, ..., P, (3.9)
Pp ≥ ∆ > 0, ∀p = 1, 2, ..., P. (3.10)
3. Various Attacks. The changes caused by two distinct types of attacks are considerably
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different, otherwise these two types of attacks can be treated as identical. To this end,
we assume that
|p˜ (Ψl, θ)− p˜ (Ψm, θ)| ≥ ddiff, ∀l 6= m. (3.11)
4. Non-trivial Attacks. If the FC perceives some sensor produces a constant value of 0 or
1, then the FC can easily recognize the sensor is under attack. For this reason, in order
to reduce the probability of being detected, we assume that the adversaries ensure
p˜ (Ψp, θ) 6= 0 or 1, ∀p. (3.12)
It is worth mentioning that the adversary model assumed in (3.6) can change the after-
attack pmf to have any desired valid values satisfying (4.59), (3.11), and (3.12) through
proper choice of the two attack parameters ψp,0 and ψp,1. In this sense, it is a fairly general
adversary model.
3.3 Identification and Categorization of Attacked Sensors
In order to mitigate the effect caused by the adversaries, we seek to identify the attacked
sensors and categorize them into different groups according to the different attacks. In this
section, we investigate our ability to undertake these two tasks.
Let ST
∆
= ∪Pp=0Ap denote the set of all sensors in the sensor network, and let C0 and
C1(κ) define two collections of sets of the sensors, whose elements are the subsets of ST
C0
∆
= {S ⊂ ST | ∃ p s.t. S ⊂ Ap} , (3.13)
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C1(κ)
∆
=
{
S ⊂ ST | ∃ S1, S2 ⊂ S and S1, S2 ∈ C0,
s.t. PS1 ≥ κ, PS2 ≥ κ, and S1 ∪ S2 /∈ C0
}
, (3.14)
where κ ∈ (0, ∆) is a constant. C0 is the collection of all homogeneous sets of sensors which
are also referred to as statistically identical sets, while C1(κ) is the collection of all non-
homogeneous sets of sensors made up from combining homogeneous parts which each occupy
more than a given percentage κ of all sensors. Every subset of Ap for any p is an example of
an element in C0, and one example of an element in C1(κ) is Al ∪ Am provided l 6= m.
Lemma 9 Consider a subset J of the sensors which includes a fixed percentage PJ
∆
=
|J |/N ≥ ∆ of all sensors in a sensor network such that J ∈ C0 ∪ C1(κ) for some κ. Let S1
and S2 denote two disjoint subsets of J with PS1 = PS2 = κ. Let dmin
∆
= min{dimpact, ddiff},
and hence 0 < dmin < 1 due to (4.59) and (3.11). Define
λ
∆
=
dmin
2 sup
ν
f (ν)
. (3.15)
Now, consider the hypothesis testing problem


H0 : J ∈ C0
H1 : J ∈ C1(κ)
(3.16)
and the decision rule
̟ (u˜J ) =


0, T (u˜J , κ) ≤ λ;
1, T (u˜J , κ) > λ,
(3.17)
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where
T (u˜J , κ)
∆
= sup
{S1,S2:PS1 ,PS2=κ}
{∣∣∣θˆS1NML − θˆS2NML∣∣∣} (3.18)
and θˆSNML denotes the naive ML estimate from (3.4) based on the observations from the subset
S. Let π0 and π1 denote the prior probabilities of H0 and H1 respectively. Under Assumption
8, if K is larger than some constant K∗, then
Perror
∆
= π0 Pr (Declare H1| H0) + π1 Pr (Declare H0| H1)
≤ CeκγKN , (3.19)
where γ is a negative constant, and C is a positive constant.
Proof: Consider a subset S of J with PS percent of all sensors in the sensor network,
which is only tampered with by the l-th attack, where l ∈ {0, 1, ..., P }. The naive ML estimate
θˆSNML based on the observations from the sensors in S can be expressed as
θˆSNML = τ − F
−1 (ξS) , (3.20)
where ξS is defined as
ξS
∆
=
1
K |S|
∑
j∈S
K∑
k=1
(1− u˜jk), (3.21)
and u˜jk, for j ∈ S, follows a Bernoulli distribution with probability p˜ (Ψl, θ).
Under hypothesis H1, there are at least two disjoint statistically distinct groups of sen-
sors, say S∗1 and S
∗
2 with PS∗1 = PS∗2 = κ. Without loss of generality, assume S
∗
1 and S
∗
2 are
attacked by the l-th and m-th attacks respectively, and p˜ (Ψl, θ) > p˜ (Ψm, θ), where l 6= m
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and l,m ∈ {0, 1, ..., P }. Define T
(S∗1 ,S∗2 )
1
∆
= θˆ
S∗1
NML− θˆ
S∗2
NML. By employing (3.20), we can obtain
that
∣∣∣T (S∗1 ,S∗2 )1 ∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣θˆS∗1NML − θˆS∗2NML∣∣∣ = ∣∣F−1 (ξS∗2 )− F−1 (ξS∗1 )∣∣
≥
[
inf
ν
∣∣∣∣∂F−1(ν)∂ν
∣∣∣∣
] ∣∣ξS∗2 − ξS∗1 ∣∣
≥
1
sup
ν
f(ν)
∣∣ξS∗2 − ξS∗1 ∣∣ , (3.22)
and therefore, (3.15), (3.21), and (3.22) yield an upper bound on the error probability under
hypothesis H1 that
Pr (Declare H0| H1) = Pr (T (u˜J , κ) ≤ λ| H1)
≤ Pr
(∣∣∣T (S∗1 ,S∗2 )1 ∣∣∣ ≤ λ∣∣∣H1)
≤ Pr
(∣∣ξS∗2 − ξS∗1 ∣∣ ≤ λ sup
ν
f(ν)
∣∣∣∣H1
)
≤ Pr
(
ξS∗1 − ξS∗2 ≥ −
1
2
dmin
∣∣∣∣H1
)
= Pr
(
κKN∑
i=1
Xi ≥ −
1
2
dminκKN
∣∣∣∣∣H1
)
(3.23)
where {Xi} is a sequence of i.i.d. random variables with distribution
pX1
∆
= Pr (Xi = 1| H1) = [1− p˜ (Ψl, θ)] p˜ (Ψm, θ) , (3.24)
pX¯1
∆
= Pr (Xi = −1|H1) = [1− p˜ (Ψm, θ)] p˜ (Ψl, θ) , (3.25)
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and
pX0
∆
= Pr (Xi = 0| H1)
= p˜ (Ψl, θ) p˜ (Ψm, θ) + [1− p˜ (Ψl, θ)] [1− p˜ (Ψm, θ)] . (3.26)
Since E (Xi) = p˜ (Ψm, θ) − p˜ (Ψl, θ) ≤ −dmin < −
1
2dmin, by the large deviations theory
[67,68], we know
Pr
(
κKN∑
i=1
Xi ≥ −
1
2
κKNdmin
∣∣∣∣∣H1
)
≤ e
κγ
(l,m)
dmin
KN
, (3.27)
where the rate function γ
(l,m)
dmin
is defined as
γ
(l,m)
dmin
∆
= lim
κKN→∞
1
κKN
ln Pr
(
κKN∑
i=1
Xi ≥ −
1
2
κKNdmin
∣∣∣∣∣H1
)
=
1
2
dminη
∗ + lnϕX(η∗) < 0, (3.28)
and
ϕX(η)
∆
= E {exp (ηXi)} = pX0 + pX1e
η + pX¯1e
−η. (3.29)
Moreover, the quantity η∗ in (3.28) is the positive solution of the equation
d
dη
ϕX(η) = −
1
2
dminϕX(η). (3.30)
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By employing (3.24)–(3.26) and (3.28)–(3.30), the rate function γ
(l,m)
dmin
can be expressed as
γ
(l,m)
dmin
=
1
2
dmin ln bX + ln
[
pX0 + pX1bX + pX¯1b
−1
X
]
, (3.31)
where bX represents
bX
∆
=
−dminpX0 +
√
d2minp
2
X0
+ 4(4 − d2min)pX1pX¯1
2(2 + dmin)pX1
. (3.32)
Define
γ1
∆
= max
l,m:l 6=m
γ
(l,m)
dmin
, (3.33)
then by noting (3.23) and (3.27), we can obtain
Pr (Declare H0|H1) ≤ e
κγ1KN . (3.34)
On the other hand, under hypothesis H0, all sensors in J are statistically identical
to each other. Without loss of generality, we assume J are tampered with by the l-th
attack, l ∈ {0, 1, ..., P }. Consider two disjoint subsets S1 and S2 of J with fixed percentages
PS1 = PS2 = κ respectively. Define
T
(S1,S2)
0
∆
= θˆS1NML − θˆ
S2
NML = F
−1 (ξS2)− F
−1 (ξS1) , (3.35)
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and therefore, the error probability under hypothesis H0 is bounded above as per
Pr (Declare H1| H0) = Pr (T (u˜J , κ) > λ| H0)
= Pr

 sup
{S1,S2:PS1 ,PS2=κ}
{∣∣∣T (S1,S2)0 ∣∣∣} > λ
∣∣∣∣∣∣H0


≤ 22|J | sup
{S1,S2:PS1 ,PS2=κ}
Pr
(∣∣∣T (S1,S2)0 ∣∣∣ > λ∣∣∣H0) (3.36)
= 22PJN Pr
(∣∣∣T (S1,S2)0 ∣∣∣ > λ∣∣∣H0) , (3.37)
where (3.37) is due to the fact that Pr
(∣∣∣T (S1,S2)0 ∣∣∣ > λ∣∣∣H0) is the same for every pair of
disjoint S1 and S2 with PS1 = PS2 = κ, since all observations from J are independent and
identically distributed under hypothesis H0.
Let E1 and E2 denote the events {ξS1 ∈ [ε, 1 − ε]} and {ξS2 ∈ [ε, 1 − ε]} respectively and
E
∆
= E1 ∩ E2, where ε is a positive small constant such that


0 < ε < 1−max
p
p˜ (Ψp, θ)
0 < ε < min
p
p˜ (Ψp, θ)
. (3.38)
Since it is assumed beforehand that F−1 (x) is differentiable on the open interval (0, 1), we
know F−1 (x) is a Lipschitz continuous function with some Lipschitz constant LF > 0 over
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the compact set [ε, 1 − ε]. Hence, by noticing (3.21), we can obtain that
Pr
(∣∣∣T (S1,S2)0 ∣∣∣ > λ∣∣∣H0)
≤ Pr
({∣∣∣T (S1,S2)0 ∣∣∣ > λ} ∩ E∣∣∣H0)+ Pr (EC∣∣H0)
≤ Pr ({LF |ξS2 − ξS1 | > λ} ∩ E| H0) + 2Pr
(
E
C
1
∣∣H0)
≤ Pr
(
LF
∣∣∣∣∣ 1κKN
κKN∑
i=1
Yi
∣∣∣∣∣ > λ
∣∣∣∣∣H0
)
+ 2Pr
(
E
C
1
∣∣H0)
≤ 2Pr
(
κKN∑
i=1
Yi ≥ κKNaY
∣∣∣∣∣H0
)
+ 2Pr
(
E
C
1
∣∣H0) , (3.39)
where
aY
∆
= min
{
1
2
,
λ
LF
}
> 0, (3.40)
and under hypothesis H0, {Yi} is a sequence of i.i.d. random variables with distribution
pY1
∆
= Pr (Yi = −1|H0) = Pr (Yi = 1|H0)
= p˜ (Ψl, θ) [1− p˜ (Ψl, θ)] , (3.41)
and
pY0
∆
= Pr (Yi = 0|H0)
= [p˜ (Ψl, θ)]
2 + [1− p˜ (Ψl, θ)]
2. (3.42)
Since aY > E(Yi) = 0, by applying a similar argument as in (3.27)–(3.32), we can obtain
Pr
(
κKN∑
i=1
Yi ≥ κKNaY
∣∣∣∣∣H0
)
≤ eκγ
(l)
aY
KN , (3.43)
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where the rate function γ
(l)
aY is given by
γ(l)aY = −aY ln bY + ln
[
pY0 + pY1
(
bY + b
−1
Y
)]
< 0, (3.44)
and bY represents
bY
∆
=
aY pY0 +
√
a2Y p
2
Y0
+ 4(1 − a2Y )p
2
Y1
2(1 − aY )pY1
. (3.45)
Similarly, by employing (3.21) and the large deviations theory, we can obtain
Pr
(
E
C
1
∣∣H0) = Pr ({ξS1 < ε} ∪ {ξS1 > 1− ε}|H0)
≤ Pr (ξS1 ≤ ε| H0) + Pr (ξS1 ≥ 1− ε|H0)
= Pr
(
κKN∑
i=1
Z¯i ≥ κKN (1− ε)
∣∣∣∣∣H0
)
+ Pr
(
κKN∑
i=1
Zi ≥ κKN (1− ε)
∣∣∣∣∣H0
)
≤ eκγ¯
(l)
ε KN + eκγ
(l)
ε KN , (3.46)
where Z¯i
∆
= 1−Zi, and {Zi} is a sequence of i.i.d. random variables with Bernoulli distribution
under hypothesis H0


pZ0
∆
= Pr (Zi = 0| H0) = p˜ (Ψl, θ)
pZ1
∆
= Pr (Zi = 1| H0) = 1− p˜ (Ψl, θ)
. (3.47)
The rate functions γ¯
(l)
ε and γ
(l)
ε in (3.46) can be written as
γ¯(l)ε = −(1− ε) ln
(1− ε)(1 − pZ0)
εpZ0
+ ln
1− pZ0
ε
< 0, (3.48)
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γ(l)ε = −(1− ε) ln
(1− ε)pZ0
ε(1 − pZ0)
+ ln
pZ0
ε
< 0. (3.49)
Taking into account (3.37), (3.39), (3.43), and (3.46), yields
Pr (Declare H1|H0)
≤ 21+2PJN
(
eκγ
(l)
aY
KN + eκγ¯
(l)
ε KN + eκγ
(l)
ε KN
)
≤ 6 exp
[(
γ∗ +
2PJ ln 2
κK
)
κKN
]
, (3.50)
where
γ∗ ∆= max
{
max
l
γ(l)aY ,maxl
γ(l)ε ,max
l
γ¯(l)ε
}
< 0. (3.51)
Thus, if K is large enough such that
K > K∗ ∆= −
2 ln 2
κγ∗
≥ −
2PJ ln 2
κγ∗
, (3.52)
then γ0
∆
= γ∗ + 2PJ ln 2κK < 0, and hence an upper bound on the error probability under
hypothesis H0 can be expressed as
Pr (Declare H1|H0) ≤ 6e
κγ0KN . (3.53)
As a result, by (3.34) and (3.53), we conclude the proof by noting that
Perror = π0 Pr (Declare H1|H0) + π1 Pr (Declare H0|H1)
≤ 6π0e
κγ0KN + π1e
κγ1KN ≤ CeκγKN , (3.54)
where γ
∆
= max {γ0, γ1} < 0 and C
∆
= 2max {6π0, π1} is a positive constant.
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The rate functions merit some attention. Fig. 3.1 depicts the rate functions in (3.28),
(3.44), (3.48) and (3.49) for different p˜ (Ψl, θ), where aY = 1/4, dmin = 10
−4, p˜ (Ψm, θ) =
0.009, and ε = 10−3. It is seen that the rate functions are all smaller than 0 for every p˜ (Ψl, θ)
and the dominant rate function can be different for different range of p˜ (Ψl, θ).
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Figure 3.1: Rate functions versus p˜ (Ψl, θ).
Lemma 9 demonstrates that the error probability in (3.19) decreases to 0 as either
K → ∞ or N → ∞, which implies that both enlarging the size of the sensor network and
increasing the number of time observations at each sensor can improve the FC’s ability to
determine whether a given set J ∈ C0 ∪ C1(κ) for some κ with PJ ≥ ∆ is homogeneous
or not. This fact motivates us to further investigate the identification and categorization
performance when K or N increases.
74
3.3.1 The Number K of Time Samples at Each Sensor is Sufficiently Large
First, we study the identification and categorization performance we can obtain in the
scenario that the number K of time samples is sufficiently large.
Theorem 8 Take Assumption 8 as a given. For any N as K → ∞, the FC can always
identify from the observations, without further knowledge, a group of sensors which make
up P0 percent of all sensors such that this group contains zero percent attacked sensors with
probability 1. In this sense, one can always identify the unattacked sensors. Moreover, as
K → ∞, the FC is also able to identify the other P groups of sensors, which respectively
make up {Pp}
P
p=1 percent of all sensors, such that for p = 1, 2, ..., P , group p contains zero
percent sensors not experiencing attack p with probability 1.
Proof: By Lemma 9, for any given κ ∈ (0,∆) and any set J ∈ C0 ∪ C1(κ) of sensors
which includes at least ∆ percent of all sensors, we know from Lemma 9 that as K → ∞,
Perror → 0. Thus, for any given κ and J ∈ C0 ∪ C1(κ),
Pr (̟ (u˜J ) = 1 |J ∈ C1(κ) ) = 1, (3.55)
and so if the decision rule in (3.17) yields ̟ (u˜J ) = 0, then
J ∈ (C1(κ))
C. (3.56)
Consider
κ∗ =
1
N
. (3.57)
75
By the definition of C1(κ) in (3.14), it is easy to see that C1(κ
∗) ⊂ CC0 . On the other hand,
for any S ∈ CC0 , ∃ nonempty S1 and S2 ⊂ S such that S1 ⊂ Al and S2 ⊂ Am for some l 6= m.
Since both S1 and S2 at least contain 1 sensor, PS1 ,PS2 ≥ 1/N = κ∗. Thus, S ∈ C1(κ∗), and
hence CC0 ⊂ C1(κ
∗). As a result, C1(κ∗) = CC0 , and therefore C0 ∪ C1(κ
∗) is the power set of
ST , that is, for any set J ⊂ ST with PJ ≥ ∆,
J ∈ C0 ∪ C1(κ
∗), (3.58)
By the result in (3.56), if the decision rule in (3.17) yields ̟ (u˜J ) = 0, then
J ∈ (C1(κ
∗))C = C0. (3.59)
Consequently, for any subset J ⊂ ST with PJ ≥ ∆, we can identify whether J ∈ C0 or
not by checking the output of the decision rule as K →∞. In other words, we can determine
whether J is homogeneous or not. By examining all possible such subsets in such a way, we
can find the collection {A˜p}
P˜
p=0 of the largest subsets, where ∪
P˜
p=0A˜p = ST and A˜p ∈ C0 for
all p = 0, 1, ..., P˜ . Moreover, the collection of the largest subsets implies that A˜l ∪ A˜m 6∈ C0,
if l 6= m.
According to Assumption 8, {Ap}
P
p=0 is the collection of the largest subsets. Therefore,
P˜ = P and A˜p = Ap. Furthermore, the largest one in these P + 1 subsets is the set of
unattacked sensors and its corresponding percentage equals to P0. The rest of subsets in
{Ap}
P
p=0 are the sets of attacked sensors which are taken over by different types of attacks.
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As demonstrated by Theorem 8, the FC is able to perfectly identify the set of unattacked
sensors and categorize the attacked sensors into different groups according to their distinct
types of attacks as the number K of time samples at each sensor increases to infinity.
3.3.2 The Number N of Sensors is Sufficiently Large while the Number K
of Time Samples at Each Sensor is Finite
We now give a Theorem demonstrating the ability of the FC to identify and catego-
rize different subsets of sensors as the number N of sensors in the sensor network becomes
sufficiently large.
Theorem 9 Consider a sensor network with N sensors. Each sensor observes a finite num-
ber K of time samples which satisfies
K ≥ −
8 ln 2
γ∗min {∆∆0,∆2}
+ 1, (3.60)
where γ∗ are defined in (3.51). Under Assumption 8, as N →∞, the FC can determine the
number of attacks in the sensor network. Moreover, for the p-th attack ∀p ≥ 0, the FC can
identify a corresponding group of sensors A˜p which satisfies
0 ≤ |P˜p − Pp| ≤ P
∗
p < δ with probability 1, (3.61)
where P˜p
∆
= |A˜p|/N , P
∗
p
∆
= |(A˜p\Ap) ∪ (Ap\A˜p)|/N , and
δ
∆
= −
4 ln 2
∆(K − 1)γ∗
. (3.62)
In addition, the group A˜0 which approximates the set A0 of unattacked sensors is still the
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largest group in {A˜p}
P
p=0.
Proof: See Appendix 3.8.1.
As Theorem 9 demonstrates, with a finite number of time samples at each sensor, even as
the numberN of sensors in the sensor network grows to infinity, the FC is able to ascertain the
number of attacks in the sensor network, but there is no guarantee that the FC can perfectly
categorize the sensors into different groups according to distinct attack types. Essentially,
Theorem 9 provides an upper bound which quantifies the maximum percentage of sensors
that are misclassified in finding every Ap. As stipulated in (3.62), this upper bound depends
on K and monotonically decreases to 0 as K increases to infinity. It is worth noting that the
upper bound given in Theorem 9 is very informative, as it reveals the relationship between the
accuracy of the categorization and the requirement of the number of time samples at each
sensor, which provides the FC with a tradeoff between the accuracy of the categorization
and time efficiency. More specifically, based on our derived results, the FC can obtain the
maximum percentage of misclassified sensors in the categorization for various K and choose
K such that the maximum percentage of misclassified sensors is tolerable for the scenario of
interest.
3.3.3 Discussion
It is worth mentioning that the assumption that the percentage of the unattacked sensors
is larger than any percentage of similarly attacked sensors is not necessary for Lemma 9,
Theorem 8 and 9. Once all the sensors have been categorized, the side information that the
unattacked sensors constitute the largest fractions of the sensors can help the FC to identify
the group of unattacked sensors.
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A particular note of interest is that the performance improvements in categorization
induced by increasing K or N are different. As specified in (3.19), Lemma 9 implies that
increasing K or N gives rise to the same effect on reducing the error probability of the
hypothesis test. However, Theorem 8 and Theorem 9 indicate that under Assumption 8,
the FC is able to determine the number P of attacks in the sensor network and achieve the
correct categorization as K → ∞, while as N → ∞ with finite but sufficiently large K, it
can be shown that the FC can also ascertain P and upper bound the maximum percentage
of misclassified sensors in the categorization. In this sense, the effect of enlarging the size
of the sensor network is not equivalent to that of increasing the number of time samples at
each sensor in the presence of attacks. In other words, adding more spatial observations is
different from adding more temporal observations in the sensor network under attack. The
reason is that the additional temporal observations can provide the FC with more information
than the additional spatial observations. To be specific, when the number of sensors in the
sensor network increases, the set of additional observations produced by the new sensors
is a mixture of differently attacked observations. Thus, the FC needs to categorize the
additional sensors into different groups according to distinct types of attacks, since the FC
is unaware of the attack each additional sensor undergoes. In contrast, as K increases, the
information buried in the additional temporal observations not only encompasses that implied
by the additional spatial observations, but also conveys that, according to Assumption 8, the
additional temporal observations from a certain sensor are statistically identical to those
original observations from the same sensor, and hence they are under the same attack. Thus,
the FC doesn’t need to categorize the additional temporal observations, since the additional
temporal observations will be automatically categorized once the FC has categorized the
original observations. For this reason, one can intuitively expect that the performance of
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categorization can be better ameliorated by increasing the number of time samples at each
sensor rather than increasing the number of sensors in the sensor network.
The number of hypothesis tests needed to implement the categorization approach pro-
posed in Theorem 8 and Theorem 9, which is referred to as its complexity, deserves some
discussion. Admittedly, the approach we proposed in Theorem 8 and Theorem 9 is to check
all possible subsets of the sensor network. It is observed that for a sensor network ST with
N sensors, the number of nonempty subsets is (2N − 1). In addition, each subset contains
at most (2N − 1) nonempty sub-subsets. Thus, the complexity of the proposed approach
must be smaller than 8N . For the scenario discussed in Theorem 8, as K increases, the
complexity remains the same and finite, and hence the proposed approach is amenable to
implementation. For the scenario in Theorem 9, the complexity of the proposed approach
can be very high when N is sufficiently large. Clearly, the task of identification and catego-
rization, no matter what algorithm is applied, must be arduous when the number of sensors
is large. The purpose of presenting the results in Theorem 9 is twofold. On one hand, the
results in Theorem 9 are a nice complement to those results in Theorem 8 which further the
understanding of the categorization performance in the two types of asymptotic regions and
highlight some differences between increasing N as opposed to K. On the other hand, we
feel it is useful to demonstrate that it is possible, at least in theory, to categorize the sensors
into different groups for these two cases in the specific sense previously discussed. These
results can encourage further investigation on the pursuit of more efficient identification and
categorization algorithms for large scale sensor networks.
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3.4 Fisher Information Matrix in the Presence of Attacks
As shown in Section 3.3, when each sensor accumulates sufficiently many time samples
or the size of the sensor network is sufficiently large, the FC is able to determine the number
of attacks in the sensor network and categorize the sensors into different groups according
to distinct types of attacks perfectly or with a tolerable small misclassification which can be
ignored. Thus, in the following part, we assume that the sensors have been well identified
and categorized into {Ap}
P
p=0. Then we attempt to estimate θ. There are two approaches:
(1) ignore the data at the attacked sensors. (2) Use the data at the attacked sensors. We can
easily take approach (1) without estimating any parameters describing the attacks. However,
to attempt to take approach (2), and potentially do better than approach (1), we will in-
vestigate the performance of the joint estimation of the desired parameter and the unknown
attack parameters in this section.
Although Section 3.3 showed that {Ap}
P
p=0 can be determined, the FC is still unaware of
the attack parameters Ψp for p = 1, 2, .., P . Let Θ denote a vector containing the parameter
θ along with all the unknown parameters of the attacks
Θ
∆
= [θ, ψ1,0, ψ1,1, ..., ψP,0, ψP,1]
T . (3.63)
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The log-likelihood function evaluated at u˜ = r is
L (Θ) = lnPr (u˜ = r |Θ)
= ln
P∏
p=0
∏
j∈Ap
K∏
k=1
1∏
r′
jk
=0
Pr
(
u˜jk=r
′
jk |Θ
)
1{rjk=r′jk}
=
P∑
p=0
∑
j∈Ap
K∑
k=1
1∑
r′
jk
=0
1
{
rjk = r
′
jk
}
ln Pr
(
u˜jk = r
′
jk |Θ
)
.
In order to gain insight into the impact of attacks and evaluate the estimation perfor-
mance, we carry out an analysis of the FIM for Θ.
By noting that p˜ (Ψp, θ) = Pr (u˜jk = 1 |θ ), ∀j ∈ Ap, the (l,m)-th element of the FIM for
Θ, therefore, is given by
[J (Θ)]l,m = −E
{
∂2L (Θ)
∂Θl∂Θm
}
= KN
P∑
p=0
Pp
p˜ (Ψp, θ) [1− p˜ (Ψp, θ)]
∂p˜ (Ψp, θ)
∂Θl
∂p˜ (Ψp, θ)
∂Θm
. (3.64)
Define φl
∆
= ∂p˜(Ψl,θ)∂Θ . Then, the FIM described in (3.64) can be formulated as
J (Θ) = KN
P∑
p=0
Ppφpφ
T
p
p˜ (Ψp, θ) [1− p˜ (Ψp, θ)]
= KN
P∑
p=0
̺pΦp, (3.65)
where ̺p
∆
=
Pp
p˜(Ψp,θ)[1−p˜(Ψp,θ)] and Φp
∆
= φpφ
T
p . Apparently, rank (Φp) = 1.
In the following theorem, we provide results concerning the FIM in the presence of
attacks.
Theorem 10 In the presence of attacks, the FIM J (Θ) for Θ described in (3.65) is singular.
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Proof: Since rank (Φp) = 1 for all p, and noting that the dimensions of J (Θ) are
(2P + 1)× (2P + 1), we can obtain
rank (J (Θ)) = rank

KN P∑
p=0
̺pΦp


≤
P∑
p=0
rank (Φp) = P + 1 < 2P + 1,
and hence, the FIM J (Θ) for Θ is singular.
Theorem 10 reveals that we cannot jointly estimate the parameter θ and the attack
parameters with an accuracy that grows with KN . Actually, this negative conclusion is
conceivable. Reexamining the after-attack pmf in (3.7) for the sensor taken over by the p-th
attack, it is observed that for any given before-attack probability Pr (ujk = 1 |θ ) and after-
attack probability Pr (u˜jk = 1 |θ ), the pair of attack parameters (ψp,0, ψp,1) of the p-th attack
in (3.6) is not unique. Moreover, there exists an infinite number of pairs of attack parameters
(ψp,0, ψp,1) which can map the given before-attack probability Pr (ujk = 1 |θ ) to the given
after-attack probability Pr (u˜jk = 1 |θ ) by using (3.6). From the perspective of the FC, even
though the FC can ascertain the after-attack probability Pr (u˜jk = 1 |θ ) as KN → ∞, the
FC is unable to determine the exact (ψp,0, ψp,1) employed by the p-th attack because of this
non-uniqueness. For this reason, it is reasonable that in the presence of attackers who modify
the data in the manner shown in (3.6), the corresponding FIM for Θ is singular. To this end,
it is of great interest to investigate approaches which lead to nonsingular FIMs to allow us to
efficiently estimate Θ and take advantage of attacked observations to improve the estimation
performance for the parameter θ.
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3.5 Time-variant Quantization Approach to Achieve Nonsin-
gular FIM
In this section, we first develop the time-variant quantization approach (TQA) to over-
come the singular FIM in the presence of attacks. We then examine the CRB performance
of our approach and compare it to that of the simple estimation approach where only the set
A0 of unattacked sensors are used to estimate the parameter θ. Furthermore, necessary and
sufficient conditions are derived under which the attacked observations can be utilized in the
proposed fashion to improve the CRB performance for estimating the parameter θ.
3.5.1 Time-variant Quantization Approach
In the time-variant quantization approach, the quantizer at each sensor is equipped with
a set of Q distinct thresholds Q = {τ1, τ2, ..., τQ}. In each of Q different time slots {Tt}
Q
t=1,
where Tt contains Kt time samples and
∑Q
t=1Kt = K, the quantizer employs a different
threshold to quantize its time samples into one-bit observations which are sent to the FC.
We assume that the length Kt of each time slot Tt is the same for all the sensors, and in each
time slot Tt, all sensors use an identical threshold τt to quantize their time samples. In this
manner, the after-attack pmf of the quantized observations received at the FC in the t-th
time slot can be written using, ∀k ∈ Tt and j ∈ Ap,
p˜ (Ψp, θ, t)
∆
= Pr (u˜jk = 1 |θ )
= (1− ψp,0) Pr (ujk = 0 |θ ) + ψp,1 Pr (ujk = 1 |θ )
= (1− ψp,0 − ψp,1)F (τt − θ) + ψp,1, (3.66)
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Then, the log-likelihood function of the TQA, evaluated at u˜ = r, is given by
LTQA (Θ)
=
P∑
p=0
∑
j∈Ap
Q∑
t=1
∑
k∈Tt
1∑
r′
jk
=0
1
{
rjk = r
′
jk
}
ln Pr
(
u˜jk = r
′
jk |Θ
)
.
Applying a similar argument as in (3.64), the (l,m)-th element of the corresponding FIM for
Θ can be calculated as
[JTQA (Θ)]l,m = N
P∑
p=0
Q∑
t=1
KtPp
∂p˜(Ψp,θ,t)
∂Θl
∂p˜(Ψp,θ,t)
∂Θm
p˜ (Ψp, θ, t) [1− p˜ (Ψp, θ, t)]
. (3.67)
Define
φp,t
∆
= ̺p,t
∂p˜ (Ψp, θ, t)
∂Θ
= ̺p,t
[
∂p˜ (Ψp, θ, t)
∂θ
,
∂p˜ (Ψp, θ, t)
∂ψ1,0
,
∂p˜ (Ψp, θ, t)
∂ψ1,1
,
...,
∂p˜ (Ψp, θ, t)
∂ψP,0
,
∂p˜ (Ψp, θ, t)
∂ψP,1
]T
, (3.68)
where ̺p,t
∆
=
(
KtPp
p˜(Ψp,θ,t)[1−p˜(Ψp,θ,t)]
) 1
2
. Therefore, for all t and p ≥ 1, we can obtain
φp,t = ̺p,t[− (1− ψp,0 − ψp,1) f (τt − θ) , 0,
..., 0, −F (τt − θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
the (2p)-th element
, −F (τt − θ) + 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
the (2p+1)-th element
, 0, ..., 0]T , (3.69)
while, for all t and p = 0,
φ0,t = ̺0,t[f (τt − θ) , 0, ..., 0]
T . (3.70)
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As a result, the FIM in (3.67) can be rewritten as
JTQA (Θ) = N
P∑
p=0
Q∑
t=1
φp,tφ
T
p,t
= N
P∑
p=0
ΞpΞ
T
p = N
P∑
p=0
Γp, (3.71)
where
Ξp
∆
= [φp,1,φp,2, ...,φp,Q] , (3.72)
Γp
∆
= ΞpΞ
T
p  0. (3.73)
Theorem 11 If Q ≥ 2, then the FIM for Θ in the TQA, i.e., JTQA (Θ) described in (3.71),
is nonsingular for any value of θ.
Proof: Since F (·) is a strictly monotonic function, F (τl − θ) 6= F (τm − θ) provided
l 6= m. This implies φp,l and φp,m in (3.69) are linearly independent for p ≥ 1. As a result,
if Q ≥ 2, then ∀p ≥ 1,
rank (Γp) = rank
(
ΞpΞ
T
p
)
= rank (Ξp)
≥ rank (Ξp ({2p, 2p + 1} , {:})) = 2. (3.74)
Noticing that
Γp ({2p, 2p + 1} , {2p, 2p + 1}) = Ξp ({2p, 2p+ 1} , {:}) [Ξp ({2p, 2p + 1} , {:})]
T  0, (3.75)
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we can obtain
rank (Γp ({2p, 2p + 1} , {2p, 2p + 1}))
= rank (Ξp ({2p, 2p + 1} , {:})) = 2, ∀p ≥ 1. (3.76)
and hence
Γp ({2p, 2p + 1} , {2p, 2p + 1}) ≻ 0, ∀p ≥ 1. (3.77)
Moreover, since for all p ≥ 1,
Γp ({1, 2p, 2p + 1} , {1, 2p, 2p + 1})
= Ξp ({1, 2p, 2p + 1} , {:}) [Ξp ({1, 2p, 2p + 1} , {:})]
T  0,
we know that for any w 6= 0,
wTΓp ({1, 2p, 2p + 1} , {1, 2p, 2p + 1})w ≥ 0. (3.78)
Noting that Γ0 only contains one nonzero element which is [Γ0]1,1 =
Q∑
t=1
̺20,tf
2 (τt − θ) >
0, yields ∀p ≥ 1 and for any w = (ω,ν)T 6= 0,
wT
([
1
P
Γ0 + Γp
]
({1, 2p, 2p + 1} , {1, 2p, 2p + 1})
)
w
=
ω2
P
[Γ0]1,1 +w
TΓp ({1, 2p, 2p + 1} , {1, 2p, 2p + 1})w
(3.79)
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If ω 6= 0, then by (3.78) and (3.79), we can obtain
wT
([
1
P
Γ0 + Γp
]
({1, 2p, 2p + 1} , {1, 2p, 2p + 1})
)
w
≥
ω2
P
[Γ0]1,1 > 0. (3.80)
If ω = 0, then ν 6= 0, and hence (3.79) simplifies to
wT
([
1
P
Γ0 + Γp
]
({1, 2p, 2p + 1} , {1, 2p, 2p + 1})
)
w
= νTΓp ({2p, 2p + 1} , {2p, 2p + 1}) ν > 0, (3.81)
where we have employed Γp ({2p, 2p + 1} , {2p, 2p + 1}) ≻ 0, ∀p ≥ 1 in (3.77).
In consequence, we have shown that ∀p ≥ 1,
[
1
P
Γ0 + Γp
]
({1, 2p, 2p + 1} , {1, 2p, 2p + 1}) ≻ 0. (3.82)
As a result, for any given vector v 6= 0, we can obtain
vT

 P∑
p=0
Γp

v = P∑
p=1
vT
(
1
P
Γ0 + Γp
)
v
=
P∑
p=1
{
vT (1, 2p, 2p + 1)
([
1
P
Γ0 + Γp
]
({1, 2p, 2p + 1} , {1, 2p, 2p + 1})
)
v (1, 2p, 2p + 1)
}
> 0. (3.83)
Thus,
P∑
p=0
Γp ≻ 0 for Q ≥ 2, and hence JTQA (Θ) described in (3.71) is nonsingular.
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Theorem 11 implies that as long as K ≥ 2, we can always obtain a nonsingular FIM
as described in (3.71), since we can divide the time samples into at least two time slots and
employ distinct thresholds to quantize the time samples in different time slots. To gain insight
into the proposed TQA estimation scheme, we now revisit the relationship in (3.6) between
the before-attack pmf, the after-attack pmf, and the pair of attack parameters (ψp,0, ψp,1).
It is seen from (3.7) that for any given before-attack pmf and after-attack pmf, the attack
parameters pair (ψp,0, ψp,1) will span a one dimensional space since if ψp,0 is chosen then ψp,1
is also determined to satisfy the equation shown in (3.7). If we change the threshold of the
quantizer at each sensor, we can obtain another pair of before-attack and after-attack pmfs
which must be related by the same (ψp,0, ψp,1) under our assumption that these parameters
are fixed over the estimation interval. This second set of equations combined with the first
set will yield a unique solution for (ψp,0, ψp,1). Consequently, it is intuitively possible for the
FC to jointly estimate the parameter θ and the attack parameters simultaneously when the
quantized observations are generated by at least two distinct thresholds.
3.5.2 CRB Performance Analysis of the Time-variant Quantization Ap-
proach
The main goal of the sensor network is to estimate the parameter θ. Hence, the FC can
carry out a simple estimation approach (SEA) which just utilizes the set A0 of unattacked
sensors to estimate the parameter θ rather than employing the TQA to obtain both the
estimate of θ and the estimates of the attack parameters with the purpose of improving
the estimation of θ. The SEA is obviously easier to implement in practice and can lower
the computational complexity of the estimation by reducing the number of parameters to
be estimated from 2P + 1 to 1. However, the SEA discards the possible information on
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θ buried in the attacked observations which may lead to performance loss in estimating θ
when compared to the TQA. In this subsection, the CRB performance of estimating θ by
employing the TQA is compared to that in the SEA. The comparisons are made assuming
both approaches use the same set of Q distinct thresholds {τ1, τ2, ..., τQ} over the same Q
different time slots Tt to provide a fair comparison. We also develop necessary and sufficient
conditions under which the CRB performance of estimating θ can be improved by using the
attacked observations in our proposed fashion.
For the SEA, the FC ignores the observations from the attacked sensors, and only makes
use of the unattacked observations to estimate the parameter θ. By noting that
[Γ0]1,1 =
Q∑
t=1
KtP0
p˜ (Ψ0, θ, t) [1− p˜ (Ψ0, θ, t)]
[
∂p˜ (Ψ0, θ, t)
∂θ
]2
= P0
Q∑
t=1
Ktf
2 (τt − θ)
F (τt − θ) [1− F (τt − θ)]
, (3.84)
the Fisher Information Matrix in (3.71) degenerates to a scalar which can be expressed as
JSEA (θ) = N [Γ0]1,1 = NP0
Q∑
t=1
Ktf
2 (τt − θ)
F (τt − θ) [1− F (τt − θ)]
.
Hence, the corresponding CRB performance of SEA for θ is given by
CRBSEA (θ) =
1
JSEA (θ)
=
1
NP0
{
Q∑
t=1
Ktf
2 (τt − θ)
F (τt − θ) [1− F (τt − θ)]
}−1
. (3.85)
On the other hand, considering the TQA which takes advantage of attacked observations
to estimate the parameter θ, the CRB of estimating θ is the (1, 1)-th element of the inverse
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of the FIM described in (3.71), i.e. CRBTQA (θ) =
[
J−1TQA (Θ)
]
1,1
.
Using the expression J−1TQA (Θ)JTQA (Θ) = I, we have following identities,
[
J−1TQA (Θ)
]
1,1
[JTQA (Θ)]1,1
+
2P+1∑
l=2
[
J−1TQA (Θ)
]
1,l
[JTQA (Θ)]l,1 = 1, (3.86)
and ∀m = 2, 3, ..., 2P + 1,
[
J−1TQA (Θ)
]
1,1
[JTQA (Θ)]1,m
+
2P+1∑
l=2
[
J−1TQA (Θ)
]
1,l
[JTQA (Θ)]l,m = 0. (3.87)
Since there is one nonzero element in Γ0 which is the (1, 1) element and Γv only has 9
nonzero elements at the intersections of the 1st, 2v-th, and (2v + 1)-th rows and columns
for v = 1, 2, ..., P , the nonzero elements of Γv and Γv′ do not overlap except for the (1, 1)
element provided that v 6= v′. As a result, taking into account JTQA (Θ) = N
P∑
v=0
Γv from
(3.71), (3.86) can be rewritten as
[
J−1TQA (Θ)
]
1,1

[Γ0]1,1 +
P∑
p=1
hp (Θ)

 = 1N , (3.88)
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where
hp (Θ)
∆
= [Γp]1,1 +
[
J−1TQA (Θ)
]
1,2p[
J−1TQA (Θ)
]
1,1
[Γp]2p,1
+
[
J−1TQA (Θ)
]
1,2p+1[
J−1TQA (Θ)
]
1,1
[Γp]2p+1,1. (3.89)
Similarly, (3.87) simplifies to
[
J−1TQA (Θ)
]
1,1
[Γp]1,2p +
[
J−1TQA (Θ)
]
1,2p
[Γp]2p,2p
+
[
J−1TQA (Θ)
]
1,2p+1
[Γp]2p+1,2p = 0, (3.90)
[
J−1TQA (Θ)
]
1,1
[Γp]1,2p+1 +
[
J−1TQA (Θ)
]
1,2p
[Γp]2p,2p+1
+
[
J−1TQA (Θ)
]
1,2p+1
[Γp]2p+1,2p+1 = 0 (3.91)
for all p = 1, 2, ..., P .
Note that Γp is symmetric for all p. Then from (3.90) and (3.91),
[
J−1TQA (Θ)
]
1,2p
and[
J−1TQA (Θ)
]
1,2p+1
can be determined by
[
J−1TQA (Θ)
]
1,2p
=
[Γp]1,2p+1[Γp]2p,2p+1−[Γp]1,2p[Γp]2p+1,2p+1
[Γp]2p,2p[Γp]2p+1,2p+1−
{
[Γp]2p,2p+1
}2 [J−1TQA (Θ)]1,1, (3.92)
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and
[
J−1TQA (Θ)
]
1,2p+1
=
[Γp]1,2p[Γp]2p,2p+1 − [Γp]1,2p+1[Γp]2p,2p
[Γp]2p,2p[Γp]2p+1,2p+1 −
{
[Γp]2p,2p+1
}2 [J−1TQA (Θ)]1,1. (3.93)
Substituting (3.92) and (3.93) into (3.89), we obtain
hp (Θ)
= [Γp]1,1+
[Γp]1,2p+1[Γp]2p,2p+1−[Γp]1,2p[Γp]2p+1,2p+1
[Γp]2p,2p[Γp]2p+1,2p+1−
{
[Γp]2p,2p+1
}2 [Γp]1,2p
+
[Γp]1,2p[Γp]2p,2p+1 − [Γp]1,2p+1[Γp]2p,2p
[Γp]2p,2p[Γp]2p+1,2p+1 −
{
[Γp]2p,2p+1
}2 [Γp]1,2p+1
=
det (Γp ({1, 2p, 2p + 1} , {1, 2p, 2p + 1}))
det (Γp ({2p, 2p + 1} , {2p, 2p + 1}))
, (3.94)
which yields
CRBTQA (θ) =
[
J−1TQA (Θ)
]
1,1
=
1
N

[Γ0]1,1 +
P∑
p=1
hp (Θ)


−1
=
1
N
{
[Γ0]1,1
+
P∑
p=1
det (Γp ({1, 2p, 2p + 1} , {1, 2p, 2p + 1}))
det (Γp ({2p, 2p + 1} , {2p, 2p + 1}))
}−1
(3.95)
where Γp is defined in (3.73).
In the following theorem, we provide the result with regard to the necessary and sufficient
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conditions under which the CRB performance of estimating θ can be improved by employing
TQA.
Theorem 12 The CRB performance for θ can be improved by utilizing the observations from
the set of attacked sensors in our proposed fashion, if and only if at least one member of the
set {Ξp}
P
p=1 has rank (Ξp) = 3, where Ξp is defined in (3.72). Otherwise, there is no CRB
improvement, but also no loss in performance, from utilizing the attacked observations.
Proof: Since Γp ({1, 2p, 2p + 1} , {1, 2p, 2p + 1})  0 and Γp ({2p, 2p + 1} , {2p, 2p + 1}) ≻
0, we can conclude that ∀p = 1, 2, ..., P ,
det (Γp ({1, 2p, 2p + 1} , {1, 2p, 2p + 1}))
det (Γp ({2p, 2p + 1} , {2p, 2p + 1}))
≥ 0. (3.96)
Consequently, by noticing (3.95), we can obtain
CRBTQA (θ) ≤
1
N
{
[Γ0]1,1
}−1
= CRBSEA (θ) . (3.97)
Moreover, the equality holds if and only if ∀p = 1, 2, ..., P ,
det (Γp ({1, 2p, 2p + 1} , {1, 2p, 2p + 1})) = 0, (3.98)
which implies that
rank (Ξp) = 2, ∀p = 1, 2, ..., P. (3.99)
Noting that Ξp only contains at most 3 nonzero rows, we know rank (Ξp) ≤ 3. As a result, in
order to improve the CRB for θ by taking advantage of the attacked observations, we must
have rank (Ξp) = 3 for some p.
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The result in Theorem 12 implies that a proper estimation approach will never lead to
any loss in asymptotic performance from using the observations from the attacked sensors.
In order to obtain rank (Ξp) = 3 for some p, the number of thresholds Q cannot be less than
3. So that the number of time samples K at each sensor is required to be larger or equal to
3. Generally, if Q is large, it is easy to obtain rank (Ξp) = 3 for some p. However, for some
specific attacks, using the observations from the attacked sensors in the fashion of the TQA
will not provide better asymptotic estimation performance. For example, if for all p, the
p-th attack sets ψp,0 + ψp,1 = 1, then each Ξp only contains at most 2 nonzero rows for any
thresholds. Hence rank (Ξp) = 2 < 3 for all possible set of thresholds Q = {τ1, τ2, ..., τQ}. For
this scenario, it is seen from (3.7) that the after-attack pmf is independent of the parameter
θ, thus it is obvious that the attacked observations cannot improve the CRB for θ.
In order to evaluate the superiority of TQA, we are primarily interested in the relative
CRB gain which is defined as the ratio of the CRB for θ when applying SEA relative to that
employing TQA. From (3.85) and (3.95), the relative CRB gain can be obtained as
CRBrelative gain (θ)
∆
=
CRBSEA (θ)
CRBTQA (θ)
=
1
N
{
[Γ0]1,1
}−1
1
N
{
[Γ0]1,1 +
P∑
p=1
det(Γp({1,2p,2p+1},{1,2p,2p+1}))
det(Γp({2p,2p+1},{2p,2p+1}))
}−1
= 1 +
1
[Γ0]1,1
P∑
p=1
det (Γp ({1, 2p, 2p + 1} , {1, 2p, 2p + 1}))
det (Γp ({2p, 2p + 1} , {2p, 2p + 1}))
, (3.100)
which is not a function of N but depends on the percentage of attacked sensors, the thresholds
Q = {τ1, τ2, ..., τQ}, the attack parameters, and the value of θ. It can be shown from (3.100)
that if the attack parameters (ψp,0, ψp,1) are close to (0, 0) or (1, 1) for all p, the FC can
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expect to attain significant relative CRB gain by making use of attacked observations.
3.6 Numerical Results
3.6.1 Identification and Categorization of Attacked Sensors
In this subsection, we first test the performance of the identification and categorization
technique described in Section 3.3 for some example cases. Specifically, we consider a sensor
network consisting of N = 10 sensors, which is subject to 2 attacks. The 2 attacks control
30% and 20% of sensors respectively, and modify their observations with attack parameters
(ψ1,0, ψ1,1) = (0.2, 0.8) and (ψ2,0, ψ2,1) = (0.7, 0.1). The parameter to be estimated is θ = 1,
the threshold of the quantizer is τ = 1, ∆0 = ∆ = 20%, and the additive noise obeys a
standard normal distribution. Fig. 3.2 depicts the Monte Carlo approximation (200 times)
of the ensemble average of the percentage of all mis-categorized sensors as a function of the
numberK of time samples at each sensor. As expected from our analysis, the curve in Fig. 3.2
clearly shows a diminishing trend of the average percentage of mis-categorized sensors and
this percentage appears to decrease towards 0 as the number K of time samples at each
sensor increases. This implies that the FC can identify and categorize the attacked sensors
into different groups according to distinct types of attacks to achieve any desired level of
accuracy for a sufficiently large K.
Next, we present numerical results in support of our theoretical analysis which illus-
trate the CRB performance of our proposed TQA for estimating θ. The numerical re-
sults also corroborate the superiority of the CRB performance of the proposed TQA when
compared to that of the SEA. In the following subsections, we consider a sensor network
consisting of N = 100 sensors. The additive noise obeys a standard normal distribu-
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Figure 3.2: Identification and categorization of attacked sensors.
tion. The length of each time slot is fixed at Kt = 10, and the set of 801 thresholds is
Q = {0,−0.125, 0.125,−0.250, 0.250, ...,−5, 5}.
3.6.2 CRB Comparison between the TQA and the SEA
We firstly compare the CRB performance for estimating θ by using the proposed TQA
to that obtained by using the SEA. Here, the parameter to be estimated is θ = 2 and two
different attacks (P = 2) are considered. The first attack tampers with 25% of the sensors
with attack probabilities ψ1,0 = 0.9 and ψ1,1 = 0.95. The other attack takes over 20% of
the sensors while using the attack probabilities ψ2,0 = 0.15 and ψ2,1 = 0.2. Fig. 3.3 depicts
the CRB of estimating θ for the two approaches with a varying number of thresholds Q
from 400 to 800. In the numerical results, for a given number of thresholds Q, each sensor
observes QKt time samples, and picks the first Q thresholds from the set of thresholds Q to
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quantize the time samples in different time slots. It is seen that the CRB for both approaches
decreases as Q, the number of thresholds, grows, since the number of time samples at each
sensor increases. Moreover, it is easy to see that the relative CRB gain increases with Q. In
addition, Fig. 3.3 illustrates that the TQA provides significant CRB performance gain when
compared to the SEA, which implies that the set of thresholds leads to rank (Ξp) = 3 for at
least one p.
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Figure 3.3: Comparison between the CRB for θ when employing either the TQA or the SEA.
3.6.3 Relative CRB Gain versus the Percentage of Attacked Sensors under
One Attack
We now study the relationship between the relative CRB gain in (3.100) and the percent-
age of attacked sensors. To simplify the problem, we consider a scenario where P = 1, the
parameter to be estimated is θ = 2, and each sensor observes Q = 801 time slots of time sam-
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ples which are quantized by employing the threshold set Q. Fig. 3.4 illustrates the relative
CRB gain as the percentage of the compromised sensors varies from 0% to 45% for different
statistical attack matrices. The relative CRB gain for the distinct statistical attack matrices
with ψ1,0 = ψ1,1 = 0.05, ψ1,0 = ψ1,1 = 0.15, ψ1,0 = ψ1,1 = 0.25, and ψ1,0 = ψ1,1 = 0.35
are marked with rectangles, circles, diamonds, and triangles respectively. It is seen that
the relative CRB gain increases with the percentage of attacked sensors for all cases. As
expected from the discussion after the proof of Theorem 12, Fig. 3.4 depicts that for a given
percentage of attacked sensors, the larger the difference between ψ1,0 = ψ1,1 and 0.5 (where
ψ1,0 + ψ1,1 = 1), the larger the relative CRB gain that the corresponding TQA enjoys.
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Figure 3.4: Relative CRB gain versus the percentage of attacked sensors.
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3.7 Summary
In this chapter, we study the distributed estimation problem using quantized data in the
presence of attacks. The sensor data modifications implemented by the adversaries are sta-
tistically characterized by a set of unknown probability transition matrices. We demonstrate
that the FC is able to identify the attacked sensors and categorize these sensors into different
subsets according to distinct types of attacks perfectly or with a very small percentage of
misclassified sensors, as K →∞ or N →∞ respectively, provided that the set of unattacked
sensors is larger than any of these subsets. In order to improve the estimation performance by
utilizing the attacked sensors, a joint estimation of the statistical description of the attacks
and the parameter to be estimated is considered. However, it is shown that the corresponding
FIM is singular if the previously used data quantization approach is employed. Thus, it is
not possible to accurately estimate the parameters using this approach with an estimate that
would always become more and more accurate as we increase the number of observations.
Aiming to overcome this, the TQA is proposed which divides the observation time interval
at each sensor into several time slots and employs distinct thresholds to quantize the time
samples in different time slots. If the number of time samples at each sensor is not less than
2, then it can be proven that the FIM for all unknown parameters in TQA is nonsingular
which implies that the statistical properties of the attacks and the parameter to be estimated
can be accurately estimated with a sufficiently large number of observations. We also derive
necessary and sufficient condition under which the attacked observations can be taken advan-
tage of to improve the asymptotic estimation performance. A notable fact is that for many
cases, significant improvement in CRB performance for the parameter to be estimated can be
attained by making use of attacked observations in our proposed fashion. However, for some
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specific cases, using the attacked observations will not provide better asymptotic estimation
performance. It is worth mentioning that both the theoretical analysis and numerical results
illustrate that the improvement in CRB performance by utilizing attacked observations in
our proposed fashion depends not only on the statistical description of the attacks and the
parameter to be estimated, but also on the sets of thresholds of the quantizer, which moti-
vates us to pursue the optimum quantizer design for distributed estimation in the presence
of attacks in future work.
3.8 Appendix
3.8.1 Proof of Theorem 9
In order to satisfy the condition in Lemma 9, that is, K > K∗ = −2 ln 2/(κγ∗) as shown
in (3.52), we consider
κ
∆
= −
2 ln 2
γ∗(K − 1)
. (3.101)
Hence, from (3.60), we can obtain that
κ ≤ min
{
∆∆0,∆
2
}
/4. (3.102)
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Let CC denote the complement of C0 ∪ C1(κ), that is,
CC
∆
= (C0 ∪ C1(κ))
C
= {S | S 6⊂ Ap,∀ p}
∩
{
S | ∀ S1, S2 ⊂ S, {S1, S2} ⊂ C0, and S1 ∪ S2 /∈ C0
s.t. PS1 < κ or PS2 < κ
}
. (3.103)
By Lemma 9, for any subset J ∈ C0 ∪ C1(κ) of sensors with percentage PJ ≥ ∆, we
know that as N →∞, Perror → 0, and hence
Pr (̟ (u˜J ) = 1 |J ∈ C1(κ) ) = 1.
Therefore, for any subset J ⊂ ST , if ̟ (u˜J ) = 0, then J ∈ C0 ∪ CC.
From the assumption in (3.10), we know that P < 1/∆ and
κP < ∆2/(4∆) = ∆/4 (3.104)
by employing (3.102). Hence, if J ∈ C0 ∪ CC and PJ ≥ ∆, then by the definition of C0
and CC in (3.13) and (3.103), most of sensors in J must come from some unique Al which
constitute the core subset EJ of J , and the rest of sensors in J come from the other Ap,
∀p 6= l which constitute the minor part E¯J of J . To be specific, the core subset EJ of J is
defined as
EJ
∆
= J ∩ Al (3.105)
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for some unique l, which satisfies
PEJ
∆
= |EJ |/N > PJ − κP > PJ −∆/4 ≥ 3∆/4, (3.106)
and the minor part E¯J of J can be expressed as
E¯J
∆
= J \EJ =
P
∪
p=0, p 6=l
E¯pJ (3.107)
where E¯pJ
∆
= (J \EJ ) ∩ Ap = J ∩ Ap for all p 6= l and moreover
PE¯p
J
∆
= |E¯pJ |/N = |J ∩ Ap|/N < κ. (3.108)
The first inequality in (3.106) and the inequality in (3.108) are due to the definition of C0
and CC in (3.13) and (3.103). The second inequality in (3.106) is from (3.104). Furthermore,
by (3.104), the percentage of the minor part E¯J of J is upper bounded by
PE¯J
∆
=
∣∣E¯J ∣∣ /N = ∣∣∣∣ P∪p=0, p 6=l E¯pJ
∣∣∣∣ /N
=
P∑
p=1, p 6=l
PE¯p
J
< κP < ∆/4. (3.109)
By checking all possible such subsets J with PJ ≥ ∆ and̟ (u˜J ) = 0, one can determine
the collection of the largest subsets {A˜p}
P˜
p=0 ⊂ C0 ∪ CC which satisfies


̟
(
u˜A˜p
)
= 0, P˜p ≥ ∆ ∀p = 0, .., P˜
|A˜i ∩ A˜j|/N < 2κP < 2κ/∆ < ∆/2, ∀i 6= j
P˜
∪
p=0
A˜p =
P
∪
p=0
Ap
, (3.110)
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where the collection of the largest subsets implies that one is unable to replace any A˜l with
A˜∗l such that |A˜
∗
l | > |A˜l| and the new collection of subsets still meets (3.110), and there is
not any other collection of subsets {A˜∗l }
L
l=0 with L < P˜ which also satisfies (3.110).
Since A˜p ∈ C0 ∪ CC and P˜p ≥ ∆ for all p as defined by (3.110), we can replace J with
any A˜p in (3.106), (3.107), (3.108), and (3.109), and the results still hold. The proof of
Theorem 9 can be completed by proving the following bullets.
• The number of groups in {A˜p}
P˜
p=0 equals to the number of attacks, i.e., P˜ = P .
Suppose P˜ < P . Replacing J with A˜l in (3.106), we know that for each l = 0, 1, ..., P˜ ,
A˜l has a core subset EA˜l ⊂ Al˜ for some unique l˜. Thus, there is at least one Ap which doesn’t
contain any core subset of A˜l, ∀l = 0, 1, ..., P˜ . By employing (3.104) and replacing J with
A˜l in (3.108), we can obtain
∣∣∣∣ P˜∪l=0(A˜l ∩ Ap)
∣∣∣∣ /N ≤ P˜∑
l=0
∣∣∣A˜l ∩ Ap∣∣∣ /N = P˜∑
l=0
PE¯p
A˜l
< κ(P˜ + 1) ≤ κP < ∆/4 < Pp. (3.111)
Thus,
Ap 6⊂
P˜
∪
l=0
A˜l, (3.112)
which contradicts the third equation in (3.110). Therefore, P˜ ≥ P .
On the other hand, noting that {Ap}
P
p=0 ⊂ C0 are disjoint and Pp ≥ ∆, ∀p as shown in
(3.10), {Ap}
P
p=0 is a collection of subsets satisfying (3.110). Since {A˜p}
P˜
p=0 is the collection
of the largest subsets, we know P˜ ≤ P . It follows that P˜ = P , since we have proven P˜ ≥ P .
• The core subsets of different groups in {A˜l}
P˜
l=0 are tampered with by distinct types of
attacks.
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Suppose there are two core subsets controlled by the same attack type, then there exists
some Ap which contains at least two core subsets of different groups in {A˜l}
P˜
l=0. Since P˜ = P
and every A˜l only has one core subset which comes from some unique Ap, there is at least
one Ap which doesn’t contain any core subset of A˜l, ∀l = 0, 1, ..., P˜ . By the same argument
in (3.111) and (3.112), we reach a contradiction. Therefore, for different groups A˜l and A˜m,
∀l 6= m, their core subsets EA˜l and EA˜m satisfy that if for some p, EA˜l ⊂ Ap, then
EA˜m 6⊂ Ap. (3.113)
As a result, without loss of generality, we renumber the indices of {A˜l}
P˜
l=0 to satisfy that
the core subset EA˜l of A˜l is contained in Al for all l = 0, 1, ..., P in the following part.
• For all m = 0, 1, ..., P , P˜0 > P˜m and 0 ≤ |P˜m − Pm| = P
∗
m < δ.
Since EA˜m ⊂ Am, by replacing J with A˜m in (3.109), an upper bound on |A˜m\Am|/N
is given by ∣∣∣A˜m\Am∣∣∣ /N = ∣∣∣A˜m\EA˜m ∣∣∣ /N = PE¯A˜m < κP, (3.114)
For all p 6= m, by (3.113), we know that EA˜p 6⊂ Am, and hence by replacing J with A˜p in
(3.108), we can obtain
∣∣∣A˜p ∩ Am∣∣∣ /N = ∣∣∣E¯mA˜p
∣∣∣ /N = PE¯m
A˜p
< κ, (3.115)
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which yields
∣∣∣∣ P˜∪p=0, p 6=m(A˜p ∩ Am)
∣∣∣∣ /N
≤
P˜∑
p=0, p 6=m
∣∣∣A˜p ∩ Am∣∣∣/N < κP. (3.116)
Since ST =
P
∪
p=0
Ap =
P˜
∪
p=0
A˜p, we can obtain A˜
C
m = (
P˜
∪
p=0
A˜p)\A˜m ⊂
P˜
∪
p=0,p 6=m
A˜p, and hence, by
employing (3.116),
∣∣∣Am\A˜m∣∣∣ /N = ∣∣∣Am ∩ A˜Cm∣∣∣ /N
≤
∣∣∣∣ P˜∪p=0, p 6=m(A˜p ∩ Am)
∣∣∣∣ /N < κP. (3.117)
Thus, (3.114) and (3.117) yield
P˜0 = |A˜0|/N ≥ |A0 ∩ A˜0|/N
=
(
|A0| − |A0\A˜0|
)
/N > P0 − κP, and (3.118)
P˜m = |A˜m|/N ≤ |Am ∪ A˜m|/N
=
(
|Am|+ |A˜m\Am|
)
/N < Pm + κP, (3.119)
and hence, by employing (3.102) and noticing that P < 1/∆,
P˜0 − P˜m > P0 − Pm − 2κP > ∆0 − 2κP
> ∆0 − 2κ/∆ > ∆0/2 > 0. (3.120)
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Furthermore, we can obtain from (3.114) and (3.117) that
P∗m =
∣∣∣(A˜m\Am) ∪ (Am\A˜m)∣∣∣ /N
≤
∣∣∣A˜m\Am∣∣∣ /N + ∣∣∣Am\A˜m∣∣∣ /N < 2κP. (3.121)
Finally, we conclude the proof by noting that
0 ≤ |P˜m − Pm| =
∣∣∣|A˜m| − |Am|∣∣∣ /N
≤
(
|A˜m ∪ Am| − |A˜m ∩ Am|
)
/N = P∗m < 2κP
< 2
(
−
2 ln 2
(K − 1)γ∗
)
1
∆
= δ. (3.122)
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Chapter 4
Functional Forms of Optimum
Spoofing Attacks for Vector
Parameter Estimation in Quantized
Sensor Networks
4.1 Introduction
Recent developments in sensor technology have encouraged a large number of appli-
cations of sensor networks for parameter estimation ranging from inexpensive commercial
systems to complex military and homeland defense surveillance systems [49]. Typically,
large-scale sensor networks are comprised of low-cost and spatially distributed sensor nodes
with limited battery power and low computing capacity, which makes the system vulnerable
to cyberattacks by adversaries. This has led to great interest in studying the vulnerability
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of sensor networks in various applications and from different perspectives, see [61,69–73] and
the references therein. Due to the dominance of digital technology, a great deal of attention
has focused on parameter estimation using quantized data [50, 51, 53, 54, 56]. The sequel
considers the problem of estimating a vector parameter by using quantized data collected
from a distributed sensor network under the assumption that the measurements from several
subsets of sensors have been falsified by spoofing attacks, a topic that has received virtually
no attention to date. To be specific, the spoofing attacks maliciously modify the temporal
analog measurements of the phenomenon acquired at the subset of attacked sensors.
4.1.1 System and Adversary Models
Consider a distributed sensor network SN consisting of N spatially distributed sensors,
each making some measurements of a particular phenomenon. We assume that the j-th
sensor acquires Kj measurements, and we denote the before-attack measurement of the j-th
sensor at time instant k by xjk which follows a pdf fj (xjk |θ ) depending on an unknown
deterministic vector parameter θ with dimension Dθ that is desired to estimate for the
measurements. For simplicity, we assume that the measurements {xjk} from the same sensor
j but for different times (k 6= k′) are statistically independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.), while the measurements from different sensors are statistically independent but not
necessarily identically distributed.
The adversaries alter the physical phenomenon as in Fig. 4.1, thus tampering with the
measurements at a subset of sensors in the sensor network, hoping to undermine the estima-
tion performance of the system. Let V ⊂ SN denote the set of sensors undergoing spoofing
attacks while the set U
∆
= SN\V represents the set of unattacked sensors. A generalized math-
ematical model of spoofing attacks which maliciously modify the distribution of the analog
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Figure 4.1: Distributed estimation system in the presence of spoofing attacks.
observations of the physical phenomenon at the attacked sensors is considered employing
general probability density functions {fj} and {gj} which depend of the desired and attack
vector parameters. To conform to previous work, the functional forms of the attacks, thus
{fj} and {gj}, are assumed known to the attacked system but the desired and attack vector
parameters are not. Thus, the after-attack version x˜jk of xjk obeys the statistical model
that1 {x˜jk} is independent over j and i.i.d. over k, moreover,
x˜jk ∼


fj (xjk |θ ) , if j ∈ U
gj
(
xjk
∣∣θ, ξ(j) ) , if j ∈ V , (4.1)
where if j ∈ V, the after-attack pdf gj(xjk|θ, ξ
(j)) is parameterized by the desired vector
parameter θ and the attack vector parameter ξ(j). It is worth mentioning that the notation2
gj(x|θ, ξ
(j)) does not imply that the after-attack pdf gj(x|θ, ξ
(j)) of the measurements at the
1The notations x˜jk and u˜jk denote the after-attack analog measurements and the corresponding quantized
measurements.
2Since the temporal analog measurments at the same sensor are assumed to be i.i.d, we use fj(x|θ) and
gj(x|θ, ξ
(j)) instead of fj(xjk|θ) and gj(xjk|θ, ξ
(j)) in the following for the sake of notational simplicity.
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j-th sensor has to depend on θ. For example, the adversaries can intercept the signal from
the physical phenomenon and generate a new signal using some different pdf solely based on
its attack vector parameter. A detailed example of a practical attack of the type described
in (1) is provided in Section 4.2.
The set V of attacked sensors can be divided into disjoint subsets {Ap}
P
p=1 in terms of
distinct attack vector parameters {ξ(j)} such that
V =
P
∪
p=1
Ap, and Al ∩ Am = ∅, ∀l 6= m, (4.2)
where the attacked sensors in the subset Ap are known by the system under attack to employ
an identical attack vector parameter τ (p) with dimension Dp so that ξ
(j) = τ (p), ∀j ∈ Ap.
The identical attack vectors are possibly due to the sensors in Ap being attacked by the same
attacker. For the sake of notational simplicity, we use A0 to denote the set U of unattacked
sensors and let Np denote the number of sensors contained in Ap for all p = 0, 1, ..., P .
Due to the communications employed, each sensor is restricted to convert analog mea-
surements to digital data before transmitting this data to the fusion center (FC) as shown in
Fig. 4.1. At the j-th sensor, each after-attack measurement x˜jk is quantized to u˜jk by using
a Rj-level quantizer with quantization regions {I
(r)
j }
Rj
r=1, that is,
u˜jk =
Rj∑
r=1
r1
{
x˜jk ∈ I
(r)
j
}
. (4.3)
We adopt this general quantization model due to the fact that optimized quantization regions
{I
(r)
j }
Rj
r=1 for different sensors can be very different, since the measurements from different
sensors do not necessarily obey an identical pdf [51,74]. We assume that the quantizer design
111
{I
(r)
j }
Rj
r=1 for each sensor is predefined and known to the FC, but not the attacker.
Let Θ denote a vector containing the unknown parameter θ along with all the unknown
attack vector parameters which parameterize the spoofing attacks in the sensor network
Θ
∆
=
[
θT ,
(
τ (1)
)T
, ...,
(
τ (P )
)T]T
. (4.4)
For the sake of notational simplicity in the following parts, we use p
(r)
j to denote the after-
attack probability mass function (pmf) of the quantized measurement u˜jk evaluated at u˜jk =
r, that is,
p
(r)
j
∆
= Pr (u˜jk = r |Θ )
=


∫
I
(r)
j
fj (x |θ ) dx, ∀j ∈ A0∫
I
(r)
j
gj
(
x
∣∣θ, τ (p) ) dx, ∀j ∈ Ap, ∀p ≥ 1 . (4.5)
For simplicity, the communication channel between the FC and each sensor is assumed
ideal, and hence the FC is able to accurately receive what was transmitted from both the
unattacked and attacked sensors. After receiving the quantized data from all sensors, the
FC attempts to make an estimate of the desired vector parameter without knowing which
sensors have been tampered nor the attack parameters used by the attackers.
4.1.2 Performance Metric
It is of considerable interest to investigate the performance of spoofing attacks, and
mathematically characterize the class of the most devastating spoofing attacks under the as-
sumption that the adversaries have no information about what computations the FC is using.
Hence, this chapter develops guarantees for the attacker’s performance that are independent
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of the computations performed at the FC. It is clear that if the FC has the information about
the attack groupings for the sensors, i.e., {Ap}, it can use this information to improve esti-
mation performance over the case where this information is not employed, since the FC can
always do better in estimating the desired vector parameter with extra knowledge. There-
fore, for the case of spoofing attacks employing some specific {fj(x|θ)} and {gj(x|θ, τ
(p))},
the case where the compromised sensors are well identified and categorized into P different
groups according to distinct types of spoofing attacks by the FC corresponds to the case
where the FC has the best chance to combat the spoofing attacks. In other words, the best
possible estimation performance (smallest error) under this case provides a lower bound on
the estimation performance for any other cases, which implies that the corresponding spoofin-
g attack performance under this case provides a guaranteed attack performance in degrading
the estimation performance no matter what computations the FC is using. The recent work
in [73] has shown that for some classes of spoofing attacks, with a sufficient number of ob-
servations, the FC is able to perfectly identify the set of unattacked sensors and categorize
the attacked sensors into different groups according to distinct types of spoofing attacks.
For these reasons, we adopt the following definition of the optimal guaranteed degradation
spoofing attacks in this chapter.
Definition 1 Consider attacks employing {fj(x|θ)} and {gj(x|θ, τ
(p))}. The optimal guar-
anteed degradation spoofing attack (OGDSA) maximizes the degradation of the Cramer-Rao
Bound (CRB) for the vector parameter of interest at the FC when the attacked sensors are
well identified and categorized according to distinct types of spoofing attacks by the FC.
The estimation performance for a vector parameter in a distributed sensor network
can be expressed using an error correlation matrix. However, in most cases, a closed form
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expression for the error correlation matrix is intractable. Thus the CRB, an asymptotically
achievable lower bound on the error correlation matrix, is employed inDefinition 1. It is worth
mentioning that the optimal guaranteed degradation spoofing attack defined in Definition 1
achieves the classical definition of attack optimality (largest CRB) for the scenario where
the FC has the best chance to combat the spoofing attacks. It might not be the classically
optimal spoofing attack for the scenario where the FC is unable to determine which sensors
are attacked, or to classify sensors into groups of distinct types of spoofing attacks. However,
the OGDSAs defined in Definition 1 can provide a guarantee that the actual degradation in
the CRB must exceed some critical value no matter what computations the estimation system
employs. This guarantee makes OGDSA an excellent spoofing attack from the adversaries’
point of view.
4.1.3 Summary of Results and Main Contributions
Unlike previous work, a generalized attack model is employed which manipulates the
data using transformations with arbitrary functional forms determined by some attack pa-
rameters whose values are unknown to the attacked system. For the first time, necessary and
sufficient conditions are provided under which these transformations provide an OGDSA.
These conditions imply that, for an OGDSA, either the Fisher Information Matrix (FIM)
under the conditions of Definition 1 for jointly estimating the desired and attack parameters
is singular or that the attacked system is unable to improve the CRB under the conditions
of Definition 1 for the desired vector parameter through this joint estimation even though
the joint FIM is nonsingular. It is shown that it is always possible to construct an OGDSA
by properly employing a sufficiently large dimension attack vector parameter relative to the
number of quantization levels employed, which was not observed previously. It is shown
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that a spoofing attack can render the attacked measurements useless in terms of reducing
the CRB under the conditions of Definition 1 for estimating the desired vector parameter if
and only if it is an OGDSA. For a class of OGDSAs, a computationally efficient heuristic is
developed for the joint identification of the attacked sensors and estimation of the desired
vector parameter which, in numerical tests for a sufficiently large number of observations,
achieves a genie bound that knows all the groups of identically attacked sensors.
4.1.4 Related Work
In recent years, the estimation problem under different attacks has seen great interest in
various engineering applications, see [9, 61, 69–73, 75–77] and the references therein. Rather
than the man-in-the-middle attacks which falsify the data transmitted from the sensors to
the FC [61, 72], we are primarily interested in spoofing attacks in the distributed sensor
estimation system in this chapter, which maliciously modify the measurements of the physical
phenomenon at a subset of sensors, see Fig. 4.1.
As previously introduced, spoofing attacks have been widely considered in wireless sensor
networks, smart grids, radar systems and sonar systems [9, 69–71, 73, 75–78]. Each of these
recent works takes one specific type of spoofing attack into account, and investigates the
attack or the estimation performance. In this chapter, we don’t focus on one specific type
of spoofing attack. Instead, we consider a generalized attack model which can describe the
different kinds of spoofing attacks employed in all recent work, and moreover, we make use
of this generalized model to provide uniform tools to test if a spoofing attack is optimal in
our defined sense. Both CRB-based analysis and a finite sample sized estimation approach
are presented for a class of OGDSAs provided in this chapter.
Another difference between our work and other recent work on spoofing attacks in [9,
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69–71, 75–78] is that we consider a distributed sensor estimation system which employs a
quantization using a finite alphabet at each sensor which is typically the case in practice.
Interestingly, we show that the quantization limits the capacity of the estimation system to
combat the spoofing attacks. In partcular, it is shown that the adversaries can launch a class
of quantization induced OGDSAs which are easily constructed in practice.
4.1.5 Notation
Throughout this chapter, bold upper case letters and bold lower case letters are used to
denote matrices and column vectors respectively. The symbol 1(·) stands for the indicator
function. Let [A]i,j denote the element in the i-th row and j-th column of the matrix A,
and R(A) represents the range space of A. A ≻ 0 and A  0 imply that the matrix is
positive definite and positive semidefinite respectively. To avoid cumbersome sub-matrix and
sub-vector expressions in this chapter, we introduce the following notation. The notation
[A]S,: stands for the sub-matrix of A which consists of the elements with row indices in the
set S, and [A]1:N represents the N -by-N leading principle minor of A. The i-th element of
the vector v is denoted by vi, and [v]S represents the sub-vector of v which only contains
the elements with indices in the set S. The symbols ∇vf and ∇
2
vf respectively signify the
gradient and Hessian of f with respect to v. Finally, the expectation and rank operators are
denoted by E (·) and rank(·) respectively.
4.2 Illustrative Example of a Practical Spoofing Attack
Spoofing attacks on sensor networks can occur in various engineering applications. For
instance, spoofing attacks have been described for the localization problem in wireless sensor
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networks, see [69, 70] and the references therein. Table I in [69] provides a summary of
different types of spoofing attack threats for the localization problem. Radar and sonar
systems also suffer from spoofing attack threats in practice. As one example of a spoofing
attack technique, the application of an electronic countermeasure (ECM), which is designed to
jam or deceive the radar or sonar system, can critically degrade the detection and estimation
performance of the system [79]. One popular technique for the implementation of ECM
employs digital radio frequency memory (DRFM) in radar systems to manipulate the received
signal and retransmit it back to confuse the victim radar system. DRFM can mislead the
estimation of the range of the target by altering the delay in transmission of pulses, and fool
the system into incorrectly estimating the velocity of the target by introducing a Doppler
shift in the retransmitted signal [75]. An example of a spoofing attack created by nature is
environmental variation in shallow water sonar systems. According to waveguide-invariant
theory [80], the environmental variation, such as sound-speed or water-depth perturbations,
essentially introduces an apparent shift in the position of the target of interest when the data
is processed by matched field processing [78, 81]. Hence these environmental variations can
be treated as spoofing attacks which falsify the physical model of the received signal in sonar
systems. More recently, the data-injection attack considered in smart grids is another typical
example of a spoofing attack, see [9, 71,76,77] and the references therein.
In order to motivate the mathematical description of spoofing attacks, we consider a
spoofing attack utilizing a DRFM in a radar system as an example, which stores the received
signal and strategically retransmits it back by introducing an additional delay to mislead
the estimation of the range of the target. In the absence of spoofing attacks, the simplified
signal model of the measurement xj at the j-th receiver at time instant tj , which ignores the
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Doppler shift, can be expressed as
xj =
√
Ejajs (tj − θj) + nj, (4.6)
where s(·), Ej and aj respectively represent the transmitted signal, the transmitted energy,
and the reflection coefficient. The time delay is denoted by θj which is the parameter to be
estimated. We assume that the clutter-plus-noise nj is a zero-mean Gaussian random variable
with known variance σ2j while all other quantities in (4.6) are deterministic. As a result, the
probability density function (pdf) fj(xj |θj) of xj in the absence of spoofing attacks is given
by3
fj (xj |θj ) = N
(√
Ejajs (tj − θj) , σ
2
j
)
. (4.7)
In the presence of a spoofing attack, the after-attack measurement x˜j can be described as
x˜j =
√
Ejajs (tj − θj − ξj) + nj, (4.8)
where ξj is the delay introduced by the DRFM. Therefore, we can obtain the corresponding
after-attack pdf of x˜j
gj (x˜j |θj, ξj ) = N
(√
Ejajs (tj − θj − ξj) , σ
2
j
)
= fj (x˜j |θj + ξj ) . (4.9)
In this example, the after-attack pdf gj(x˜j |θj, ξj) and the before-attack pdf fj(xj |θj) are in
the same family as shown in (4.9), i.e., the family of Gaussian distributions with the same
3N (a, b) denotes a Gaussian pdf with mean a and variance b.
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variance σ2j . While this may not always be true, the after-attack pdf is generally not only
parameterized by the desired parameter θj but also by an unknown attack parameter ξj .
Motivated by this example and other popular spoofing attack examples, such as those
in [9, 69–71, 73, 75–78], the essential impact of a spoofing attack, which maliciously modifies
the measurements at the j-th sensor in a manner similar to (4.8), can be described as a
mapping which maps the before-attack pdf fj(x|θ) of the measurements at the j-th sensor to
an after-attack pdf gj(x|θ, ξ
(j)), where θ and ξ(j) account for the desired vector parameter
and the attack vector parameter at the j-th sensor which represents those deterministic
unknowns which can determine the after-attack pdf.
4.3 The Optimality of Spoofing Attacks
In this section, we pursue the explicit characterization of the optimal spoofing attack
defined in Definition 1. The adversaries can attempt to maximize CRB for θ in the positive
semidefinite sense to achieve an optimal spoofing attack as per Definition 1. The FIM JΘ
for Θ is defined as [82]
[JΘ]l,m
∆
= −E
{
∂2L (Θ)
∂Θl∂Θm
}
, (4.10)
where L (Θ) denotes the log-likelihood function.
When the attacked senors are well identified and categorized into different groups accord-
ing to distinct types of spoofing attacks, the log-likelihood function L (Θ) in (4.10) evaluated
at
u˜
∆
=[u˜11, u˜12, ..., u˜1K1 , u˜21, ..., u˜NKN ]
T =r
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can be expressed as
L (Θ) = lnPr (u˜ = r |Θ )
=
P∑
p=0
∑
j∈Ap
Kj∑
k=1
Rj∑
r=1
1 {rjk = r} ln p
(r)
j (4.11)
by employing (4.5).
By substituting the expression of the log-likelihood function L (Θ) in (4.11) into the
definition of the FIM in (4.10), it can be shown that the FIM JΘ for Θ takes the form
JΘ
∆
=


Jθ B1 B2 · · · BP
BT1 Jτ (1) 0 · · · 0
BT2 0 Jτ (2)
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
. . . 0
BTP 0 · · · 0 Jτ (P )


(4.12)
where Jθ ∈ R
Dθ×Dθ , Jτ (p) ∈ R
Dp×Dp , and Bp ∈ RDθ×Dp for all p = 1, 2, ..., P . Moreover,
following from (4.4) and (4.10), we can obtain that ∀p
Jτ (p) =
∑
j∈Ap
Rj∑
r=1
Kj
p
(r)
j
∂p
(r)
j
∂τ (p)
[
∂p
(r)
j
∂τ (p)
]T
, (4.13)
Bp =
∑
j∈Ap
Rj∑
r=1
Kj
p
(r)
j
∂p
(r)
j
∂θ
[
∂p
(r)
j
∂τ (p)
]T
, (4.14)
and
Jθ =
P∑
p=0
JAp , (4.15)
120
where JAp , which is contributed from the measurements observed at the sensors in Ap, is
defined as
JAp
∆
=
∑
j∈Ap
Rj∑
r=1
Kj
p
(r)
j
∂p
(r)
j
∂θ
[
∂p
(r)
j
∂θ
]T
. (4.16)
By denoting the indices of sensors in Ap by {j
p
i }
Np
i=1, we define the matrices Φθ(p) and
Φτ (p) for all p as
Φθ(p)
∆
=
[
φθ
(p)
jp11
,φθ
(p)
jp12
, ...,φθ
(p)
jp1Rjp1
,φθ
(p)
jp21
, ...,φθ
(p)
jp
Np
R
j
p
Np
]
, (4.17)
and
Φτ (p)
∆
=
[
φτ
(p)
jp11
,φτ
(p)
jp12
, ...,φτ
(p)
jp1Rjp1
,φτ
(p)
jp21
, ...,φτ
(p)
jp
Np
R
j
p
Np
]
, (4.18)
where the vectors φθ
(p)
jr and φ
τ (p)
jr in (4.17) and (4.18) are given by
φθ
(p)
jr
∆
=
√
Kj
p
(r)
j
∂p
(r)
j
∂θ
and φτ
(p)
jr
∆
=
√
Kj
p
(r)
j
∂p
(r)
j
∂τ (p)
. (4.19)
By employing the singular value decomposition of Φθ(p) and Φτ (p) for all p
Φτ (p)=Uτ (p)Λτ (p)V
T
τ (p)
and Φθ(p)=Uθ(p)Λθ(p)V
T
θ(p)
, (4.20)
the expressions of Jτ (p) , Bp, and Jθ in (4.13)–(4.15) can be written in compact forms following
Jτ (p) = Φτ (p)Φ
T
τ (p)
= Uτ (p)Λτ (p)Λ
T
τ (p)
UT
τ (p)
, (4.21)
Bp = Φθ(p)Φ
T
τ (p)
, (4.22)
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and
Jθ =
P∑
p=0
JAp =
P∑
p=0
Φθ(p)Φ
T
θ(p)
=
P∑
p=0
Uθ(p)Λθ(p)Λ
T
θ(p)
UT
θ(p)
. (4.23)
4.3.1 Inestimable Spoofing Attacks
Next we show that just due to the sensor system employing a quantization with a limited
alphabet, the adversaries can launch a class of spoofing attacks which bring about a singular
FIM JΘ due to the singularity of Jτ (p) for some p ∈ {1, 2, ..., P}. We formally define these
inestimable spoofing attacks as follows.
Definition 2 (Inestimable spoofing attack) The p-th spoofing attack is referred to as an
inestimable spoofing attack (ISA) if the corresponding Jτ (p) defined in (4.13) is singular.
From (4.13), we have the following result with regard to the singularity of Jτ (p) .
Theorem 13 For the p-th spoofing attack, if the dimension Dp of the attack parameter τ
(p)
satisfies
Dp >
∑
j∈Ap
Rj − |Ap|, (4.24)
then Jτ (p) is singular, and furthermore, the FIM JΘ is also singular.
Proof: It is clear that
Rj∑
r=1
p
(r)
j = 1, (4.25)
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for all j. Hence, we can obtain that
Rj∑
r=1
∂p
(r)
j
∂τ (p)
= 0, ∀j, (4.26)
which yields
rank

 Rj∑
r=1
∂p
(r)
j
∂τ (p)
[
∂p
(r)
j
∂τ (p)
]T ≤ Rj − 1, ∀j. (4.27)
Thus, the rank of Jτ (p) is bounded above as per
rank (Jτ (p)) = rank

∑
j∈Ap
Rj∑
r=1
Kj
p
(r)
j
∂p
(r)
j
∂τ (p)
[
∂p
(r)
j
∂τ (p)
]T
≤
∑
j∈Ap
rank

 Rj∑
r=1
∂p
(r)
j
∂τ (p)
[
∂p
(r)
j
∂τ (p)
]T
≤
∑
j∈Ap
(Rj − 1)
=
∑
j∈Ap
Rj − |Ap| (4.28)
Since Jτ (p) is a Dp-by-Dp positive semidefinite matrix, we know that Jτ (p) is singular if
Dp >
∑
j∈Ap Rj − |Ap|. Finally, the proof concludes by noting that JΘ is singular as long as
Jτ (p) is singular.
The proof of Theorem 13 demonstrates that the rank of Jτ (p) is upper bounded by the
sum of the sizes of the alphabet sets employed at the sensors under the p-th spoofing attack
minus the size of Ap. This implies that the numbers of quantization levels employed at the
compromised sensors will limit the size of the attack vector parameter the quantized esti-
mation system can estimate with accuracy that increases with more observations. Theorem
13 provides a sufficient condition under which inestimable spoofing attacks can be launched.
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Thus, these inestimable spoofing attacks, which are quantization induced, can be easily con-
structed in practice, even without any information about the value of θ and the quantization
regions {I
(r)
j } at each sensor. Further, if the adversaries have knowledge of the number of
quantization levels of each attacked sensor, they know the minimum size of the attack vector
parameter they can employ to ensure an inestimable spoofing attack. One simple example of
an inestimable spoofing attack employs Dp >
∑
j∈Ap Rj − |Ap| and
x˜jk =
Dp∑
i=1
τ
(p)
i (xjk)
i . (4.29)
If (4.24) is not satisfied, the inestimability is determined by the {I
(r)
j } employed at the
attacked sensors and the set of after-attack pdfs {gj(x|θ, τ
(p))}. From (4.21), it is seen that
the inestimability of the p-th spoofing attack is equivalent to
rank (Λτ (p)) < Dp. (4.30)
In the presence of inestimable spoofing attacks, the FIM JΘ for joint estimation of the
desired vector parameter and the attack vector parameters is singular, which implies that the
FC is unable to improve the estimation of θ via jointly estimating θ and the attack vector
parameters in the CRB sense. If (4.30) is true for all p = 1, 2, ..., P , this means the best the
FC can do in this sense is to estimate θ using only unattacked data, and hence the CRB for
θ in such case can be obtained as
CRBISA (θ) = J
−1
A0 = Uθ(0)
(
Λθ(0)Λ
T
θ(0)
)−1
UT
θ(0)
(4.31)
by employing (4.23).
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4.3.2 Optimal Estimable Spoofing Attacks
In this section, we focus on estimable spoofing attacks which are defined as follows.
Definition 3 (Estimable spoofing attack) The p-th spoofing attack is said to be estimable
if the corresponding Jτ (p) defined in (4.13) is nonsingular.
Without loss of generality, we assume all spoofing attacks are estimable in this subsection.
Otherwise, we can eliminate the observations at ISA sensors, and just consider the joint
estimation of the desired vector parameter θ and the estimable attack vector parameters.
From (4.12) and (4.15), we can obtain the CRB for θ in the presence of estimable spoofing
attacks as
[
J−1
Θ
]
1:Dθ
=

Jθ − P∑
p=1
BpJ
−1
τ (p)
BTp

−1
=

JA0 + P∑
p=1
(
JAp −BpJ
−1
τ (p)
BTp
)−1. (4.32)
In the following theorem, we provide an upper bound on the CRB for θ in (4.32) in the
positive semidefinite sense.
Theorem 14 In the presence of estimable spoofing attacks, the CRB for θ is bounded above
as per
CRBESA (θ) =
[
J−1
Θ
]
1:Dθ
 J−1A0 . (4.33)
Equality in (4.33) holds if and only if ∀p = 1, 2, ..., P ,
R
(
Vθ(p)Λ
T
θ(p)
)
⊆ R
(
Vτ (p)Λ
T
τ (p)
)
. (4.34)
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Proof: Let’s first examine the term in the sum in (4.32). Noticing by (4.21), (4.22) and
(4.23), we can express JAp −BpJ
−1
τ (p)
BTp as
JAp −BpJ
−1
τ (p)
BTp
=Φθ(p)Φ
T
θ(p)
−Φθ(p)Φ
T
τ (p)
(
Φτ (p)Φ
T
τ (p)
)−1
Φτ (p)Φ
T
θ(p)
. (4.35)
Denote
D
∆
=
(
Φτ (p)Φ
T
τ (p)
)−1
Φτ (p)Φ
T
θ(p)
, (4.36)
then by employing (4.35), we can obtain that
JAp −BpJ
−1
τ (p)
BTp
=
(
ΦT
θ(p)
−ΦT
τ (p)
D
)T (
ΦT
θ(p)
−ΦT
τ (p)
D
)
 0. (4.37)
What’s more, the equality in (4.37) is attained if and only if
ΦT
θ(p)
−ΦT
τ (p)
D = 0,∀p ≥ 1, (4.38)
which is equivalent to ∀p ≥ 1,
Vτ (p)
[
I−ΛT
τ (p)
(
Λτ (p)Λ
T
τ (p)
)−1
Λτ (p)
]
VT
τ (p)
Vθ(p)Λ
T
θ(p)
=0,
and therefore, we can obtain that
R
(
Vθ(p)Λ
T
θ(p)
)
⊆ R
(
Vτ (p)Λ
T
τ (p)
)
,∀p ≥ 1. (4.39)
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Consequently, from (4.32), (4.37), and (4.39), we can conclude that
[
J−1
Θ
]
1:Dθ
 J−1A0 , (4.40)
with equality if and only if ∀p = 1, 2, ..., P ,
R
(
Vθ(p)Λ
T
θ(p)
)
⊆ R
(
Vτ (p)Λ
T
τ (p)
)
. (4.41)
In Theorem 14, we provide the necessary and sufficient conditions under which the
estimable spoofing attacks can deteriorate the CRB for estimating θ to its upper bound as
shown in (4.33). We formally define this class of optimal estimable spoofing attacks next.
Definition 4 (Optimal Estimable Spoofing Attack) An estimable spoofing attack which
satisfies the necessary and sufficient condition in (4.34) is called an optimal estimable spoofing
attack (OESA).
The physical meanings of the terms in (4.32) and the insight into Theorem 14 deserve
some discussion. The term JA0 represents the information on θ embedded in the data from
A0, while JAp indicates the information on θ that can be provided by the data from Ap if
τ (p) is known to the FC. The term BpJ
−1
τ (p)
BTp specifies the degradation of the information on
θ from Ap, which is induced by the uncertainty of τ
(p). By considering the interpretations of
these terms, the insight into Theorem 14 is that if and only if (4.34) holds, the uncertainty
of τ (p) can reduce the information on θ conveyed by the data from Ap to 0 in which case the
sum in the inverse does not contribute to (4.32). Moreover, Theorem 14 points out that the
degradation BpJ
−1
τ (p)
BTp cannot be strictly larger than JAp .
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Theorem 14 also describes how to design optimal estimable spoofing attacks. The ad-
versaries choose {gj(x|θ, τ
(p))} to meet the necessary and sufficient condition in (4.34). One
trivial example of OESA, which may be relatively easy to detect, is to replace the original
measurements at the attacked sensors by some regenerated data obeying a distribution not
parameterized by θ, which leads to Φθ(p) = 0 for all p ≥ 1, and therefore, (4.34) is satisfied.
In the following part, some typical OESA examples of practical interest are investigated.
Corollary 1 If the spoofing attacks are such that for any p ≥ 1, ∃λp satisfying
Φθ(p) = λpΦτ (p) , (4.42)
then the CRB [J−1
Θ
]1:Dθ for θ will be maximized in the positive semidefinite sense, more
specifically [
J−1
Θ
]
1:Dθ
= J−1A0 . (4.43)
Furthermore, the necessary and sufficient condition under which (4.42) is satisfied for any θ,
τ (p) and {I
(r)
j } is that ∀j ∈ Ap, the after-attack pdf gj(x|θ, τ
(p)) can be expressed as
gj
(
x
∣∣∣θ, τ (p)) = g˜j (x ∣∣∣λpθ + τ (p)) , (4.44)
for some g˜j.
Proof: Note that if for any p ≥ 1, ∃λp such that
Φθ(p) = λpΦτ (p) , (4.45)
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then ∀p ≥ 1, Dθ = Dp and
R
(
Vθ(p)Λ
T
θ(p)
)
⊆ R
(
Vτ (p)Λ
T
τ (p)
)
.
Thus, by Theorem 14, we can obtain that
[
J−1
Θ
]
1:Dθ
= J−1A0 . (4.46)
In addition, (4.45) is equivalent to
∂p
(r)
j
∂θ
= λp
∂p
(r)
j
∂τ (p)
, ∀j ∈ Ap, ∀r. (4.47)
Noticing by (4.5), in order to render (4.47) be assured for any θ, τ (p) and {I
(r)
j }, the adver-
saries need to ensure that
∂
∂θ
gj
(
x
∣∣∣θ, τ (p)) = λp ∂
∂τ (p)
gj
(
x
∣∣∣θ, τ (p)) (4.48)
for all j ∈ Ap and for any θ and τ
(p).
It is clear that if
gj
(
x
∣∣∣θ, τ (p)) = g˜j (x ∣∣∣λpθ + τ (p)) , (4.49)
for some g˜j, then (4.48) holds. On the other hand, if (4.48) is true for any θ and τ
(p), then
∀l = 1, 2, ...,Dθ ,
(1,−λp)


∂
∂θl
gj
(
x
∣∣∣{θm}m6=l, {τ (p)m }m6=l, θl, τ (p)l )
∂
∂τ
(p)
l
gj
(
x
∣∣∣{θm}m6=l, {τ (p)m }m6=l, θl, τ (p)l )

=0
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for any θ and τ (p), which implies that the gradient of gj(x|{θm}m6=l, {τ
(p)
m }m6=l, θl, τ
(p)
l ) with
respect to [θl, τ
(p)
l ]
T is parallel to the vector [λp, 1]
T for any θl and τ
(p)
l . Therefore, for any l,
if
(λp, 1)

 0
t

 = (λp, 1)

 θl
τ
(p)
l

 , (4.50)
that is, t = λpθl + τ
(p)
l , then we can obtain that
gj
(
x
∣∣∣{θm}m6=l, {τ (p)m }m6=l, 0, t)
= gj
(
x
∣∣∣{θm}m6=l, {τ (p)m }m6=l, θl, τ (p)l ) . (4.51)
As a result, for any l, by employing (4.51) and defining
g˜j,l
(
x
∣∣∣{θm}m6=l, {τ (p)m }m6=l, t)
∆
= gj
(
x
∣∣∣{θm}m6=l, {τ (p)m }m6=l, 0, t) , (4.52)
we can express gj(x|{θm}m6=l, {τ
(p)
m }m6=l, θl, τ
(p)
l ) as
gj
(
x
∣∣∣{θm}m6=l, {τ (p)m }m6=l, θl, τ (p)l )
= g˜j,l
(
x
∣∣∣{θm}m6=l, {τ (p)m }m6=l, λpθl + τ (p)l ) (4.53)
for some g˜j,l, which implies that
gj
(
x
∣∣∣θ, τ (p)) = g˜j (x ∣∣∣λpθ + τ (p)) (4.54)
for some g˜j .
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As demonstrated by Corollary 1, if the spoofing attack gives rise to an after-attack pdf
gj(x|θ, τ
(p)) which is only parameterized by the sum of λpθ and τ
(p) for any λp, then the
spoofing attack is optimal in the sense of Definition 4. This class of OESAs are interesting
and powerful in practice, since their optimality is independent of the values of the desired
vector parameter and the attack vector parameter. The DRFM example discussed in the
introduction which introduces a time delay is one example of this class of OESAs (with
λp = 1). For the scenario where the desired parameter is the mean of the observations,
which is a popular signal model for sensor network estimation systems with quantized data
[51, 54, 56, 72], this class of OESAs can be easily launched by just adding an offset to the
measurements at each attacked sensor.
Another representative example of the class of OESAs described by (4.44) is extensively
considered in smart grid systems under the name data-injection attacks, see [9,71,76,77] and
the references therein. At time instant k, the direct current power flow model in the absence
of spoofing attacks can be expressed as
xk = Hθ + nk. (4.55)
Considering the p-th data-injection attack, the after-attack measurements from the sensors
in Ap at time instant k are given by
[x˜k]Ap = [xk]Ap + a
(p) = [H]Ap,:θ + a
(p) + [nk]Ap , (4.56)
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where a(p) represents the data injected by the p-th spoofing attack. If the adversaries choose
a(p) such that
a(p) = [H]Ap,:τ
(p) (4.57)
for some τ (p), then the after-attack measurements from the sensors in Ap can be equivalently
written as
[x˜k]Ap = [H]Ap,:
(
θ + τ (p)
)
+ [nk]Ap , (4.58)
and therefore, (4.44) is satisfied by the data-injection attack. Further, by Corollary 1, the
CRB for θ is maximized in the positive semidefinite sense if all the attacks are of this type.
Moreover, it can be shown that the stealth attack or undetectable attack in [9,71,76], which
attracts extensive attention in recent literature on smart grids, is just such an attack with
P = 1.
In addition to the class of OESAs described in (4.44), there are many other OESAs. For
example, if the p-th spoofing attack satisfies that ∀j ∈ Ap, gj(x|θ, τ
(p)) = g˜j(x|hj(θ, τ
(p)))
for some g˜j and some symmetric function hj of θ and τ
(p), then it can be shown that the
p-th spoofing attack is an OESA provided that the values of τ (p) and θ are equal.
4.3.3 Discussion
Under the conditions ofDefinition 1, it is clear that J−1A0 is an upper bound on the CRB for
θ, no matter what kind of attacks have been launched. From (4.31) and Theorem 14, the CRB
for θ under ISA or OESA equals to its upper bound J−1A0 . Therefore, according to Definition 1,
both ISA and OESA are OGDSAs. Furthermore, note thatΛτ (p) is aDp×(
∑
j∈Ap Rj) matrix,
and hence, rank(Λτ (p)) ≤ Dp. Thus, any OGDSA is either an ISA when rank(Λτ (p)) < Dp,
or an OESA when rank(Λτ (p)) = Dp.
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A particular note of interest is that the results in Section 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 can be used
to judge whether the attacked measurements are useful or not in terms of reducing CRB
under the conditions of Definition 1. In particular, it is seen from (4.31) and Theorem 14
that the CRB for θ in the presence of ISA or OESA is the same as the CRB for θ when only
unattacked data is used. Thus, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 2 Under the conditions of Definition 1, the necessary and sufficient condition un-
der which the attacked measurements are useless in terms of reducing CRB is that the spoofing
attacks belong to either ISA or OESA which are defined in Definition 2 and 4 respectively.
However, the fundamental mechanisms of ISA and OESA for making the attacked mea-
surements useless in terms of reducing CRB are very different. To be specific, ISA renders
the task of estimating the attacks beyond the capabilities of the quantized estimation system
by causing the FIM for jointly estimating the desired and attack parameters to be singular,
thus preventing the FC from potentially improving the CRB of the estimate of θ by jointly
estimating θ and the attacks. In contrast, even though the FC is able to estimate the attacks,
paying a big price in computational complexity for jointly estimating θ and the attacks, the
FC is not able to obtain any improvement in the CRB performance for θ under OESA.
It is worth mentioning that (4.31) and Theorem 14 demonstrate that under the conditions
of Definition 1, the CRB for θ reaches its upper bound in the presence of ISA or OESA. In
practice, however, the FC may not be able to well identify the set of unattacked sensors and
categorize the attacked sensors into different groups according to distinct types of spoofing
attacks. Thus, the actual estimation performance under ISA and OESA can be expected to
be inferior to the analytical results in this section. To illustrate this, consider the example
of the data-injection attack in smart grids as described in (4.56). It can be shown that if
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the adversaries only employ one spoofing attack, then it is possible for the adversaries to
dramatically impact the estimate of the desired vector parameter to produce an arbitrarily
large bias [9, 76].
4.4 Joint Identification and Estimation under Optimal Es-
timable Spoofing Attack
In this section, we focus on a class of OESAs in which for any p, ∀j ∈ Ap, the FIM for
τ (p) based on the data from the j-th sensor is nonsingular. Further, we assume that JA0
defined in (4.16) is nonsingular in the presence of spoofing attacks. This could occur, for
example, if only a small subset of sensors can be attacked in a distributed sensor setting or
if a subset of sensors can be well protected in advance to give rise to a nonsingular JA0 .
Before proceeding, the following assumptions are made from a practical viewpoint.
Assumption 9 As the sensors are assumed to be spread over a wide area and typically
adversaries have limited resources, we assume that no more than half of sensors are attacked.
Assumption 10 (Significant Attack) In order to give rise to sufficient impact on the
statistical characterization of the measurements at each attacked sensors, every attacker is
required to guarantee a minimum norm of the attack vector parameter, that is,
‖τ (p)‖2 > dτ , ∀p. (4.59)
We do not conisder modifications smaller than (4.59) as attacks and assume they have little
impact on performance.
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The results in Section 4.3 demonstrate that under OESA, the CRB for θ which employs
the data from both attacked and unattacked sensors is equal to the CRB for θ which only
makes use of unattacked data. Since CRB is the adopted performance metric, we only need to
identify the set of unattacked sensors, and the categorization of the attacked sensors according
to distinct types of spoofing attacks is no longer necessary for estimating θ in the presence
of OESA. To this end, we use {ξ(j)}Nj=1 instead of {τ
(p)}Pp=1 to denote the attack vector
parameters employed by the adversaries in the following part. To be specific, ξ(j) denotes the
attack vector parameter employed at the j-th sensor. For the sake of notational simplicity,
we introduce the following notations
qjr
∆
=
∫
I
(r)
j
fj (x |θ ) dx and q˜jr
∆
=
∫
I
(r)
j
gj
(
x
∣∣∣θ, ξ(j)) dx (4.60)
where q˜jr and qjr represent the r-th value of the after-attack pmf at the j-th sensor when it
is attacked and unattacked respectively.
Let Ω denote a vector containing the desired vector parameter θ, the set of unknown
attack vector parameters {ξ(j)} as well as a set of unknown binary state variables {ηj} that
Ω
∆
=
[
ΞT ,ηT
]T
, (4.61)
where
Ξ
∆
=
[
θT ,
(
ξ(1)
)T
,
(
ξ(2)
)T
, ...,
(
ξ(N)
)T]T
(4.62)
and
η
∆
= [η1, η2, ..., ηN ]
T . (4.63)
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The j-th element of η is zero, i.e., ηj = 0, if the j-th sensor is unattacked, while ηj = 1
implies the j-th sensor is attacked. The log-likelihood function evaluated at u˜ = r is
L (Ω)
∆
= lnPr (u˜ = r |Ω)
=
N∑
j=1
Kj∑
k=1
[
ηj ln q˜jrjk + (1− ηj) ln qjrjk
]
. (4.64)
Based on this setting, the FC can jointly identify the state of each sensor and estimate the
desired vector parameter θ by solving the following constrained optimization problem
Ωˆ = argmax
Ω
N∑
j=1
Kj∑
k=1
[
ηj ln q˜jrjk + (1− ηj) ln qjrjk
]
(4.65a)
s. t. ηj ∈ {0, 1} , ∀j, (4.65b)
N∑
j=1
ηj <
N
2
, (4.65c)
‖ξ(j)‖2 > dτ , ∀ηj = 1, (4.65d)
where the constraints in (4.65c) and (4.65d) are due to Assumption 9 and Assumption 10.
The integer constraint in (4.65b) makes the optimization problem difficult to solve. For
small N , it may be solved exactly simply by exhaustively searching through all possible
combinations of {ηj}, while for large N , this is not feasible in practice, since the number
of all possible combination of {ηj} is on the order of 2
N . To this end, it is of considerable
practical interest to develop an efficient algorithm to solve the optimization problem in (4.65).
In this section, we propose a heuristic for solving (4.65).
136
4.4.1 Random Relaxation with the EM Algorithm
According to the constraint in (4.65b), ηj is an unknown deterministic binary variable,
and hence, (4.65b) is equivalent to
πj
∆
= Pr (ηj=1) ∈ {0, 1} and Pr (ηj=0) = 1− πj,∀j. (4.66)
Further, by dropping the constraint (4.65c) as well as (4.65d), and then relaxing the deter-
ministic {ηj} to be random, that is, allowing πj = Pr (ηj = 1) ∈ [0, 1] for all j = 1, 2, ..., N ,
the problem in (4.65) reduces to
Ωˆpi = argmax
Ωpi
N∑
j=1
Kj∑
k=1
ln
[
πj q˜jrjk + (1− πj) qjrjk
]
(4.67a)
s. t. πj ∈ [0, 1], ∀j = 1, 2, ..., N, (4.67b)
where Ωpi
∆
= [ΞT ,piT ]T and pi
∆
= [π1, π2..., πN ]
T .
The physical interpretation behind (4.67) is that via random relaxation of the determin-
istic binary vector state variable η, the set A0 of unattacked sensors is no longer deterministic,
and moreover, each sensor in the sensor network is attacked with a certain probability πj at
every time instant.
By introducing a latent vector variable
z = [z11, z12, ..., z1K1 , z21, ..., zNKN ]
T , (4.68)
where zjk = 1 indicates that the k-th measurement at the j-th sensor was attacked, and
zjk = 0 implies that the k-th measurement at the j-th sensor was unattacked, we can employ
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the Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm [?, 83], which is an iterative method that
alternates between performing an expectation (E) step and a maximization (M) step, to
solve the relaxed problem in (4.67).
E-step
The E-step computes the expected log-likelihood function Q(Ωpi|Ω
′
pi), with respect to
z given the quantized data u˜ = r and the current estimate of the vector parameter Ωˆ′pi =
[(Ξˆ′)T , (pˆi′)T ]T , as following
Q
(
Ωpi
∣∣∣Ωˆ′pi ) ∆= Ez|Ωˆ′pi,u˜=r {L (Ωpi)} , (4.69)
where the log-likelihood function L (Ωpi) is given by
L (Ωpi) = lnPr (z, u˜ = r|Ωpi)
= lnPr ( u˜ = r|Ωpi, z) + lnPr (z|Ωpi)
=
N∑
j=1
Kj∑
k=1
{
1{zjk=1}
(
ln q˜jrjk + lnπj
)
+1{zjk=0}
[
ln qjrjk + ln (1− πj)
]}
. (4.70)
Define
υ
(1)
jk
∆
=E
z|Ωˆ′pi,u˜=r
{
1{zjk=1}
}
=
πˆ′j q˜jrjk
πˆ′j q˜jrjk+
(
1− πˆ′j
)
qjrjk
(4.71)
and
υ
(0)
jk
∆
= E
z|Ωˆ′pi,u˜=r
{
1{zjk=0}
}
= 1− υ
(1)
jk , (4.72)
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then by employing (4.69) and (4.70), we can obtain the expected log-likelihood function
Q
(
Ωpi
∣∣∣Ωˆ′pi) = N∑
j=1
Kj∑
k=1
{
υ
(1)
jk
(
ln q˜jrjk + lnπj
)
+υ
(0)
jk
[
ln qjrjk + ln (1− πj)
]}
. (4.73)
M-step
TheM-step seeks to find a new estimate of the vector parameter Ωˆpi to update the current
estimate of the vector parameter Ωˆ′pi by maximizing the expected log-likelihood function
Q(Ωpi|Ωˆ
′
pi), that is,
Ωˆpi =
[
ΞˆT , pˆiT
]T
= argmaxQ
(
Ωpi
∣∣∣Ωˆ′pi ) . (4.74)
Updated estimate of pi According to (4.74), the updated estimate πˆj should satisfy
∂Q
(
Ωpi
∣∣∣Ωˆ′pi)
∂πj
=
1
πj
Kj∑
k=1
υ
(1)
jk −
1
1− πj
Kj∑
k=1
υ
(0)
jk = 0, (4.75)
which yields, by employing (4.72),
πˆj =
1
Kj
Kj∑
k=1
υ
(1)
jk . (4.76)
Updated estimate of Ξ Similarly, the updated estimate Ξˆ is the solution of the following
equation
∇ΞQ
(
Ωpi
∣∣∣Ωˆ′pi) = 0. (4.77)
Generally, a closed-form solution for the above equation may not exist. To solve (4.77) in such
cases, Newton’s method can be employed with an initial point Ξˆ(0) = Ξˆ′. At the (i + 1)-th
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iteration of Newton’s Method, the updated point Ξˆ(t+1) can be expressed as
Ξˆ(t+1)
= Ξˆ(t) − κt
[
∇2ΞQ
(
Ω(t)pi
∣∣∣Ωˆ′pi )]−1∇ΞQ(Ω(t)pi ∣∣∣Ωˆ′pi ) (4.78)
where Ω
(t)
pi = [(Ξˆ(t))T , (pˆi′)T ]T , and κt ∈ (0, 1) is the t-th step size computed by using a
backtracking line search [84].
For completeness, the explicit expressions for the gradient and Hessian of the expected
log-likelihood function with respect to Ξ are provided. The gradient ∇ΞQ(Ω
(t)
pi |Ωˆ′pi) consists
of the quantities ∂∂θlQ(Ω
(t)
pi |Ωˆ′pi) and
∂
∂ξ
(j)
l
Q(Ω
(t)
pi |Ωˆ′pi) for different j and l, which can be
computed by
∂
∂θl
Q
(
Ω(t)pi
∣∣∣Ωˆ′pi)
=
N∑
j=1
Kj∑
k=1
{
υ
(1)
jk
1
q˜jrjk
∂
∂θl
q˜jrjk + υ
(0)
jk
1
qjrjk
∂
∂θl
qjrjk
}
(4.79)
and
∂
∂ξ
(j)
l
Q
(
Ω(t)pi
∣∣∣Ωˆ′pi) = Kj∑
k=1
υ
(1)
jk
1
q˜jrjk
∂
∂ξ
(j)
l
q˜jrjk . (4.80)
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The elements of the Hessian ∇2
Ξ
Q(Ω
(t)
pi |Ωˆ′pi) can be calculated by the following expressions
∂2
∂θl∂θm
Q
(
Ω(t)pi
∣∣∣Ωˆ′pi)
=
N∑
j=1
Kj∑
k=1
{
υ
(1)
jk
(
1
q˜jrjk
∂2q˜jrjk
∂θl∂θm
−
1
q˜2jrjk
∂q˜jrjk
∂θl
∂q˜jrjk
∂θm
)
+υ
(0)
jk
(
1
qjrjk
∂2qjrjk
∂θl∂θm
−
1
q2jrjk
∂qjrjk
∂θl
∂qjrjk
∂θm
)}
, (4.81)
∂2
∂θl∂ξ
(j)
m
Q
(
Ω(t)pi
∣∣∣Ωˆ′pi )
=
Kj∑
k=1
υ
(1)
jk
(
1
q˜jrjk
∂2q˜jrjk
∂θl∂ξ
(j)
m
−
1
q˜2jrjk
∂q˜jrjk
∂θl
∂q˜jrjk
∂ξ
(j)
m
)
, (4.82)
∂2
∂ξ
(j)
l ∂ξ
(j)
m
Q
(
Ω(t)pi
∣∣∣Ωˆ′pi )
=
Kj∑
k=1
υ
(1)
jk
(
1
q˜jrjk
∂2q˜jrjk
∂ξ
(j)
l ∂ξ
(j)
m
−
1
q˜2jrjk
∂q˜jrjk
∂ξ
(j)
l
∂q˜jrjk
∂ξ
(j)
m
)
, (4.83)
and
∂2
∂ξ
(i)
l ∂ξ
(j)
m
Q
(
Ω(t)pi
∣∣∣Ωˆ′pi) = 0, if i 6= j. (4.84)
The quantities in (4.79)–(4.84) are all evaluated at Ω
(t)
pi . Repeating the calculation of (4.78)
until {Ξˆ(t)} converges, the limit point Ξˆ of {Ξˆ(t)} is the solution for (4.77), and also the
updated estimate of Ξ.
The convergence of the EM algorithm is guaranteed and the detailed analysis can be
found in [83, 85], that is to say, by iteratively alternating between E-step and M-step, the
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solution for (4.67) can be obtained. It is worth mentioning that since we do not require a very
accurate solution for the relaxed optimization problem in (4.67), once the difference between
the updated and current estimates is sufficiently small, we can terminate the iterations in the
EM algorithm and utilize the current estimate of Ωpi in the following rounding step.
4.4.2 Constrained Variable Threshold Rounding and Barrier Method
By utilizing the EM algorithm as illustrated in Section 4.4.1, we can obtain the solution
Ωˆpi for the relaxed optimization problem in (4.67). The element πˆj of Ωˆpi specifies the
probability of the j-th sensor being attacked over time. However, according to (4.65c) and
(4.66), we know that before relaxation, πˆj ∈ {0, 1} and 1
T pˆi < N/2. To this end, we consider
the task of rounding pˆi to a valid binary vector. To accomplish this task, we propose a
constrained variable threshold rounding (CVTR) approach which is based on the heuristic
developed by Zymnis et al. [86]. The basic idea of the CVTR is that we first round pˆi to
generate a set of most likely probability vectors {p˜i(l)} with binary elements which satisfy
the constraints in (4.65c). Then, under constraint (4.65d), the joint maximum likelihood
estimate of the desired vector parameter and attack vector parameters are pursued over the
generated set of valid probability binary vectors {p˜i(l)}.
We first generate the set of the most likely valid binary probability vectors {p˜i(l)} by
employing the CVTR which can be described as
{
p˜i(l)
}
∆
=
{
sgn (pˆi − λ1) : 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1,
‖sgn (pˆi − λ1)‖1 <
N
2
}
. (4.85)
Since the j-th element π˜
(l)
j of p˜i
(l) denotes the probability the j-th sensor is attacked, each
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probability vector p˜i(l) with binary values corresponds to a deterministic state variable vector
η˜(l) as following
η˜(l) = p˜i(l), ∀l. (4.86)
We refer to {η˜(l)} as the set of the most likely state variable vectors, and we only consider the
combinations of {ηj} in this set. Further, it is seen from (4.85) that as λ increases from 0 to
1, this approach only generates up to ⌊N/2⌋ distinct valid binary probability vectors. Thus,
it is feasible to exhaustively evaluate the maximum likelihood function, which is maximized
with respect to Ξ, for each given η˜(l). As a result, the optimization problem in (4.65) can be
reduced to
ΩˆR =
[
ΞˆTR, ηˆ
T
R
]T
=arg max
η∈{η˜(l)}
max
Ξ
L (Ω) (4.87a)
s. t. ‖ξ(j)‖2 > dτ , ∀ηj = 1, (4.87b)
As (4.87) demonstrates, we need to solve the inner maximization for each candidate state
variable vector η˜(l), and then keep the solution which gives rise to the maximal objective
function in (4.87). Noticing that the constraint in (4.87b) only has effects on the inner
maximization, the inner constrained maximization for each η˜(l) in (4.87) can be converted to
an unconstrained problem by employing a logarithmic barrier function as
max
Ξ


N∑
j=1
Kj∑
k=1
[
η˜
(l)
j ln q˜jrjk +
(
1− η˜
(l)
j
)
ln qjrjk
]
+ µ
N∑
j=1
η˜
(l)
j ln
(
‖ξ(j)‖2 − dτ
)
 , (4.88)
where the positive barrier parameter µ determines the accuracy with which (4.88) approx-
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imates the inner constrained maximization in (4.87). Since the objective function in (4.88)
is differentiable, the unconstrained problem in (4.88) can be similarly solved by Newton’s
Method as in Section 4.4.1 for any given µ.
Let Ξˆ
(l)
µ denote the solution of (4.88) for any given η˜(l) and µ, and let L
(l)
∗ represent the
optimal objective value of the inner constrained maximization in (4.87a) for any given η˜(l). It
can be shown that as µ→ 0, any limit point Ξˆ
(l)
∗ of the sequence {Ξˆ
(l)
µ }µ is a solution of the
inner constrained maximization in (4.87) [87]. Thus, we can obtain an accurate solution of
the inner constrained maximization in (4.87) by iteratively solving (4.88) for a sequence {µm}
of positive barrier parameters, which decrease monotonically to zero, such that the solution
Ξˆ
(l)
µm for µm is chosen as the starting point for the next iteration with barrier parameter µm+1.
By defining l∗ ∆= maxl L
(l)
∗ , the solution of the constrained optimization problem in (4.87)
can be obtained as
ΩˆR =
[
ΞˆR, ηˆR
]T
=
[(
Ξˆ
(l∗)
∗
)T
,
(
η˜(l
∗)
)T]T
. (4.89)
4.4.3 Discussion
The random relaxation and constrained variable threshold rounding approach proposed
for solving the joint identification and estimation problem in (4.65) is a heuristic approach.
Further improvement in the identification and estimation can sometimes be obtained by
performing a local optimization by searching around ηˆR [84]. To be specific, we cycle through
j = 1, 2, ..., N , and at j-th step, we flip the j-th element of ηˆR. If this change can result in an
increase in the optimal value in (4.87a) for some Ξ, then we accept this change, otherwise we
move on to the next index. We continue checking each element of the state variable vector
until we have rejected any new change. After this local optimization, the estimate of state
variable vector is at least 1-OPT, since no change in one element of the estimate can increase
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the likelihood function.
It is well known that the condition number of the Hessian matrix of the logarithmic
barrier function in (4.88) might become increasingly larger as the barrier parameter decreases
to 0. In order to overcome the ill-conditioning issue in practical computation, the numerically
stable approximation of the Newton direction can be utilized in Newton’s method for solving
(4.88) with small barrier parameter, see [87] and the references therein. It is worth mentioning
that to preserve the generality, we don’t make additional assumptions to ensure the convexity
of the objective functions in the section. Hence, the EM algorithm and Newton’s method
involved in our approach might converge to a locally optimal point if the starting point is not
close to the globally optimal point. To avoid this possibility, multiple starting points can be
employed and we choose the one that yields the maximal objective function at convergence
[82].
It is seen from (4.87)–(4.89) that the proposed approach employs joint estimation of the
desired vector parameter and the attack vector parameters in the identification process, and
moreover, as shown in (4.89), the final estimate of the desired vector parameter is directly
obtained from the joint estimation once l∗ is determined. Thus, for some scenarios where
the spoofing attacks are not OGDSAs, one can expect that the proposed approach is able to
outperform the estimation approach which just utilizes the unattacked data to estimate the
desired vector parameter, since the attacked data is employed in the proposed approach.
4.5 Numerical Results
In this section, we investigate the performance of the approaches proposed in Section
4.4 for some example cases. Specifically, we consider a sensor network consisting of N = 10
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sensors. Each sensor makes K measurements of the physical phenomenon, and employs an
identical 4-bit quantizer with a set of thresholds {0,±1,±2, ...,±7,±∞} to convert analog
measurements to quantized data before transmitting them to the FC. We take the following
signal model of the before-attack measurements, which has been studied the most in sensor
network area,
xjk = θ + njk, ∀k and ∀j, (4.90)
where θ is a deterministic unknown parameter, and {njk} is an i.i.d. zero-mean Gaussian
noise sequence with distribution N (0, σ2). Further, we assume that the first 3 sensors in the
sensor network are under data-injection spoofing attacks. The after-attack measurements are
described as
x˜jk = θ + ajk + njk, ∀k and ∀j = 1, 2, 3, (4.91)
where ajk is the unknown attack injected at the j-th sensor at time k.
4.5.1 Scalar Parameter Case with Deterministic {ajk}
In this subsection, we assume that the injected attacks a1k = −2, a2k = −1, and a3k = 1
are deterministic unknown for all k, and the variance of the noise σ2 = 5 is known to the
FC. The desired scalar parameter is θ = 1, and the constraint on the attack parameter
defined in (4.59) is dτ = 0.8. We first test the performance of the approach of the random
relaxation (RR) with the EM and CVTR in identifying the attacked and unattacked sensors.
Fig. 4.2 illustrates the Monte Carlo approximation (1000 times) of the ensemble average of
the percentage of all mis-classified sensors as a function of the number K of measurements
at each sensor. As Fig. 4.2 shows, the average percentage of mis-classified sensors decreases
towards 0 as K increases.
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Figure 4.2: Performance of identifying the attacked and unattacked sensors for scalar param-
eter.
Next, we examine the estimation performance of the proposed approaches in Section 4.4,
that is, the approach of the RR with the EM, and the approach of the RR with the EM and
CVTR. Fig. 4.3 depicts the mean squared error (MSE) performance of the two approaches
for estimating θ. For comparison, the genie CRB for θ which assumes the FC is aware of
the true states of sensors and only utilizes the unattacked data to estimate θ is also provided
in Fig. 4.3. It is seen that as K increases, the MSE performance of the approach with
CVTR for estimating θ converges to the genie CRB for θ from above, which would be the
case if the proposed estimator for the desired parameter is asymptotically efficient for this
case. The results in Fig. 4.3 also corroborates the previous theoretical results in Section 4.3
that under OESA, jointly estimating the desired parameter and the attack parameter does
not improve the estimation performance for the desired parameter in the CRB sense when
147
compared to the case where only unattacked data is employed to estimate θ. In addition, the
MSE performance of the approach with CVTR is shown to be better than the approach which
only employs the RR with the EM algorithm, which implies that the proposed constrained
variable threshold rounding can further improve the estimation performance for the deisred
parameter.
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Figure 4.3: Estimation performance of the proposed approaches for scalar parameter.
4.5.2 Vector Parameter Case with Random {ajk}
In this subsection, we extend the results in Section 4.5.1 to the vector parameter case. We
consider the scenario that the parameter θ = 1 and the variance of the noise σ2 = 3 are both
the parameters of interest. Moreover, the unknown injected attacks {ajk} are independent
random variables, where ajk obeys the Gaussian distribution N (αj , βj) for all k. The desired
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vector parameter θ
∆
= [θ, σ2]T and the attack vector parameters {ξ(j)
∆
= [αj , βj ]
T }j=1,2,3 are
θ = [1, 3]T , ξ(1) = [−2, 1]T , ξ(2) = [−1, 2]T , and ξ(3) = [1, 2]T . In our simulations, the
constraint on the attack vector parameter defined in (4.59) is dτ = 2. We first study the
performance of the approach of the RR with the EM and CVTR in identifying the attacked
and unattacked sensors for the vector parameter case. Fig. 4.4 depicts the Monte Carlo
approximation (1000 times) of the ensemble average of the percentage of all mis-classified
sensors versus K. It is seen from Fig. 4.4 that the average percentage of mis-classified
sensors reduces towards 0 as K increases. In Fig. 4.5, we plot the MSE performance of
our proposed approaches for θ. The genie CRB performance for θ which assumes the FC is
aware of the true states of sensors and only utilizes the unattacked data to estimate θ is also
plotted for comparison. As Fig. 4.5 shows, we obtain similar results to those for the scalar
parameter case in Section 4.5.1. To be specific, the MSE performance of the RR with the
EM and CVTR is very close to the genie CRB and outperforms the approach which only
employs the RR with the EM algorithm.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we study the distributed estimation of a deterministic vector parameter
by using quantized data in the presence of spoofing attacks. A generalized attack model is
employed which manipulates the data using transformations with arbitrary functional forms
determined by some attack parameters whose values are unknown to the attacked system.
Novel necessary and sufficient conditions are provided under which these transformations
provide an OGDSA. It is shown that an OGDSA implies that either the FIM under the
conditions of Definition 1 for jointly estimating the desired and attack parameters is singular
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Figure 4.4: Performance of identifying the attacked and unattacked sensors for vector pa-
rameter.
or that the attacked system is unable to improve the CRB under the conditions of Definition
1 for the desired vector parameter through this joint estimation even though the joint FIM
is nonsingular. It is demonstrated that it is always possible to construct an OGDSA by
properly employing a sufficiently large dimension attack vector parameter relative to the
number of quantization levels employed, which was not observed previously. In addition,
we demonstrate that under the conditions of Definition 1, a spoofing attack can corrupt the
original measurements to make them useless in terms of reducing the CRB for estimating
the desired vector parameter if and only if it is an OGDSA. For a class of OGDSAs, a
computationally efficient heuristic which employs the Expectation-Maximization algorithm
and the constrained variable threshold rounding is proposed for the joint identification of
attacked sensors and estimation of the desired vector parameter. The proposed heuristic
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Figure 4.5: Estimation performance of the proposed approaches for vector parameter.
approach is guaranteed to provide a locally optimal solution, but will find globally optimal
solutions when they exist when suitable conditions are satisfied. Numerical results show cases
where the proposed approach can correctly identify the attacked sensors while providing an
estimate whose mean squared error converges to the genie bound based on knowledge of the
set of attacked sensors, provided a sufficient number of measurements are available.
151
Chapter 5
Conclusions
This dissertation presents our research on several selected issues concerning sensor net-
works which focus on signal detection and estimation problems.
In Chapter 2, the large observation size performance of a truncated detector for a canon-
ical multivariate Gaussian hypothesis testing problem is studied. If the observations consist
of data taken at different times, the truncated detector can reduce the storage and multi-
plications needed when compared to the optimal detector. If the observations are obtained
from distributed sensors, the truncated detector not only reduces the communication energy
requirement for computing the test statistic, it allows efficient implementation by adopting
a consensus algorithm. Motivated by these benefits of utilizing the truncated detector, the
performance of the truncated detector in terms of deflection is investigated. Sufficient con-
ditions for a truncation rule and a sequence of tests which lead to no loss in asymptotic
deflection ratio of the truncated detector relative to the optimal detector are derived. Several
well-accepted and popular classes of system and process models are employed as examples to
show that the sufficient conditions are not overly restrictive. For all the examples considered,
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we find truncation rules which increase slowly with the number of the observations, implying
significant savings. In all the cases considered, numerical results imply that not only do the
deflections of the truncated and the optimal detectors converge to the same values for large
number of observations for our asymptotically optimal truncation rules, but the probability
of detections also converge to the same values for fixed false alarm probabilities.
In Chapter 3, the distributed estimation problem using binary quantized data in the
presence of man-in-the-middle attacks is studied. In this work, the sensor data modifications
implemented by the adversaries are statistically characterized by a set of unknown probabili-
ty transition matrices. We demonstrate that the fusion center is able to identify the attacked
sensors and categorize these attacked sensors into different subsets according to distinct types
of attacks perfectly or with a very small percentage of misclassified sensors, as the number
of temporal observations at each sensor grows to infinity or the number of sensors increases
to infinity respectively, provided that the set of unattacked sensors is larger than any set
of identically attacked sensors. In order to improve the estimation performance by utilizing
the attacked sensors, a joint estimation of the statistical description of the attacks and the
parameter to be estimated is considered. However, it is shown that the corresponding Fisher
information matrix (FIM) is singular if a standard data quantization approach is employed.
Thus, it is not possible to accurately estimate the parameters using this approach with an
estimate that would always become more and more accurate as we increase the number of
observations. Aiming to overcome this, the time-variant quantization approach is proposed
which divides the observation time interval at each sensor into several time slots and employs
distinct thresholds to quantize the time samples in different time slots. If the number of time
samples at each sensor is not less than 2, then it can be shown that the FIM for all unknown
parameters in time-variant quantization approach is nonsingular which implies that the statis-
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tical properties of the attacks and the parameter to be estimated can be accurately estimated
with a sufficiently large number of observations. A necessary and sufficient condition under
which the attacked observations can be taken advantage of to improve the asymptotic estima-
tion performance is derived. A notable fact is that for many cases, significant improvement
in Cramer-Rao Bound (CRB) performance for the parameter to be estimated can be at-
tained by making use of attacked observations in our proposed fashion. However, for some
specific cases, using the attacked observations will not provide better asymptotic estimation
performance. It is worth mentioning that both the theoretical analysis and numerical results
illustrate that the improvement in CRB performance by utilizing attacked observations in
our proposed fashion depends not only on the statistical description of the attacks and the
parameter to be estimated, but also on the sets of thresholds of the quantizer, which moti-
vates us to pursue the optimum quantizer design for distributed estimation in the presence
of man-in-the-middle attacks in future work.
In Chapter 4, we investigate the distributed estimation of a deterministic vector pa-
rameter by using possibly nonbinary quantized data in the presence of spoofing attacks. A
generalized attack model is employed which manipulates the data using transformations with
arbitrary functional forms determined by some attack parameters whose values are unknown
to the attacked system. Novel necessary and sufficient conditions are provided under which
these transformations provide a guaranteed attack performance in terms of CRB regardless
of the processing the estimation system employs, thus defining a highly desirable attack. It
is shown that this highly desirable attack implies that for any such attack when the fusion
center can perfectly identify the attacked sensors, either the FIM for jointly estimating the
desired and attack parameters is singular or the attacked system is unable to improve the
CRB for the desired vector parameter through this joint estimation even though the joint
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FIM is nonsingular. It is demonstrated that it is always possible to construct such a de-
sirable attack by properly employing a sufficiently large dimension attack vector parameter
relative to the number of quantization levels employed, which was not observed previously.
In addition, we demonstrate that when the fusion center can perfectly identify the attacked
sensors, a spoofing attack can corrupt the original measurements to make them useless in
terms of reducing the CRB for estimating the desired vector parameter if and only if it is such
a desirable attack. For a class of such desirable attacks, a computationally efficient heuristic
which employs the Expectation-Maximization algorithm and the constrained variable thresh-
old rounding is proposed for the joint identification of attacked sensors and estimation of the
desired vector parameter. For the cases considered, numerical results illustrate that the pro-
posed approach can asymptotically correctly identify the attacked sensors while providing an
estimate whose mean squared error converges to the genie bound based on knowledge of the
set of attacked sensors, provided a sufficient number of measurements are available.
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